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ABSTRACT
PHILOSOPHER’S STONE: THE FAUSTIAN GEIST OF DEVELOPMENT
by Salikyu Sangtam
August 2015
The present study juxtaposes scientific rationality with polyphonic rationality in
respect to societal development. This is done to illuminate how scientific rationality
provides a narrow and truncated view of development. In order to explicate the exclusion
of polyphonic rationalities/knowledges in favor of scientific rationality, several
development scholarships are examined along with an episode of developmental scheme
and two episodes of development programs. This is done to expound (note: ‘→’ =
influences) how scientific rationality → scholarships → organizational/institutional
schemes, such as the MDGs → actual applications of development schemes, such as
transmigration and compulsory villagization. The present inquest, more importantly,
propounds for polyphonic knowledges that accord diverse modes of thought a place in
social inquests, thus affording a better recourse than scientific rationality that blatantly
disregards the contextual particularities of human society.
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CHAPTER I
PROLEGOMENA
The Prolepsis
The title, Philosopher’s Stone: The Faustian Geist of Development, may give the
impression that this study is against every kind of development. This is certainly not the
case. Firstly, let us clarify what is meant by the term development, for it will often be
alluded to in this query. Development is a generic term employed to describe developed
society’s approach to the traditional, developing world. It is a formal, scientific field of
study that serves as the principal reference point from which to methodically approach
traditional societies for the purposes of book learning, observation, and practical
application. It is this idea of development the present study is against, not development in
and of itself. Of course, this is not to reason that the edifice of development as a
discipline is nothing more than an assortment of fables; besides, it must be more than
that, for there must be something formidable behind it that enables particular forms of
idea to become a source of pedagogic erudition in universities, books, think-tanks, and so
forth. Rather than it being some motley assemblage of fables, it is a body of theories and
practices produced to be a system of thought and knowledge that filters developed
societies’ understanding of the not so developed. What is more, the discipline of
development is used, in this inquest, as a paradigm to signify any undertaking claiming to
transform human conditions through scientific rationality—engineering human/societal
happiness, material riches, civilized lives, etc.
It is imperative to remember that the present inquest is not against development,
development in a sense that enables a society to realize its innate possibilities from
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within. Development is an essential, fundamental requisite to all living things and
environments, including societies. From the smallest of cells to humans to natural
environments, development constitutes the nature of things, the splendid manifestation
and actualization of the innate entelechy of every organic entity. Development is not
something optional; it is a creative dynamism inherent in the organic world; it is a
continuous process, process suggesting progress, and progress towards realization of an
entity’s entelechy. Certainly, for Aristotle, purposive changes, i.e. the realization of an
entity’s potentiality is the most pervasive fact of nature.1 The realization of an entity’s
innate possibilities is qualitative, not quantitative: it is a progress towards purposive
qualitative changes for the organic entity, i.e. actualization of its nature—not quantitative
growth. What is more, the actualization of an organic entity’s inherent potentials do not
happen overnight, it is sometimes an excruciatingly slow process—look at, for instance,
life on earth, even now, after aeons, some organic entities have still not realized their
fullest potential. In other words, development requires realization of itself from within,
i.e. subjective, without intrusions from the outside. Besides, disciplines in biology have
shown how disruptions from the outside impede the full development of organic entities.
In terms of society, it means, every society has its own intrinsic entelechies which are to
be actualized in the most harmonious ways possible; it means development in qualitative
aspects—harmony, conviviality, communion, coexistence, togetherness, fellowship,
etc.—of society, not quantitative aspects—per capita income, number of cars, televisions,
laptops, electronics, amount of capital wealth, degrees of industrialization, urbanizations,

Aristotle, “Physics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford
Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1984), 2.1.
1
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democratizations, capitalizations, globalizations, material comforts, monetization of
society, nor economic productions, consumptions, etc.
As organic entities take lengthy periods of time to realize their innate entelechy,
likewise, society will take prolong periods of time to realize its potentials. Just as an
organic entity’s development is impeded through outside interference, similarly, society’s
development is thwarted when there is interference from the outside. More importantly,
regarding human society, and man, in general, development does not mean manipulating
nature for the advantage of man. Instead, it is the harmony of human society with the
organic nature. In other words, say for instance, the Papuans, Native Indians of the
Americas, hunters-gatherer societies of South-East Asia, Africa, so forth—though
materially poor from the perspective of today’s civilized societies—were perhaps at the
peak of their societies’ development when they encountered the civilized people. This,
however, does not mean that the aforementioned societies were primitive or backward;
rather they were in most sense developed to their fullest potential and in their own way
rich, civilized. It is only from the material perspective of the civilized world the aforesaid
societies seem dreary, clinging to the very base of human existence. It is well to keep in
mind material progress is neither the sole nor the logical process towards development of
society or of man. Put differently, development does not mean material advancement. In
many ways, native cultures were in no sense inferior in their norms, values, beliefs, nor
were they less developed or less civilized than the civilized people who destroyed their
societies. These aforementioned societies remained the way they were for hundreds, if
not thousands, of years because they were living in harmony within their natural
environments, without banal destructions of their ecological milieu. This point is hardly
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understood by developed societies; hence, their fixations with trite material development
of every traditional society.
Secondly, this study is not anti-West, or anti-developed society, or anti-science. If
this study is read in a lax uninteresting manner, because it goes against and contests one’s
pre-dispositions, then it will no doubt seem anti-science or anti-developed society. If,
however, one reads this inquiry sensibly, one will find that it is not anti-science. The
study does not say that non-scientific rationality is good, while scientific rationality is
bad, or developed society is bad, while traditional society is good; rather what it tries to
elucidate is the happenings that occur, and consequences that invariably follow when one
accords one mode of thought a higher occasion in respect to social queries: in their
comprehension as well as in their method.
The study is not against science, for this would be in contradiction to the very idea
of polyphonic rationality. Rather it admires the critical aspects of science, i.e. its
eccentric nature, the idea that one ought to think and question critically, no matter how
absurd one’s questioning may be. Certainly, human knowledge as well as scientific
advancements—from Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, Brouwer’s Modern Topology,
Cantor’s Set Theory, to Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem—would be in a sorry state, if
one did not question existing canons. However, what this study is against is the
lackadaisical idea of science: science = empiricism; or rather anything which is science is
measurable; in other words, to assume, understanding is derived solely through
measurements. Certainly, little knowledge is required if all one does is to measure, for it
is undemanding and uncomplicated. Surely, if this is what science amounts to, then any
advancement in human knowledge could not have been possible at all. What is most
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important to science, and one that constantly goes amiss is: understanding leads to break
through in human knowledge; it is not empiricism (measurement) that burgeons scientific
progress. Rather empiricism is predicated on understanding; yet, this essential idea rather
goes amiss in today’s science.2 Just because one can measure, i.e., empiricize, it does not
mean it is science, or that which is measured is understood, in the first place. Indeed, the
geocentric view of the world was verified by means of empiricism, see Ptolemy’s
Almagest. For Aristarchus of Samos, as well as for Anaxagoras and Philolus prior to him,
his idea of heliocentric view was considered to be irrational and absurd. But we now
know it is the former view that is absurd. Furthermore, the above example vividly shows
that just because one can measure it does not mean it is science; even the most absurd of
ideas—as geocentric view—can be empiricized and posited to have scientific validity.
What is more, one must discuss issues that do not make sense. Issues—such as,
diverse modes of thought—do not make sense precisely because they are viewed from
one solitary blinkered perspective; hence, it is hardly surprising when such issues make
no sense to parochial minds. Only when viewed from diverse lenses do issues which do
not make sense finally begin to make sense. Likewise, the present query will hardly make
sense when viewed from generic lens of scientific rationality, indeed, when viewed from
the aforesaid lens, this study will seem as a crude violation of en vogue genre specific
categorizations (i.e. sub-divisions of sub-divisions of sub-divisions). Yet, when viewed

2

If one looks at scientific advancements, the era of science, in its proper sense,
ended in the early to middle periods of the previous century. Much of today’s scientific
progress is about testing or measuring theories made in previous centuries, not much
progress has been made since. The case is even bleaker in ‘social sciences,’ where the
stress is on measurement of every aspect of human society—even to the extent of
measuring ‘beliefs’, ‘values,’ etc. by the means of lethargic system of opinion and survey
polls.’ Vide, Lorenz and Popper.
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from polyphonic lens, the same query will make sense and can thus be understood, for
what is missed from one lens can be found in another, or what is of secondary importance
from one perspective can be of primary importance when viewed from another and in this
way afford us new awareness of issues previously not understood. Or what seems
outlandishly absurd may provide hidden insights into hitherto overlooked or unnoticed
aspects of phenomena. Certainly, what, at first, seems abnormal may only be the proper
approach to understand a problem or phenomenon. Indeed, advancements made in
science are a path filled with strange, even irrational, approaches.3 Anyone familiar with
history and development of science will know breakthroughs in scientific knowledge to
never be a logical, systematic, rational process; rather advancements in sciences are a
road filled with illogical, heterodox approaches violating the very rational-objective basis
of science, as maintained by many of its epigones.
Thirdly, this study should be seen as history of ideas and, hence, theoretical. It is
not an endeavor to methodically layout verifiable truths and principles pertaining to
societal development. Instead, what it tries to show is the fallacies of systematized
dogmatic methods of inquiry in development; this way revealing the richness of
incommensurable diverse modes of thought. The present study can and will, no doubt, be
considered as a trahison de clercs by many due to its heterodox nature. This is a fair
judgment; what is more, it was intentionally made as such, because—to borrow
Foucault—this work is “a theoretical production that does not need a visa from some

3

Certainly, there were scholars—especially, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and
Imre Lakatos—who tried to show scientific advancements are rational and systematic
processes, yet despite such efforts they were left as baffled as they were when they
started their endeavors.
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common regime to establish its validity (italics added).”4 Because of the theoretical as
well as humanistic nature of this query, the importance of understanding is highlighted,
for we are much less interested in the how. Without understanding, the how—such as:
how to make development sustainable; how to boost economic productivity; how to open
new markets; how to increase trade, entrepreneurship, mass consumerism, technology,
capital, material choices, market incentives; how to institute property rights, impersonal
market systems; how to install new institutions; how to carry out development projects,
etc.—becomes superfluous. Hence, if the readers are waiting for the how, then they will
have to wait indefinitely. More importantly, the readers will have to conceive their own
how from their own comprehension of the issues under examination; thence, this study
provides an avenue to understanding, not the how.
Fourthly, the adjectives traditional, developing, developed, modern, poor,
civilized, etc. are utilized to describe societies: traditional society or developed society.
This is done in order to distinguish the relative artificial differences between the
traditional, developing society and modern, developed society. Hence, the term
traditional, developing society is used in reference to traditional society relative to the
developed, modern society. Certainly, the adjectives are so wont among technical experts
and academics that they become the reality itself. However, the adjectives, noted above,
to describe societies are an artificial categorization that does not actually exist. In other
words, society is society, that’s that. By categorizing societies, it somehow constructs
imaginary differences between materially advanced and poor societies, or among
societies following different modes of thought. No society in the past since the earliest of
Michel Foucault, “Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the College De
France, 1975-76, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 6.
4
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human existence thought of themselves as advanced, traditional, or developed than
others, rather they saw themselves as society. The demarcations arise, even where none
exist, only when one society encounters another; and so to delineate one’s society from
another, a fantasized idea about self as well as the other is conceived. For example, some
human societies in the past, say, the Babylonian, Sumerian, Assyrian, Egyptian, Indus,
Greeks—saw themselves as more civilized than others, but if we compare those of the
past with, say, today’s developed society, claims made by past societies seem rather
strange. Hence, such classification is only fantastically relative, at best.
Lastly, the study is not trying to romanticize traditional societies. Indeed, there are
lots of societal values, norms, beliefs, etc., in traditional societies which differ from one’s
own, but one ought to see these differences as actualities of human society. It makes very
little sense to pry and criticize or pass judgment on the values, norms, or beliefs that
differ from one’s own. There are numerous obvious practices, values, and norms in
traditional societies, which are seen to be primitive from developed societies’
perspective; nevertheless, the differences should not justify the idea that there are
universal standards on how to judge diverse belief systems. Rather what the differences
in values of diverse societies show are the realities of the human world, it cannot be
otherwise; besides it is the differences that make our world an interesting place, a place
filled with wisdom and mysteries that provide each society the opportunity to learn,
appreciate, and accept each other’s differences, and thus live in harmony even with those
differences.5 Obviously, none of us, i.e. no one in the world is in any position, nor occupy

5

This is the splendid majesty of our world as intended by nature (if one is a
believer in science), and the purpose of any religion (if one is a believer in religion), at
least those which the author is aware of.
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the moral high ground to judge the other’s belief systems. Every society is the product of
organic environment that necessarily defines its belief systems; besides, numerous
anthropological studies have given us enough evidences that such is the case.6 Of course,
this does not mean values, norms, or belief systems are relative; rather these are neither
absolute nor relative, they are what they are. To put it in simpler terms: values, beliefs, or
practices—as the Stoic’s (such as: Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, or Epictetus) believed—are
not right or wrong, good or evil, correct or incorrect in and of themselves, rather it is the
meaning assigned to them by people that makes them either good or evil, right or wrong.
Indeed, one will find, since long ago, there have been thinkers—from Lao Tzu,
Herodotus, Epicurus, Lucretius, Ovid, to Stendhal, Dostoevsky, Freud, Nietzsche—who
urged against reckless applications of moral judgment on norms and values. Every
society decides for itself what is good, what is bad; besides, human society is not possible
if all of society’s beliefs are wholly good or wholly bad. In any society, there are (and
must be) good and bad norms and beliefs, after all, it is the inherent presence of good and
bad that sustains any society; this was the significance behind Bernard de Mandeville’s
Fable. Hence, it is extremely imprudent to pass moral, value judgments on belief system
of societies other than one’s own, as if the values of one’s society are the paragon of
everything good and right. Let us end the caveats with the following: the moral judgment
one passes on belief systems of other societies is just one out of infinite other
perspectives and interpretations, as Nietzsche once verily pointed out.7

6

At the same time, it would be a gross misunderstanding for one to suppose that
the author is advocating evolutionary theory.
7
Friedrich Nietzsche, Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage
Books, 1974), “We Fearless ones” 374.
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This inquiry is humanistic—i.e. highlights centrality of human society—and
philosophical—i.e. examinations of the source of modes of thought or knowledge—in
nature highlighting the lived actualities of society. Furthermore, it is neither a political
nor an economic study because they necessarily involve probing into societal issues
through predisposed blinkered ideology, or narrowing of lens jettisoning many essential
elements of society by labelling them as subjective, unscientific, unempirical, irrational.
Of course, this does not mean that the present inquiry is unbiased; it is biased, biased in
the sense that no inquiry carried out in the realm of social sciences8—which development
is itself a part of—can be completely impartial. The examination of issues is, itself,
framed by one’s life experiences; it colors one’s sense of inquiry and requires one to
probe into problems through knowledge one has accumulated through one’s existential
realities. Certainly, this is the beauty of what it means to carry out social analyses. It is
the subjective feelings, emotions that provide the best possible tool for one to probe into
issues where scientific reasoning becomes murky or tentative at best, viz. we enter a
realm where, ironically, scientific rationality no longer seems reasonable. The humanistic
approach of this inquiry means we inquest into the topic as a human being, even the
reader would be best helped if he or she delves into this present study as a person and not
as an academic or an expert, etc., viz. to take off the hat of one’s profession (whatever
one is) and put on the hat of a human being. In doing so, one is opened and connected to

The term ‘social study’ is much more appropriate than ‘social science’ because
this discipline—composed of political studies, economics, psychology, sociology,
anthropology, etc.—is not ‘science’ and is never meant to be ‘science.’ Indeed, one could
venture a postulate as to why social studies are obsessed with and desperate to become
science. The answer is simple: social sciences suffer from—to borrow Adler’s term—
inferiority complex, or, to put it differently, ‘physics envy’; it is no wonder, the more
appropriate noun ‘study’ is replaced by an ill-suited noun ‘science.’
8
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ideas and wisdoms which only a person can experience as well as appreciate without the
distraction of whether what one learns and experiences are real, rational, or can be proven
by science.
One could, at this point, certainly denounce this study as subjective, hence,
unscientific. Such claims are rather premature because subjectivity (or feelings and
emotions) is an essential part of scientific reasoning. Without (subjective) feelings and
emotions, rationality becomes impossible, viz. emotions and feelings are notable
expressions of rationality, this is substantiated by works in neurology.9 Damasio, a
neurobiologist, shows—from his clinical studies—how “…feeling [is] an integral
component of the machinery of reason…” and that “…the process of emotion and feeling
are indispensable for rationality.”10 In other words, feeling and emotion—which are
influenced by one’s lived experiences—are essential parts of rationality, none of these are
independent of one another; rather emotion and feeling, on the one hand, and rationality,
on the other, are in synthesis with one another, the isolation, which is adamantly
proselytized in the social sciences, negates their working together. The rational-empirical
academics, technical experts, and specialists fail to realize that reduction in a person’s
emotions is an important source of irrational behaviors.11 No wonder, social scientists,
mostly unaware, uninformed, or through conscious purgation of how rationality is
contingent on feeling and emotion, espouse the primacy of scientific rationality within
their disciplines, while at the same time ridicule feelings and emotions by stigmatizing
these as subjective, normative, unscientific. They, thereby, disregard the essentiality of
9

Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Errors (New York, NY: Avon Books, 1994), xii,

44-45.
10
11

Damasio, Descartes’ Errors, xii, xiii.
Ibid., 53.
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how rationality is, ultimately, dependent on the very elements they contempt. Put
differently, subjective elements, i.e. emotion and feeling, of a person make rationality
possible in the first place.
Feelings and emotions are some of the most essential features of rationality.
However, this does not necessarily mean feelings and emotions are always good all the
time, but rather, the point here is, one cannot and should not neglect human aspects while
engaging in social inquests. One cannot simply ignore these aspects because they can’t be
quantified or measured. This is important to recognize because human beings and human
society cannot be understood in a piecemeal manner; one cannot pick and choose certain
human aspects by designating them as good just because they are quantifiable, while
assigning the rest as bad because they are unquantifiable. It is the totality—i.e.
rationality, feelings, emotions, etc.—that makes us human beings and human societies.
As such, in order to properly cognize society, one must embrace and accept the rational
along with the arrational aspects of human society. As Goethe rightly noted, “Thus every
one thing exists for the sake of all things and all for the sake of one; for the one is of
course the all as well. Nature, despite her seeming diversity, is always a unity, a whole;
and thus, when she manifests herself in any part of that whole, the rest must serve as a
basis for that particular manifestation, and the latter must have a relationship to the rest of
the system.”12 The point here being, since rationality, feeling, and emotion constitutes a
person, even the most rational person would not be rational without emotions and
feelings for they all are in concatenation with one another.

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Goethe on Science: A Selection of Goethe’s
Writings, ed. Jeremy Naydler (Edinburgh, UK: Floris Books, 1997), 60.
12
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Newton and Einstein contributed to the advancement in natural sciences because
of their subjective emotions and feelings. Even the most important, ground breaking
scientific advancements are made out of subjectivity of scientists, not objectivity.13
Examples of which are Galileo’s motion, Einstein’s general relativity, Copernicus
heliocentric, Neils Bohr’s atomic structure and quantum physics, among many others. All
of these achievements, when first advanced, were seen by their contemporaries as a
subjective theory (of Galileo, Einstein, Copernicus, Bohr). Their contemporaries did not
see these theories as scientific. Kuhn even goes as far as to argue that the greatest
scientific achievements are possible because of the subjectivity of the inquirer.14 Even
determining which scientific theory (or paradigm), during periods of scientific revolution,
will dominate the academic world is established and dependent upon the subjectivity of
the scientists, for it is, ultimately, they who will have to convince their fellow members.
Thus, Kuhn maintains, “theory must be chosen for reasons that are ultimately personal
and subjective.”15 And this subjectivity—feeling and emotion—goes back as far as the
manner in which the prober collects data to the manner in which observations are made.
Thence, rationality is built on personal subjectivity. This is painfully obvious in the core
of natural sciences, physics, especially concerning one of the foundations upon which it
is based: quantum physics. Here, the principle issue concerns the measurement or the
observer effect. The issue is that the very act of measuring or observing affects the
measurement. This is fundamental: on one hand, it shows the subjectivity in science, on
another, it undermines the very stable scientific concepts such as time, space, speed of
13

Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2010).
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1996).
15
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 199.
14

14
light, etc. This is to say, it undermines the rational, objective, stable, fixed concepts on
which the whole of natural science is based. Even the observational statements, which are
interpretation or meaning of empirical investigations, are theory-laden. In other words,
interpretation of observational statements—which are deemed objective, unbiased, and
neutral—is determined by the theory one utilizes to explain what one observes, as such,
the meaning of the observational statement depends on the theory or theoretical lens from
which the observation is made.16 Subjectivity, i.e. the observer, therefore, enters the
realm of natural science. The subjective aspects of knowledge are always present, no
matter the objectivity of a discipline; it ultimately guides the prober to make sense of
phenomena. As such, subjectivity and objectivity are coterminous or symbiotic. They are
inseparable from one another. To remove subjectivity is to remove the very feature that
makes objective science possible.
The philosophical-humanistic nature of the present inquiry also means, it
incorporates works from diverse disciplines, from social studies—cultural studies,
sociology, anthropology, political studies, economics—to humanities—philosophy,
literature. This eo ipso makes it non-quantitative or non-empirical. In other words, social
analyses cannot be limited to one mode of methodology—i.e. scientific rationality—

16

Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the
Conceptual Foundations of Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1958); Paul K. Feyerabend, Philosophical Papers: Realism, Rationalism and Scientific
Method, vol. 1 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1985a). For instance, a
neo-classical theory observes the large economies of scales or the large enterprises as
lowering production costs. Thus, these are seen to be better for consumers. Yet, the same
observation from, say, Marxian perspective is interpreted as exploitations, on one hand,
and accumulation of wealth, on the other. Or, for instance, human beings, plants, other
living things are, from evolutionary theory, the results of a long process of evolution;
while the same observation, from theistic view, is interpreted as signs of divine being,
deity.
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because it is imprudent to reason that studies carried out in one particular method are
worth discussing or inquiring into, while all other manners of inquiries (such as,
humanistic) are useless. One can, at this point, argue why bring in disciplines of
humanities, especially literature, to an empirical object of study, i.e. development, and
since this study is carried out in a non-quantifiable or non-empirical manner, it is
unscientific. These are some of the arguments made against the mode of inquiry
employed in the present study; however, one must be careful, especially in social
sciences, about the word empirical.
Empirical, at least in its strict sense, means to verify a phenomenon or an object
of study through experience. In its proper scientific sense, empirical means that which
can be verified through experiences which are, in turn, predicated on observable facts in
nature (not man-made facts like the ones in social sciences); this means, the numerical
aspects derived from nature are a priori constant and not manipulatable by the subject (or
the individual) carrying out the observation. In other words, numbers which are,
ironically, used in social sciences are not the ones one finds in nature (or used in the
natural sciences); for instance, the speed of light or the force of gravity are values as
found in and given by nature, these are not arbitrary values (procured through opinion or
survey polls) assigned by the examiner.17 Numbers in hard sciences are atemporal that
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remain undisturbed by the senses of the temporal object, but the same cannot be applied
to social sciences. The numbers in social sciences—be they sociology, political studies,
psychological, or economic—are temporal, i.e. these numbers are not given by nature;
they are not constant in nature; they are manipulatable by the prober; and these numbers
are exclusively dependent upon the prober, i.e. these are artificially constructed; thus, the
word empirical is, in its proper sense, inappropriate apropos to social sciences.
Furthermore, empiricism in natural science is a tool to falsify, not verify
hypotheses. Popper made it clear about this issue when he reasoned, “what characterizes
the empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsification.”18 However, in the social
sciences empiricism is mostly taken to mean to verify, rather than to falsify proposed
postulates. This is abundantly shown in numerous leading journals or books in social
sciences where almost all hypotheses proposed are verified: support what authors set out
to prove or disprove. In examination of most journals and books in social sciences, one
will find numerous hypotheses being verified—which is preternatural considering almost
all hypotheses proposed in natural sciences (which are more empirical than in social
sciences) are falsified. Given the numerous postulates verified and published in social
sciences, any astute, informed person will find this troubling and unnatural for two
reasons: first, there can be no social laws like the ones one finds in natural sciences;
second, when a hypothesis is verified, it becomes a theory, i.e. a (natural) fact. For
instance, Copernicus’ heliocentric world, Einstein’s General Relativity, and Newton’s
University Press, 1978); George Berkeley, The Analyst, ed. David R. Wilkins (Dublin,
2002); George Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues, ed.
Howard Robinson (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Friedrich
Nietzsche, Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books,1974).
18
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gravity, were postulates failed to be falsified, thus they became theories, natural facts.
One cannot say the earth does not revolve around the sun, because it is a fact that it does;
however, no social hypothesis can adhere to the proper criteria of (scientific) empiricism.
The verification of hypotheses in social sciences only shows how the very idea of
verification and falsification are rampantly abused to give an air of science to this
impoverished discipline which stems from physic envy. What this shows is, empiricism is
unsuitable for social sciences as it lacks the atemporal aspects—which is one of the
essential features of empiricism; the lack of atemporality leads to the usage of
verification rather than falsification as means for empiricism. Expressed differently:
social science is methodologically dogmatic. The aforesaid field is able or willing to
acknowledge something as truth, knowledge, or fact only if it conforms to the dominant
methodologies of the day. The accepted knowledge or truth is defended with chauvinistic
zeal; yet, “The truth they have protected,” writes Deloria, “has nearly always been
obsolete, framed in outmoded concepts, and defended zealously against heresy. Truth,
under these conditions, has become a matter of authority rather than inquiry.”19 Indeed,
what is more dangerous to human advancement is not superstition or religion, but
unqualified adherence to dogmas, which scientific rationality seems to have become.
Now to the criticism as to why resort to the humanities, especially literature? The
answer is quite commonsensical, or to use Gramsci’s term, good sense. Social inquiry
always necessarily involves the whole human aspects of society, not some murky trite
quantitative representations of phantasmagoric society. Social inquiry involves persons,
their feelings, emotions, beliefs, myths, memories, histories, socio-cultural realities,
19
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festivities, gods, etc. One cannot simply ignore these subjective aspects of persons in
society; to be more precise, to dwell and focus narrowly only on facile, exterior aspects
of society only lead to an impoverished, unrealistic comprehensions of that which is
inquired. No understanding is involved if all one does is to quantify society, just as the
protagonists in Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet, where Bouvard and Pécuchet, in their
failed attempt to reconcile scientific knowledge with confronting realities of human
society, decide in the end to merrily transcript their most beloved scientific ideas
devotedly from one text onto another.
Vilfredo Pareto, a philosopher, sociologist, political scholar, and economist,20 will
be quite disappointed with the manner in which his name is evoked to defend hidebound
empirical methods in social sciences. Indeed, Pareto was clearly against strict dogmatic
empiricism (i.e. quantification) when it came to social inquiries, he reasoned thusly: “One
should not deem any method as good or any theorem derived from it as true only because
it carries the ‘quantitative’ label (italics added).”21 Pareto did not adhere to, nor
prescribed that social queries should be carried out empirically and mathematically, i.e.
quantitatively, he was against such strict dogmatic methods. For him, “all arguments
regarding the method that should be adopted in a particular science are somewhat
useless… Employ whatever reasoning method you prefer, seek the support of history,
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physics, accept or reject the evolutionary theories… all is allowed, all is fair, provided
you can discover…[and] shed new light on old ones, and rectify errors (italics added).”22
Pareto clearly saw the need to allow any modes of thought that would enhance our
knowledge of the examined phenomenon. He, being a free thinking scholar (unlike his
narrow, over-specialized acolyte), saw the essentiality of polysemous ideas for the proper
comprehension of the object of inquiry; after all, being open to diverse modes of thought
enables one to view old problems in a new way.23
An astute reader would have noticed the extreme disconnect between what Pareto
espoused and what his followers, i.e. contemporary social scientists, think he advocated.
Thus, it will not be of any surprise for epigones of Pareto to criticize this study for
according literature a place in social query. However, for Pareto, it makes little
difference as to what kinds of methods one uses as long as they lead to a better
understanding of social phenomena, viz. in regard to methods of analysis “We are
interested in the end, and much less or not at all interested in the means by which we
attain it [i.e. understanding].”24 As such, one can only hope that the above reasonings
have served well as prolepsis for arguments against the present study’s view on nonempiricism and by bringing in disciplines from humanities.
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Why Polyphony?
Now delving deeper into the concerned subject:25 The present query explores
issues of rationality and development: how the dominant rationality or—to use Gramsci’s
terms—the hegemonic26 rationality colors the discourse in societal development by
ostracizing other modes of thought, which are collectively represented here by the term,
polyphonic knowledge. This study dichotomizes the dominant rationality, scientific
rationality, from the excluded or neglected rationality, polyphonic knowledge.
So, why this topic or why is this topic important? This topic is important because
no scholarships exist exploring, in a juxtapose manner, issues of rationality and
development. Differently put, there are no scholarships examining excluded knowledges,
and how they relate to development. This study is perhaps paving the way for future
research, not just in societal development but social sciences, in general—at least, on
issues concerning the polysemous interpretation of ideas, norms, values, knowledges,
etc., all of which are crucial for any social inquiry. This topic is possible, thanks to
today’s extreme over-specialization and narrowness of philosophers and social scientists.
It is to them and their disregard for diverse modes of rationality to which this study
perhaps owes its pioneering aspects. No doubt, the pioneering aspects may be viewed
with suspicion by the reader, and such attitude is not surprising either. Because social
sciences view themselves to be science, they confined themselves to canonical dogmas,
this is to say, new ideas or knowledges should be built on existing studies. In other
Certainly, the proper term here is ‘object’ not ‘subject’; however, since this is a
humanistic study, the term ‘subject’ rather than ‘object’ is preferred, because the former
term, ‘subject,’ is more human evincing feelings, emotions, and seems natural, while the
latter term, ‘object,’ is more detached, cold, unsympathetic, and mechanical.
26
Vide, Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans.
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words, adding to the existing stock of knowledge by building upon what is already
known. Certainly, this is essential for natural sciences, but such dogmas are more than
thoughtless in respect to social sciences. As much as social scientists may desire laws
congruent to those in natural sciences, they can never procure for themselves acontextual
laws of society; hence, additions of new knowledge by building upon existing studies is
reasonable in hard sciences, but are more than unwise in social examinations.
Because of this dogmatic need to accord new ideas only when based on existing
knowledge, one will find social scientists slavishly proselytizing uniformity, conformity
in the utilization of scientific methods in social examinations. Thus, new ideas, not based
on existing stocks of knowledge, are discouraged. In other words, it suits obsequious
social science practitioners who, to borrow Bertrand Russell’s words, “would rather die
than think.”27 No wonder, one natural sciences’ epigone, in justifying uniformity and
scientific study of society, asserts: “Self-orientating in the scientific world would tend to
be seriously dysfunctional.”28 Parsons was no doubt invoking natural sciences to justify
conformity in social sciences, but Parsons failed to recognized that most scientific
advancements were possible because scientists who made the breakthroughs did not
slavishly adhere, nor conform to the canonical dogmas of scientific method, in fact they
unreservedly violated every methods, rules, and principles of scientific investigation—
look at the development of quantum theory, Einstein’s theory of general relativity, string
theory, etc. Even cultural progress requires break from conventional doctrines: for
instance, Claude Debussy, one of the most original composers of modern times, broke
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every textbook rule in music to find a new musical language; or Beethoven, one of the
most influential composers, broke every possible formal musical rules; thus, shaking the
musical establishments. Goethe, himself, in his literary and scientific works as well as in
his poetries, shows an overwhelming disregard for the established etiquettes and canons.
Einstein, was considered heretic, when in 1905 he argued that lights, in his explanation of
photoelectric effect, are not waves but a stream of tiny particles: quanta/quantum. This
argument of his considered heretical, sacrilegious, even by the established scientific
community, at a single stroke solved all problems concerning light that occupied the
minds of many great scientists like Max Planck, James Maxwell, Heinrich Hertz, J. J.
Thomson. Surely, the soothing of human soul (socio-cultural), or the progress of human
mind (scientific) requires a break from platitudinous blinkered doctrines. Yet, present
academics, technical experts, etc. hopelessly fear to break away from orthodox canons
precisely because to do so would undermine their narrow understanding of the world, just
like the contemporaries of Galileo who refused to gaze at Jupiter’s moons through the
telescope as they were afraid that peeking through the piece of cylindrical tube would
undermine their stable geo-centric, Ptolemaic world system.
Furthermore, implicit in any orthodox doctrine is its assumption about the
infallibility not only of the professed dogmas, but also of its adherers; therefore,
stigmatizing, silencing anyone who questions or deviates from the propriety procrustean
creed, becomes ubiquitous. This way human progress, be it cultural, social, or scientific,
is stifled. And indeed, progress in social sciences is already stifled because, as Andreski
puts it, “What is particularly dismaying is that not only does the flood of publications
reveal an abundance of pompous bluff and a paucity of new ideas, but even the old and
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valuable insights which we [social sciences] have inherited from our illustrious ancestors
are being drowned in a torrent of meaningless verbiage and useless technicalities.
Pretentious and nebulous verbosity, interminable repetition of platitudes and disguised
propaganda are the order of the day, while at least 95 % of research is indeed re-search
for things that have been found long ago and many times since.”29 This way advancement
is stifled in the name of (and social sciences’ quest to become) exact science.
This inquiry is not the first to propose new forms of knowledge, since there exist
studies already advocating such views: Foucault’s subjugated knowledges, Haraway’s
situated knowledges, and Spivak’s subaltern.30 However, the aforementioned forms of
knowledge, firstly and most importantly, have helpless passive undertones such as,
“subjugated,” “situated,” or “subaltern.” These terms, utilized by aforesaid authors, give a
docile languorous air about other modes of knowledge as if they are inferior to the
dominant rationality. Hence, polyphony rationalities, as proposed in this query, are not
passive modes of thought; they are not inferior to scientific knowledge. Secondly,
knowledges proposed by aforesaid authors have nothing whatever to do with
development; thirdly, they do not succinctly represent nor accommodate polysemous
knowledges as they are; fourthly, there is an ideological—be they political, economic, or
both—penchant inherent in the aforesaid knowledges; fifthly, even if they do advocate
for the need to take into account different forms of knowledge, they nevertheless do
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implicitly assume (and their knoweldges’, no doubt, stems from) the dominant form of
rationality (i.e. scientific rationality); lastly, in all of these proposed knowledges, the
authors implicitly call for change not only in the dominant ways of thinking, but also in
the manner in which other forms of knowledge are to be accommodated.
Polyphonic rationality, on the other hand, not only differs from scientific
rationality, but also differs from those proposed by Foucault, Haraway, and Spivak. What
makes polyphonic knowledge different from ones mentioned above is its unsystematic
nature. It does not fall under any systematized theorization on how social analyses should
be carried out; it does not try to dress itself as a new alternative theory in an already
theory infested discipline. The knowledges espoused by aforesaid authors are presented
to be (new) theories, but polyphonic rationality does not. To be a theory is to negate the
very meaning of polyphony. The polyphonic knowledge, proposed here, accommodates,
appreciates, and, more importantly, accepts polysemous thoughts, ideas, rationalities on
their own terms, and as they are. Polyphonic knowledge does not call for exclusion of
any modes of thought, not even scientific rationality; every form of knowledge is
accommodated and given equal occasion. There is no nitpicking or privileging one
particular mode over others, equal occasion is given to all modes of thought, for it is in
this openness to diverse modes that redeems the term polyphony; it is this openness that
provides a better means through which to understand society or any social phenomenon.
In other words, social inquiry becomes more meaningful. Hence, polyphonic knowledge
best embodies the diversity of thoughts than the existing alternative forms as proposed by
Foucault, Haraway, and Spivak.
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This study, in the larger realm of, what Dilthey calls, Giesteswissenschaften (or,
roughly translated as, human studies/science), is not the first to question the standing
acme of thoughts. Indeed, this study sincerely owes to numerous eccentric
thinkers/scholars of the yesteryears from every field of Giesteswissenschaften, from
ancient to contemporary periods. One could call numerous thinkers—Epicurus,
Confucius, Lao-tzu, Marcus Aurelius, Al-Ghazali, Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Khaldun, Al-Arabi,
Vico, Cervantes, Montaigne, Nietzsche, Marcel, Stendhal, Dostoevsky, Conrad,
Spengler, Toynbee, Jung, Adorno, Fromm, Feynman, Gödel, Schrödinger, Heisenberg,
Franz Boas, just to name a few—that certainly influenced this study. An astute reader
would have noticed the numerous fields in human studies (even from natural sciences)
occupied by the above mentioned scholars coming from equally diverse societies; yet,
what unifies them is their proclivity to question the vogue ideas and thus provide a better
understanding not only of one’s society, but also of the human world. What is more, the
diverse thinkers from diverse societies occupying equally diverse fields in human studies
(and even including natural sciences) reflect and vindicate the humanistic nature of this
study as well as the importance of polyphonic knowledge in social inquiries. As such, the
present query kindles with the footsteps of those earlier works in the field of human
studies that questioned existing dogmas.
The Essentiality of an Eccentric
The initial interest on this topic began with one of the most ubiquitous features in
development scholarship: constant derision against eccentric modes of thought, i.e.
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polyphonic knowledges, other than scientific rationality.31 By eccentric modes of thought,
one has in mind here those rationalities which are “disqualified as nonconceptual
knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically
inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or
scientificity.”32 Through disparagement of other modes of thought by stigmatizing them
as subjective, unscientific, or irrational, social inquiries have become dogmatic.
Development studies and social sciences, in general, have been quite adamant in
espousing the importance of scientific rationality in their fields of study. This is justified
by how only science (and its rationalities), in its unbiased objective manner, guides
human reasoning. Implicit, in such kinds of argument, is the utter contempt for other
modes of thought.
When the majority of the academic community and developed societies disdain
other modes of thought, then surely scientific rationality, as a tool, must have enormously
contributed to our knowledge of traditional societies?33 Yet, this is hardly the case.

31

Just to name a few: Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1966); The Soul of the Primitive (Regnery Publishing, 1971); How Natives Think
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Parsons, The Social System; Ronald
Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernity, Cultural Change and Democracy: The
Human Development Sequence (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005);
Douglas C. North, and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World (New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press,1973); W. Arthur Lewis, “Economic Development with
Unlimited Supply of Labour,” The Manchester School 22 (May 1954): 139-91; Samuel P.
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2006); Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York, NY: Anchor Books,
1999); Daron Acemoglu, and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail (London: Profile
Books, 2013).
32
Foucault, “Society Must be Defended,” 7. Indeed, Foucault termed these
“buried” forms of knowledges as “subjugated knowledges.”
33
The terms, ‘traditional,’ ‘native,’ ‘developing’ societies are used
interchangeably in this study, since most of developing societies in the world are
traditional and/or native.

27
Rather what we have is the facile knowledge that is interested only in the surface or in
the empirically quantifiable. The episodes of mockery and revilement in development
scholarships would have been of no interest if traditional societies were properly
understood, and if the mission civilisatrice (which development is) was making
traditional societies better-off than they were before: culturally, socially, spiritually, viz.
not destroying the foundation of these societies. But one can hardly claim such to be the
case. Surely, one cannot claim, nor should one be satisfied by the hackneyed arguments
about how modern scientific rationality has increased the longevity of life, eradicated
many diseases, introduced mass consumerisms, material goods, etc. These kinds of
argument should not satisfy those who properly want to understand the other society. One
must, instead, question why should one consider proliferation in consumer/material
things as the emblem of human good? One must also ask: was it always the case that
prior to development (which is predicated on scientific rationality), traditional societies
did not live a healthy disease free life? Because in asking such questions, one will find
the saintly, moral image of development along with scientific rationality to be nothing but
a poor façade aimed at destroying anything different. And by different, it means any and
every cultural-social norm, value, knowledge, idea, myth, mores, etc. that differs from the
one championed by the developed world, who ultimately dictates what human good is
and which mode of thoughts is deemed acceptable for humanity at large.
The ethical, saintly image of development vanishes as one questions the
platitudinous validations used to justify the alteration of traditional societies—such as,
material things, longevity, eradication of diseases, modern institutions (such as:
democracy, capitalism, etc.) are good, modernity and development are good, and so on.
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However, numerous studies have instead shown the blatant destruction, decimation, and
atrophy of traditional societies, from peoples’ health to societal degeneration (detail
analyses of which are given in chapters Three).34
It is, thus, the irony of these episodes that caught one’s interest. This led one to
ruminate as to why there is much disdain toward non-scientific modes of thought. Is it
because of dogmatic disposition which becomes fashionable as any discipline of
knowledge becomes too specialized and thus begins to experience an epoch of jejune
derivative works? At this point, a postulate can be proposed: the limitation in current
development scholarships (and practices) stems from (a) its neurotic attachment to
scientific rationality, and (b) exclusion of polyphonic knowledges. This means: if the
existing development scholarships are highly dependent on scientific rationality, the
discourses have become dogmatic. Such dogmatic inclinations will lead to highly
perilous circumstances where no new, diverse ideas or forms of thought will be accepted
nor appreciated. In the long run, these kinds of condition will invariably lead to defense
of status quo or existing ideas with an air of religious fervent. The adamant rigidity and
inflexibility to change, or be open to new ideas will ultimately lead to intellectual
(academic) impoverishment of society, even in the most developed of societies. This is to
say, developed societies’ disregard for new thoughts and their stubborn reliance on one
mode of thought will be detrimental for themselves as well as for traditional societies.
34
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When any kind of inquiry excludes certain modes of thought, that encompasses
the vast majority of the world’s society, there is bound to be an unrealistic understanding
of social phenomena. Moreover, the exclusion encourages specialization and narrowing
of discourses. No wonder, today, most academics prefer to call themselves experts, rather
than scholars or thinkers. This is augmented by the surge of technical experts/specialists
which has led societies to place their fate on experts: telling society what cloths to
buy/wear, what foods to eat, what books/articles to read/to buy, how to manage economic
and political problems, how to manage poverty, how to manage societal development,
how to manage environment, and so on. This increase in specialization along with the
expertizing of academics is an inevitable outcome of dominance of one mode of thought.
In such an environment, social analyses become meaningless because the aim is no
longer the understanding of social phenomena, but a cul-de-sac endless sophistication of
and emphasis on demonstration. Thereby, understanding, which is the ultimate aim of
any social as well as scientific examination, is relegated to oblivion. However, if social
inquiries (and social sciences, in general) are to be truly meaningful, one ought not to shy
away from incorporating diverse modes of thought that, in many ways, will only advance
human knowledge.
Because this study focuses on the acme of scientific rationality pertinent to
development, it becomes essential to tackle the fons et origo, i.e. roots, in which
numerous development schemes are rooted. This is an important point to highlight, since,
without this in mind, the reader is bound to misunderstand not only what is to follow, but
also the intention behind the query. Inquiry into the primacy of scientific rationality in
social analyses (which development is) requires one to examine the very roots, i.e. the
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scholarships. This means, it would be a colossal error for one to inquire into how
development policies are implemented, rather than the rationality underpinning such
schemes, and one hopes that the reader keeps this point in mind so as to avoid
unnecessary confusions. This is because: first, this study is a theoretico-philosophical
inquiry, not empirical; second, the applications (and policies), i.e. empiricisms, only
follow the philosophical and theoretical inquiry, not the vice-versa. This is the most
pervasive blunder made in the social sciences. Social scientists erroneously assume any
social analysis can and must be carried out empirically from the outset. Epictetus was
among one of the first to warn us against such a lackadaisical approach to understanding.
For him, understanding is: First, and most importantly, a percept, an awareness to
understand, say for instance, “one must not lie.” The Second part, he reasons, is the
explanation of “one must not lie.” The Third part is the demonstration of “one must not
lie.” Here, the third part is essential or important only on the account of the second, and
the second on the account of the first; the third is not necessarily on its own or by itself.
So, for Epictetus, “the most necessary and that on which we ought to rest is the first. But
we do the contrary. For we spend our time on the third topic, and all our earnestness is
about it: but we neglect the first. Therefore, we lie.”35 Epictetus points out an essential
point: one erroneously places too much importance on demonstration, which is ultimately
dependent on the second and the second (explanation) being dependent on the first
(understanding). Therefore, for Epictetus, by accentuating demonstration, which is of
lowest importance, we neglect the most essential aspect of inquest: understanding. Error
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of this kind is vividly exposed and criticized by Popper, Lakatos, and Lorenz, among
many others. Therefore, it would be best for this study not to fall for and make the same
commonplace errors made by most social scientists.
Development schemes are rooted in the scholarly works; therefore, it becomes
essential to examine the source, rather than the branches. When development schemes are
set up, they are assumed to be practical; however, beneath their practical-ness lay the
scholarly works that undergird such schemes. It, thus, becomes essential to question the
reasoning, i.e. the germ-root, of such scholarships in order to illuminate the various
elements at play that lead to the privileging of scientific rationality.
Therefore, “Let us… restrict ourselves to… the views of their [leader], who is
[their] “first teacher.” For [it is the first teacher who has] organized and refined their
sciences, removed the redundant in their views, and selected what is closest to the
principles of their capricious beliefs."36 Al-Ghazali is here referring to the importance of
inquiring into the roots of an idea because disregarding the source only leads one to a
facile comprehension of that which is claimed to be examined. To tackle development
schemes, and how they are implemented, rather than the rationality behind scholarships
would mean one is only making the same pervasive errors, disregarding the very roots of
the problem.
When the source of problems is disregarded because it does not fit the ideological
prejudice of those who are to judge, it becomes a mockery not only of human society, but
also of scientific knowledge as well, viz. trying to tackle problems by disregarding their
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source is like “distributing aspirin pills to dying people whom nothing can save.”37 An
analogy might perhaps convey the point: If one is trying to grow vegetables in one’s
garden, it requires the soil be fertile and contain enough nutrients that will enable seeds to
bear healthy vegetables. However, if the soil is not fertile and lacks essential nutrients,
the seeds will bear paltry vegetables. Here, if one is to address the problem, one would be
in error if one decides to buy scientifically enhanced high quality and high yielding seeds,
rather than plant the seeds in a fertile soil with abundant nutrients. Buying high yielding
seeds will do no good (for it ignores the root problem, the soil) if those seeds are planted
in the same impoverished soil; but if one is wise, one need not buy expensive highyielding scientifically enhanced seeds; one can use the same kind of seeds and plant them
in a better fecund soil. This way one addresses the very root cause of one’s bad vegetable
yields and so corrects the problem. Much in the same way, by tackling the scientific
rationality, we are eo ipso tackling the source that necessarily goes on to guide
development schemes. Hence, it would be imprudent to examine the countless
development policies, and how they are implemented, rather than examine the source of
the schemes.
The reader may also be critical of the textual analysis approach utilized for this
present study, but one must remember the practical policies and their applications do not
suddenly spring up like Minerva.38 Rather the practical, pragmatic schemes and
applications are based on scholarships or ideas of philosophers and thinkers that
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necessarily go on to influence future generations of scholars. This relation is succinctly
put by Keynes, when he noted: “the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both
when they are right and when they are wrong are more powerful than is commonly
understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of
some defunct economist.”39 Keynes is here alluding to the source of modern ideas; he
saw the enduring aspects of idea that, be they good or bad, transcend the temporality of
time and, thereby, influence future generations of scholars and practical men alike. As a
result, it becomes essential to probe into scholarships to illuminate the source as well as
the primacy of scientific rationality, and how they go on to influence the schemes that
necessarily get implemented in traditional societies in the name of development.
To Critique
The question now becomes, which scholarships are to be examined? The works
selected are: Bronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture; Talcott Parson, The
Social System; Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy; Walt W.
Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth; Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel,
Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy; Douglass North, Understanding the
Process of Economic Change; Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty; Paul Collier, The
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Bottom Billion; William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth, and The White Man’s
Burden.40
At this point, it is essential to make a quick note. As one might have already
noticed, the number of works selected for this study is ten. The number of works has
nothing to do with some superstition, viz. there is no mysticism behind the number. Most
scholars when deciding scholarships or problems to be examined tend to have a specific
number in mind that more or less falls under their preexisting superstition about certain
numbers, or limit themselves to numbers that have a mystifying charm. However, the
number of books chosen here are based on the consideration to include, as much as
possible, scholarships from diverse disciplines in social sciences, and, in doing so, also to
limit oneself to certain number to avoid the extremes: too many—in which case, the
examination becomes repetitive—or too few—in which case, the inquiry provides not
enough variety and information to make it meaningful. In regard to this, Aristotle was
quite veracious when he urged one to avoid the two extremes, too much or too little, and
maintain the golden mean. So, here at least, his idea certainly did play a role in
determining the number of oeuvres for analysis.41

Easterly’s, The Tyranny of Experts (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2014), and
Sachs’, The Age of Sustainable Development (New York, NY: Columbia University
Press, 2015), recent works were respectively released during the latter part and after this
study had been concluded. Hence, one did not critique these works for the present study.
Nevertheless, they have been incorporated into the study. Furthermore, the reader would
be please to find that Sachs and Easterly continue to utilize the same line of reasoning,
scientific rationality, even in their recent works. This in a way substantiates how
scientific rationality remains primary in development discourses.
41
This perhaps only vindicates Keynes’ remark about how we are all influenced
by some ideas of past philosophers.
40

35
The works here selected for examination neither define nor exclusively compose
the chef d'oeuvre of development studies.42 One may certainly disagree with the selected
works and argue that one has selected the obvious scholarships that only substantiate the
point of this inquiry. However, it must be noted that here the matter of concern is not
about which works have or haven’t been selected, rather the principal concern is to
explore the prominence of scientific rationality; and the works selected provide the best
means to do so. It would be most helpful for the reader to know that there are numerous
other scholarships in development discourse which, more or less, follow the same line of
thought or rationality. Thus, the reader can take comfort in the fact that anyone, if one
wishes, can select any number of scholarships and carry out the same analysis done in
this study, for anyone familiar with development discourse will know most scholarships
in this discipline—implicitly or explicitly—positions, above all else, the priority of
scientific rationality.
An astute reader would have noticed that the works selected are gathered from
various disciplines in social sciences—anthropology, sociology, political studies,
economics. What this shows is: development discourse cannot be limited to one
discipline or sub-discipline. The specialization (and today’s sub-specialization even
within one discipline) only muddles and narrows the lens needed to properly fathom and
carry out social inquiries. In other words, proper understanding of any society requires a
holistic approach that digresses from the current specialization (and sub-specialization) of
academic disciplines in the human (social) studies.
42

Additional works are brought in during the examination to show the enduring
influences of scientific rationality through ideas and scholarships: preeminence of
scientific rationality, persistent call for change (in societal institutions), and primacy of
economy (regardless of its relevance)—the latter two being predicated on the former.
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Broadening of one’s lens becomes essential if one is to properly cognize the
other. The complexity of human society requires one to equip oneself with as many tools
or lenses as possible, only then will one be able to appreciate the diversity in thoughts. To
limit oneself to one lens is to narrow one’s views of the world. By narrowing the focus
solely on rationally explicable or measurable aspects, it eo ipso jettisons many other
essential facets which, even though they may seem as dreg from scientific lens, are
nonetheless essential to one’s understanding. The narrowing of lens leads not only to a
complete miscomprehension of societies, but also to a turbid idea about science. Because
when only one mode of rationality is emphasized, it ultimately leads to gallimaufry idea
of development and socio-analyses. Would this, then, not be a peril to societies that may
have to endure the policies concocted in such lethargic manner? Thus, the idée mère of
this study is to perhaps show how such errors can be circumvented by accommodating
diverse forms of polyphonic thought. Polyphonic thoughts, unlike scientific rationality,
do not necessarily follow rigid methods or guidelines. They are essential in making sure
that scientific rationality recognizes its limitations, and this way circumvent its
perversions. More importantly, polyphonic thoughts provide diverse avenues in
understanding issues where scientific inquiry is perhaps not possible or even
inappropriate.
The purpose of examining the scholarships is to critique their reasoning; in doing
so, it shows how exclusion of polyphonic knowledge hampers and even goes against the
very pith of scientific inquiry. We are neither interested in the criticism of, nor in
criticizing the suggestions of the examined scholarships, for they are superfluous to the
main subject of interest. Notice that what is of interest is not the criticism (nor in
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criticizing), but the critique of the scholarships. Here the word critique is to be
understood in its original: in mid-17th Century Enlightenment, the word meant the
assessment of an idea and its validity to everyday lived experiences. Here, experience
means lived experiences in a non-quantitative sense. Meaning, when one critiques, it
becomes essential for one to examine whether one’s knowledge accords with one’s lived
experiences; and one’s life experiences are, of course, the germ-roots shaping one’s
ideas, knowledge, beliefs.
Critiquing the scholarships and, thus, examining their roots, also means ushering
forth the unconscious (as well as conscious) elements that invariably undergird the
principal mode of thought in social analyses. This is important to note because scientific
rationality is so dominating that it becomes second nature, i.e. falls into the realm of
unconscious, for those who adhere to it. Yet, even if it is relegated into the unconscious
realm, it is always present, invariably determining the way one views and examines the
world, even without one’s conscious sentience of it.43 As Gramsci once reasoned, “In
every personality there is one dominant and pre-dominant activity: it is here that his
thought must be looked for, in a form that is more often than not implicit and at times
even in contradiction with what is professly expressed.”44 The authors examined may not
categorically state that they are adhering to scientific rationality, yet their motives, their
works are nevertheless predicated on it; it unconsciously goes on to influence their
dominant patterns of thought, motive, emotion, behavior. Hence, by critiquing the
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scholarships, one brings forth that which lies in the realm of unconscious and, which, one
is necessarily unaware of its sways.
Another methodological issue that needs to be addressed is temporality, i.e.
periods of analysis. With regard to the issues of temporality, one can very well regress
back into the earliest of civilizations to show the evolution of development from outright
domination to today’s idea of universal moral principles to help spread the sameness
throughout every corner of the world. For this study, however, we will limit ourselves to
those periods when scientific rationality became the edifice of development (either for
cultural, political, or economic purposes) and was (and still is) pursued under the banners
of humanity: from the end of colonialism (mid-late twentieth century) to this century,
1944 to 2007.45
Any keen reader would also have noticed that the scholarships to be examined fall
under the purview of the periods of interest. The period from the end of colonialism, i.e.
late twentieth century, to this century is of interest because scientific rationality during
this period began to play an important role, thereby, replacing or providing a scientific
gown to the previous basis of utter need to dominate the unfortunate societies. Of course,
this does not mean scientific rationality did not exist in the world prior to the end of
colonialism (or, for that matter, middle-late colonialism), for one can indeed trace
rationality back to the earliest of human societies, even prior to the Greeks. The point
being, we are more interested in the periods when scientific rationality blatantly became
the basis for development to spread progress, thereby, relegating the utter primacy of
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Perhaps one could also venture to postulate that underpinning the scientific
rationality is the element of power or neo-imperialism.
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imperialism, power, and subjugation.46 What is more, the periods of late colonialism
“have often been site of extensive experiments in social engineering,”47 and this
engineering meant carrying out experiments in colonized societies who had very little or
no say on how such man-made vicissitudes were to be carried-out, or, more importantly,
if they ever wanted such changes in the first place. As such, for our purpose, this period
provides an appropriate starting point.
Development is invariably undergirded by scientific rationality, for they
undoubtedly entail beliefs in improvement of those largely backward subsistenceoriented societies because anything traditional is seen to be a sign of underdevelopment
and savagery. How can the posterity of Bacon, Locke, Descartes, Kant, Comte, or Marx,
see old traditional edifices and ways of life as something appropriate for humans? The
descendants of such minds, like the progenitors themselves, are adamant to transform
every society deviating from, what these enlightened people sees as, the right and proper
way to human progress guided by science. Indeed, for such persons, every traditional
society is an anathema, an eyesore, to the beautiful, rational minds of enlightened
societies. Hence, a “merciless war was waged against the age-old traditions of communal
solidarity. The virtues of simplicity and conviviality, of noble forms of poverty, of the
wisdom of relying on each other, and of the arts of suffering were derided as signs of
‘underdevelopment.’”48 In this way, foundations of society are undermined, creating a
state of rootlessness or, to borrow Durkheim’s term, anomie.
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When roots of society are challenged or demoralized, society begins to degenerate
internally, i.e. morally, socially, culturally, spiritually, mentally, physically. But to the
posterity of the enlightened minds, all such miseries and destitutions of societies are
indeed a very small price to pay, for much wealth and prosperity awaits just around the
phantasmagoric valley of progress and development promising the same kind of living
standards, same kind of material benefits, same kind of mentality (thinking), same kind of
comfort and ease of life as the enlightened societies. Put differently, every society will
and must imbibe on the fortunes of modernity, thereby, eradicating the dizzying diverse
traditional societies under the uniformity of development. There is no choice or no, to
borrow Kierkegaard’s term, either/or. This is to say, “The conquerors of our days,
peoples or princes, want their empire to possess a unified surface over which the superb
eye of power can wander without encountering any inequality which hurts or limits its
view. The same code of law, the same measures, the same rules, and if we could
gradually get there, the same language; that is what is proclaimed as the perfection of the
social organization… The great slogan of the day is uniformity (italics in the original).”49
Thus, development, having thrown away the barefaced primacy of power as its basis, has
now—consciously or unconsciously—acquired a perverted humanistic foundation (which
goes back to the acme of scientific rationality in development discourses); the idea that
since man today enjoys enormous wealth and prosperity, it is only proper, i.e. a moral
duty, for one to spread this sameness throughout the world by eliminating diversity and
imposing uniformity.
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In addition to the critique of the scholarships, the study also examines an episode
of developmental scheme, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); and two episodes of
development programs, Transmigration in Indonesia and Villagization in Tanzania. This
is done in order to expound (note: ‘→’ = influence) how scientific rationalities →
scholarships → organizational/institutional schemes, such as the MDGs → actual
applications of development schemes, such as transmigration and compulsory
villagization. The three episodes are brought in to illustrate the narrow lens through
which global development is viewed and understood. The scholarships and episodes
serve as prime examples of how indiscriminant amount of deference is given to a single
perspective—the principal of theoretical and empirical quantifications to understand
diverse societal processes and problems—and how such a narrow approach brings about
adverse human consequences, vividly illuminated by the events of transmigration and
villagization, destructions of existing social systems, ethnocide, mass resettlements,
increased poverty, deprivation of lands and homes, environmental destruction, and so
forth.
As such, the works selected, and the episodes of inquiry provide fecund ground
from which to illustrate the primacy of scientific rationality and, concomitantly,
juxtapose it against polyphonic knowledge.50 So, hopefully the reader will appreciate the
rationale behind the approach of this study.
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And to analyze scholarships, from pre-late colonial period, which deal rarely, if
at all, with scientific rationality, in propinquity to development, serves no purpose to the
issue at hand.

42
The Definitions
Now, how does one define scientific rationality appertaining to this study?
Scientific rationality can be understood as an act in which one bases one’s actions on
reason and logic. Rationality follows a linear progression of thoughts and actions, which
is to say, for instance, if x then y, if z then y, therefore, x then z. In other words, there are
certain rules, methods, or standards one must adhere to if one is to think and carry one’s
thought rationally. Or, to be more precise, scientific rationality can be defined as an act of
inquiry through “principles” and “experiments,” where the experiments are “in
accordance with these principles.”51 Kant was full of adulation for such a doctrine that he
dedicated one of his masterpieces (Critique of Pure Reason) to this, where one of the
quiddities of the work was to show the inherent and logical progression from a to b.52
Inherent also in this organon of logical progression is the contingency of b on a; this
postulates the inexorable presences of cause and effect that invariably dictate any events.
Cause and effect are important aspects of rationality, for they assume general progression
of human mind53 capable of discerning a logical reasoned thought from simple irrational
beliefs based on feelings, myths, intuitions. This is why Spinoza remarked that man acts
in so far as man is guided by reason,54 which for Spinoza was the principal cause.
A rational way of carrying oneself, for instance, is to act in a certain way by
differentiating one’s thought processes from the ones that are antipode (such as: feelings,
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intuitions, etc.) to the standards of rationality. A rational person is, therefore, apt to
follow the attitude: “I will investigate phenomenon M in a manner independent from any
traditions, biasness, feelings, or emotions. And I do this in a scientific manner: by testing
general hypotheses, which are open to falsifications, and depending on their confirmation
or falsification, they will further my knowledge on phenomenon M.” Indeed, Descartes,
from whom modern scientific rationality advents, designated rationality as the “certain
seed of truth which are innate in the human mind.”55 This “human mind” which
Descartes refers to is the rationality, which he sees being “naturally equal in all human
being.”56 A rational person will, therefore, judge the world according to his or her reason
which can be verified by (scientific) empirical experiences; so that upon examination of
any event one can discover the rules and principles “that would later serve to discover
other truths,” and “since there is only one truth about each thing, whoever discovers it
knows as much as it is possible to know about it (italics added).”57
In this way, rules validating one’s reasoning are derived from the fundamental
laws. The fundamental laws are themselves derived from empirical observations of
facts58 validating or falsifying potential hypotheses, i.e. various causes and effects, that
explain the examined phenomenon. This is to say, one can know the world by observing
events and facts which are then used to infer causes and effects that go on to serve as
proofs. This constitutes the pith of scientific rationality. The empirical observations are
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used to deduce hypotheses and form theories under the guidance of reason in
collaboration with experiences that are either confirmed or falsified.59 Here, one is
obliged to follow particular methodology by adhering to the established doctrines in
order for what one does to be considered rational. All these methods culminate, after
verifying the general hypothesis through empirical observations, to construct a theory.
A theory, assumed to be simplifications of reality, contains within itself numerous
facts about the phenomenon. This means, theory is a collection of facts: facts explaining
the phenomenon; and the more facts a given theory contains, the more it represents the
reality of things examined, hence a better theory. In other words, without some kind of
empirical measurements of the phenomenon, the theory will not be seriously considered,
regardless of the cogency of its arguments. This is to say, the principles of rationality
advise that one should avoid illogical, vague, or untestable ideas; this underlines the
importance of falsifiability of phenomena. Thus, rationality stresses a person to
demonstrate or prove why one believes in certain things and not in others; this forms the
basis of rationality because, for Newton, to be rational is to be able to proceed by
demonstrating whatever phenomenon one is trying to describe,60 i.e. anything which is
rational is demonstrable, or as Hegel puts it, “What is rational is actual: / and what is
actual is rational.”61
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Indeed, for Popper, this method is the only way through which every new idea
must be received, if they are to be entertained at all.62 For him, there invariably is a need
for certain rigid methods to serve as cordon sanitaire by demarcating what is considered
to be rational, empirical, scientific from the irrational, unscientific, mythical. Hence,
Popper demanded any rational examination to adhere to strict scientific methods. The
suggestion that any new scientific ideas must be subjected to and follow a strict set of
methodologies became the foundation for all scientific endeavors, especially for the
meager sciences: social sciences. In maintaining strict methodologies, it was argued,
many logico-philosophical problems hampering the advancement of scientific knowledge
are thus eliminated.63
Regardless, what elevates scientific rationality and the ones that mostly go amiss
are the critical, yet eccentric, discussions and the issue of doubt questioning the preexisting conceptions of the world, be they scientific or otherwise. This is, indeed, one of
the most admirable and also the least adhered to aspects of science. Popper was veracious
to argue that it is critical discussions that discerned older myths from rational “science.”64
In this regard, Popper was veracious because human knowledge, not based on critical
reasoning, cannot advance our understanding of the world, since without doubting the
existing doctrines, one can hardly discern between a myth and rationality.
We now turn to the term polyphony. It is a term designating traditional
shibboleths—cultural beliefs, values, norms, myths, memories, languages, etc.—that the
oneself. Thus, what is rational, i.e. subjectively becoming aware of oneself, is actual. See,
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1977).
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present query wants to shield against scientific measurements and manipulations.
Polyphony (and its adjective polyphonic) is borrowed from Mikhail Bakhtin’s treatment
of Dostoevsky’s literature. Bakhtin uses the term to highlight the independence of
characters in Dostoevsky’s works, where each character is an “autonomous carrier of his
own individual word.”65 The characters in Dostoevsky’s literature are given their own
conscious, their own thoughts, independent from the author’s own predilections. Every
character is given a voice; a voice different from the author’s own worldly or
philosophical dispositions. The characters are allowed to disagree with, rebel against, and
even object to the views of the author. The author does not sway the characters’ voices;
each character is treated as an independent subject, an end rather than an object or means
to an end. All the voices are heard, all are allowed to speak their own minds—with all
their strengths, limits, irrationalities, caprices, absurdities—without any outside force to
silence those with whom the author disagrees or dislikes; or give preferences or long
monologues to those who buttress the author’s own ideological inclinations. Therefore,
what Dostoevsky unfolds in his “work is not a multitude of characters and fates in a
single objective world, illuminated by a single authorial consciousness; rather a plurality
of consciousness, with equal rights and each with its own world, combined but are not
merged in the unity of the event (italics in the original).”66 Certainly, what Dostoevsky
does in his works is vastly different from conventional methods in literature, this way he
creates a new genre, the polyphonic.
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Therefore, pertaining to this study, polyphonic rationality accords and accepts
diverse modes of thought, as they are. It directs one’s attention to the existential realities
of the human world: there is a world with diverse people, histories, cultures, memories
that exists beyond the rationalized world of the developed societies, and they ought to be
acknowledged in their own terms. Polyphonic rationality is where diverse forms of
knowledge are accepted as they are. Various societies have their own ways of ruminating
about their world. Their diverse lived experiences shape and determine their
understanding of their (not universal) world in their own unique ways.67 Lived
experiences vary from society to society, culture to culture, because “What is most
necessary for man, and what is given him in great abundance, are experiences, especially
experiences of the forces within him. This is his most essential food, his most essential
wealth. If man consciously receives all this abundance, the universe will pour into him,
what is called life in Judaism, spirit in Christianity, light in Islam, power in Taoism
(italics in the original).”68 So, it becomes essential in any social analysis to take into
account the knowledge which each society accumulates through its lived experiences for
hundreds, if not, thousands of years.
Polyphonic knowledges emphasize the impetus of feelings, emotions, intuitions,
as well as belief in myths, histories, supernatural, ancient gods, transfiguration of
festivals, and a dialectic symbiosis with the outside environment where nature is still seen
in an organic manner: everything human. It also means that one’s apprehension of the
67
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world very much depends on the manner in which one probes into the irrational (by
irrational, it mean, what seems rational to one may be seen as irrational to the other and
vice versa), where the world is organic, and society in which one is placed invariably
provides meaning and purpose. Furthermore, for one, one’s reasoning or probing into
myths or supernatural is not irrational because it is only commonsensical, rational even,
that one should probe into the nature or supernatural to find one’s place among the
cosmos.
It is important to recognize that polyphonic knowledges cannot be reduced to a
systematic theory, nor can it be reduced to specified parameters, like we usually
encounter in social sciences, rather the essences of polyphony is in its unsystematic,
unmethodical approach to phenomena. This may be quite disconcerting as well as
perplexing for the reader, for sure, but this is what polyphonic means. It means many
things not just one; it cannot be defined nor put in orderly methodical manner; it cannot
and can never be a theory. There is no methodological canon on how it should be done.
There is no system. One cannot pin point and say “this is it, this is polyphonic rationality”
because it changes from society to society, from questioner to questioner.
Just because specific explanation works for one society, it does not necessarily
mean it is proper to apply the same interpretation to the next: there are, as Nietzsche once
pointed out, infinite perceptions and interpretations.69 Besides a prober’s perception and
interpretation are just one out of infinite others. One’s views on development along with
the interpretation one assigns to it is just one out of an infinite number of other
interpretations. The role of the questioner is essential to polyphony rationality. An
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analogy used by Gabriel Marcel to differentiate between problem and mystery might be
helpful in fathoming the distinctiveness of the questioner in polyphonic knowledges.
Marcel writes: “A problem is something which I meet, which I find completely before
me, but which I can therefore lay siege to and reduce. But a mystery is something in
which I am myself involved, and it can therefore only be thought of as a sphere where the
distinction between what is in me and what is before me loses its meaning and initial
validity.”70 Put differently, it means, when one is dealing with a mystery, the nature of the
questioner is itself intricately tied to the question one is probing; it makes every bit of a
difference as to who is asking the question. To change the questioner is to alter the very
nature of the question itself; as such, the questioner is not substitutable; the questioner
becomes exclusively and irreplaceably sui generis.
In facing a problem, the part of the questioner matters less because anyone who
encounters it can solve it: say, for instance, 2 – 1 = 1. Here the questioner is replaceable;
however, when it comes to mystery, the very identity of the prober is tied to the question.
Likewise, when it comes to social query, our understanding of the phenomenon as well as
the questions we ask are enmeshed to who we are, which is shaped by our lived
experiences—feelings, emotions, beliefs, etc. The way one encounters the issues of social
query or development, will differ from person to person, even the meaning of social
query and development will vary.
The notion of the significance of the questioner in a query is not new; one can
trace it back to the ideas of Aristotle. For Aristotle, individuals are inextricably immersed
in matter (hulê), hence for human reasoning to grasp the understanding of things or
70
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phenomena, it becomes essential for one to act on or rely on the corporeal organs of
senses. Without relying on the organs of sentience, the power of reasoning cannot
function.71 What is more, these senses—that Aristotle alludes to—are but one’s lived
experiences; how one experiences emotions and feelings: touch, smell, sight, taste, hears,
etc.; are very much predicated on actualities of one’s societal milieu. Therefore, the way
one fathoms as well as queries into a phenomenon, ultimately, is contingent on the one
asking the question. Simply put: the question is tied to the individuality of the questioner.
Centuries later, importance of the inquirer’s distinctiveness to what is inquired is also
vividly positioned in Hegel’s idea. His idea of rational is very much dependent on the
subjectivity, for itself, of the one probing into the phenomenon. It is the returning of
oneself to oneself that completes the process of understanding of the probed phenomenon,
and, hence, the course of rationality.72
Let us add the following to remove the horror which the readers, no doubt, find
themselves in from what has been just mentioned: One’s understanding of social
phenomena, such as development, depends on the prober, where the very identity—lived
experiences (feelings, emotions, beliefs, etc.)–of the questioner is tied to the question that
is being probed. Thence, the very question as well as its meaning and significance one
queries into will differ from prober to prober. This succinctly encompasses the meaning
of polyphonic, for the word means many diverse voices, not just one. Mathematical
science provides an example of the essentiality of the identity of the prober in fathoming
Aristotle’s, “Physics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford
Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984);
“Metaphysics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed.
Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and De anima,
trans. by Hugh Lawson-Tancred (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1987).
72
Vide, Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit.
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any natural phenomenon. Perhaps one could say that it is nature’s way of asserting its
majestic brilliance, and that it is neither boring nor one-dimensional as most social
scientists as well as some natural scientists picture it to be. In mathematics, for instance,
in order to find the value of ω, we do the following (Note: any letters can be used to
signify the following expression):
ω=υ
ω (ψa) = υ (ψa)
ω (ψa) ± (ψb) = υ (ψa) ± (ψb) ………………… (1)
Where, ‘ω’ is variable; ‘υ’ is the coefficient; ‘ψa’ and ‘ψb’ are any integers.
What the above equation elucidates, and what concerns us regarding polyphonic
knowledge is this: It signifies the way one arrives at or solves the equation depends on
the specific prober, viz. the question of what solves for ω will invariably vary according
to the particular prober; the prober is intimately tied to the question. The way one
questioner comprehends and solves the equation will differ. The value for ω will vary
from inquirer to inquirer, for there are many ways to get to the value; the value itself will
be diverse; and that there is no one universal value of ω, all values, as conceived by
various inquirers, are all equally valid. Perhaps, this shows that even nature is polyphonic
in its description of phenomena. What one learns from the above example is the
following: there are many ways to attain the understanding which one seeks. This,
concomitantly, shows the errors of most academic disciplines that assume there is only
one way to attain that which one seeks to understand. Understanding of phenomena (be it
natural or social) is not restricted to one specific method. Furthermore, an astute reader
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would have noticed understanding or knowledge can be ascertained in many diverse,
multifaceted ways.
One could only hope the above explication has clarified for the reader what is
meant by polyphonic rationality. Perhaps there is an element of truth in what Pareto
opined: one should employ “whatever” method one prefers, “all is allowed, all is fair,”
provided one can discover and “shed new light on old ones, and rectify errors.”73 Hence,
this is what we have tried to do, at least, to elucidate and thus clarify to the reader what
polyphonic knowledge is, in respect to this query, for, indeed, polyphonic rationality
cannot be understood or fathomed otherwise.
One may certainly think: the tone of this study is polemical or, even,
hyperbolical.74 Yet, it may comfort the reader to know that for a very long time one has
been an ardent supporter of that which one is going against in this present query. The
over-specialization of social sciences along with their narrow understanding led one
astray into dogmatic thinking, which is so prevalent today. Hence, this study is one’s way
of shedding much of the narrowness of one’s understandings which one had accumulated
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Pareto, Considerations on the Fundamental Principles of Pure Political
Economy, 1.
74
It is essential to remember that the reader should not reduce the passion of this
query to simple hyperbole. Indeed, one’s passionate reasoning about topics or issues
become hyperbolic even without one’s intentions. What this means is, the passion makes
the study lively and animated, it gives a sense of aliveness. Contrast this with queries
done by persons who are not passionate about their topic, one will find such persons’ to
write and speak about their topic as if everything is dead, lifeless, inert, motionless. Thus,
an astute reader will regard this paper to be inspired by or be imbued with the author’s
passion, not the author’s hyperbolical polemics.
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throughout one’s prolonged anesthetic exposure to this parochial academic discipline.75
So, with these pointers in mind, let us now turn to the critique of development literature.

Additionally, one wouldn’t want the astute reader to concur with what is
reasoned in this inquiry, because if anyone is to be in concurrence, then it might be
because something about the ideas reasoned here has not been properly understood. In
this regard, Epictetus quite rightly notes: “if you shall seem to some to be a person of
importance, distrust yourself.” See, Epictetus, The Enchiridion, XIII. The point being: the
fallibility of human knowledge as well as the ignorance of the majority. Thus, one would
very much hope for the reader to understand the arguments put forward, rather than to be
in agreement.
75
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CHAPTER II
RITUALS OF DEVELOPMENT
Overture
The examination of scholarships is done to illustrate the roots of scientific
rationality. This is done to ascertain how scientific rationality, implicitly and/ or
explicitly, influences development discourse. By examining, we simultaneously
illuminate the root as well as its predominance. In illuminating the primacy of scientific
rationality, we illuminate also the primacy of its two predicates: acme of institution and
economy.1 It is important to remember that substantiating the root of an abstract idea,
which scientific rationality is, is only possible through indirect means, never direct. The
abstract nature is what gives it its staying power, its formidable defense against critique,
its utopic optimism about progress, and its superiority through predictions. Hence, the
root source is substantiated through the primacy of scientific rationality, institution, and
economy.
The following section (section II) examines the root that privileges scientific
rationality and its attempt to transmute social analyses into science. Section III discusses
1

The reader should not take the present critique as a review of the works
themselves; instead they are critiqued in so far as they are relevant to our subject of
inquiry by exploring the common leitmotif arising from the examination. Because it
would be rather redundant to allude every parallel idea of the works critiqued, it is
prudent to concentrate only on those concepts which are of most urgent relevance to the
present matter of inquest. It would also be helpful for the reader to note the following
qualification: The present critique is not so much interested in the applied plans or
proposals expressed in the examined works; rather it is interested in the roots, i.e.
rationale, behind their views. In other words, the validity of their, say for instance,
economic, political strategies: such as, measures regarding trade, aid, domestic markets,
investments, sustainable development, consumptions, economic productivity, democracy,
etc.; are of little interest, since these are based on societal institutional changes and
primacy of economy, which are themselves predicated on scientific rationality.
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how pursuit for scientificity leads to espousing of institution, which is predicated on
scientific rationality. Section IV discusses how the logical progression from scientific
rationality to institution invariably requires economy as the basic lens from which to
cognize the whole of social inquiry.
Before we begin the critique, let us digress very briefly to make an essential note.
Since terms such as predominance, acme, privilege, primacy, dominance are utilized
constantly, it would be useful for the reader to understand this terms in congruence with
Gramsci’s idea of hegemony. This way unnecessary confusion can be avoided about the
aforesaid terms. Gramsci’s idea of “hegemony” is helpful here in illuminating the root as
well as in elucidating the predominance of scientific rationality along with its two
consequent predicates. In any society, influence of certain ideas, institutions, and values
dominate over others; however, it does so not through “domination,” but through, what
Gramsci identifies as, “consent.” This is to say, the word domination undergoes semantic
transformation to “consent” in order to conceal the coercive force of the state apparatus,
which is but the domination of certain groups. The two levels, civil society (under which
culture functions) and political society, correspond with one another to maintain groups’
hegemony in the society, while also, at the same instance, sustaining dominance through
state and judicial apparatus. Thus, in any society, certain forms of cultural beliefs and
institutions predominate over others; and these forms of cultural dominance are what
Gramsci identifies as “hegemony.”2 Pertaining to the present study, it is this cultural
hegemony that sustains the predominance of certain forms of rationality; it then
bourgeons the need to foist modern societal institutions and with it its accompanying
2

Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans. Quintin
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 2010).
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importance of economy. Implicit here is the need to create “consent” for the general
mass, which is in turn based on “the prestige…which the dominant group enjoys because
of its position and function in the world of production.”3 Certainly, as it will become
evident throughout this chapter, it is developed societies’ domination in the world of
material production—wealth, economic production, technology, mass consumerism—
that justifies their prying into traditional societies by dictating what is good or how they
should develop.
The Root: Primacy of Scientific Rationality
In order to reveal the root as well as the acme of scientific rationality, one must
also first grasp the role of ideas. By directing our attention to the role of ideas, we are not
digressing from the topic; instead, it provides context to an otherwise context-less
abstract rationality. And the context here is the human realm. Bringing the
aforementioned rationality within the context of the human realm enables one to critique
as well as explicate the root which cannot be otherwise substantiated directly, by showing
the vast chasm between the actualities of society, and what scientific rationality
proselytizes.
Scientific rationality is not concrete; it is an abstract idea continuously
reproduced through texts or scholarships. This is, of course, why we are critiquing the
scholarships of development; after all, this is what critiquing means: (as described in
Chapter One) assessment of an idea and its validity to everyday lived reality. It would
indeed be improper to disregard the role of idea when critiquing scientific rationality,
which is itself an abstract idea. Through text, the abstract rational idea is made less
3

Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 12.
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abstract and, at the same instance, made more concrete (of course, the idea still remains
abstract; but, this time a form is given to the rational idea). Moreover, this reproduction
continuously sustains its staying power or its longevity. Thus, ideas, especially scientific
ideas or rationality, have an influential aura that sustains them in the minds of thinkers.
They outlive the lives of those who bore them, and the coming generation breathes new
life by interpreting or misinterpreting the ideas of the past.4
One could, indeed, trace the longevity of rational ideas to, what Edward Said
identifies as, textual attitude. The term is of course referring to the tendency “to apply
what one learns out of a book literally to reality,” and in turn “risk folly or ruin.”5
Likewise, scientific rationality, which is itself an abstract entity, is written down or made
into scholarships for pedagogic learning. This erroneously leads academics, experts, and
professionals to literally apply what they have learned in scholarships to reality, hence,
the contemporary vogue to scientificity: measure. The root of scientific rationality is thus
illuminated. Just as seeds are planted into soil from which roots germinate, similarly, the
abstract scientific idea is the seed and scholarships or texts are its roots, viz. by the virtue
of being written down or textualized, the abstract idea forms its roots.
Certainly, men are quick to shut off any criticism against ‘rationality.’ Or,
rather, rationalists will not tolerate any kind of normative human judgment—be they
spiritual, moral, or ethical—being passed on what they do. The expressions of normative
judgment are the highest forms of human freedom; yet by shutting off criticisms against
rationality, one is robbed of one’s highest freedom. It matters not what one says to
rationalists, for it will not deter nor make them stop what they are doing because they are
conditioned by the very nature of their training to perform the objectives set for them.
They are not free, however. Rather they are determined to execute tasks rationality
demands, even if it means having an overspecialized narrow lens. Thence, most people
tend to ignore the permeating presence of diverse forms of rationality; and in doing so,
one takes for granted the heterogeneity of ideas that necessarily goes on to create the
varied human societies. By glossing over such aspects of rationality, we begin to confine
our thought process by probing into every issue through our narrow lens.
5
Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 93.
4
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Ideas about scientific rationality linger because of people’s erroneous tendencies
to rely on authoritative, systematic scholarships to understand the chaotic, uncertain
human society. This way human relations and contacts which are most important in
understanding are neglected by preferring the text of some authoritative authors. Works
on scientific rationality are indeed useful, for they serve as one of the many tools
available to understand societies; however, it becomes erroneous when these texts are
literally applied to reality, forgetting it is merely a tool, not a reality. This is what actually
has become in development discipline as well as in the social sciences, in general. When
faced with the disorganized, disordered chaos of human society, social scientists
adamantly prefer texts rather than face the chaotic disorientations of the actuality. This
kind of sloppy attitude was (and still is) ubiquitous in the field of Orientalism, vividly
elucidated by Said, as he writes:
because of this human tendency to fall back on a text when the uncertainties of
travel in strange parts seem to threaten one’s equanimity…, [m]any travelers find
themselves saying of an experience in a new country that it wasn’t what they
expected, meaning that it wasn’t what a book said it would be. And of course
many writers of travel books…compose them in order to say that a country is like
this, or better, that it is colorful, expensive, interesting, and so forth. The idea in
either case is that people, places, and experiences can always be described by a
book, so much so that the book (or text) acquires a greater authority, and use,
even than the actuality it describes (italics in original).6
Said’s description of Orientalism as a discipline riddled with dogmatic
stereotypings, thereby creating realities about the Orients, which became the idées reçues
of the field, is no different from social sciences’ portrayal of the traditional. Scientific
scholarships on development, likewise, tell professional experts and academics that
traditional societies have no sense of reasoning or science; that they are backward,
6

Said, Orientalism, 93.
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primitive, believe in myths, superstitions, etc. In such circumstances, the actuality of
peoples’ lives is relegated in favor of scholarships, hence giving rise to, what Michel
Foucault identifies as, a discourse;7 a discourse outlining, even detailing, what to discuss,
how to carry out studies, and who to listen to. The discourse, to experts and academics,
thus, becomes the reality, where life in these societies must be as they are described in
texts of scholarships one reads, so much so the texts “create…the very reality they appear
to describe (italics in original).”8
Such an outlook reminds one of Stendhal’s crystallization,9 where one allocates
fantasized, idealized attributes to a person who, in reality, possesses none of those
characteristics. Reliance on scholarships rather than lived experiences is much like
Stendhal’s crystallization, attributing perceived, fantasized qualities to societies. The
textual attitude replaces actualities of society, viz. turning actualities into fantasies and
fantasies into actualities. The transposition of abstract ideas into reality is made even
more acute by the languid attitude of experts, academics to place an indiscriminant
amount of conviction in the ideas purported in texts: how development should be
approached, how it is to be studied, what is to be expected from the examined society,
how the discipline is to be made into a science, etc. In sum, a new discourse is conceived.
A whole new set of texts is manufactured to support the discourse’s monopolistic claims
to understand the subject of development, thereby establishing “a discursive practice that
sets the rules of the game, who can speak, from what points of view, with what authority,
7

See, Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1972); and Discipline & Punishment: The Birth of Prison (New York: Vintage
Books, 1995).
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and according to what criteria of expertise; it sets the rules that must be followed for this
or that problem, theory or object to emerge and be named, analysed, and eventually
transformed into a policy or a plan.”10 Certainly, the world of academics, experts,
policymakers is ruled by little else, for without such preplanned dogmas their systematic,
methodical world usually breaks down. This is why, they insist, “…on standard
arguments against standard violations of standard standards. Exclamations such as
‘inconsistent!’, ‘ad hoc!’, ‘irrational!’, ‘degenerating!’, ‘cognitive meaningless!’ recur
with tiring regularity. Illiteracy, however, not only does not matter, it is a sign of
professional excellence. It is required, not just tolerated. All the distinctions of the
discipline (context of discovery/context of justification; logical/psychological;
internal/external, and so on) have but one aim: to turn incompetence (ignorance of
relevant material and lack of imagination) into expertise (happy assurance that the things
not known and unimaginable are not relevant and that it would be professionally
incompetence to use them) (italics in original).”11 In such an environment, understanding
is relegated to the realm of metaphysics.
One must recognize the big differences between understanding something
intellectually or textually, as wonted among academics, experts and something through
lived experiences. Society cannot be understood in its fullness through intellectual
contemplation on scholarships. To understand something intellectually is to detach
oneself from the human realm and dawdle aimlessly in the cold, impersonal abstract
realm. Hence, one must immerse into societies’ manners of life; one not only needs to
10

Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995), 41.
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experience, even feel, the emotions, sympathies, mysteries, lore of the natives, but also
appreciate the meaningful significance the natives’ modes of thought provide to persons
within. If one assumes that one can systematically bring to order the disorienting chaos of
society, not through human exchange but through scholarships, then one can never
understand the issues one is probing. The books, articles, intellectual contemplations are
tools through which to reach understanding; they are neither reality nor understanding;
besides, they are superfluous; they are impersonal; most importantly, they neglect
society’s lived experiences.
Furthermore, what is of interest when examining the root is not the importance of
the works to be critiqued, but rather the particular leitmotif, i.e. scientific rationality,
continuously reproduced in the form of texts or scholarships. This interminable
reproduction can perhaps be best conveyed by Burke’s parable of endless conversation.
He writes:
Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive, others have
long preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion, a discussion too
heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is about. In fact, the
discussion had already begun before any of them got there, so that no one present
is qualified to retrace for you all the steps that had gone on before. You listen for
a while, until you decide that you have caught the tenor of the argument; then you
put in your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; another comes to your
defense; another aligns himself against you, to either the embarrassment or
gratification of your opponent, depending upon the quality of your ally’s
assistance. However, the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late, you
must depart. And you do depart, with the conversation still in progress.12
Here, the conversation which began even prior to one’s interlocution is rooted in
some topic SR. The conversation, however, ceaselessly continues based on SR; then one
joins in the ongoing discussion. Even when one decides to leave, the discussion goes on,
12

Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (New York, NY: Vintage
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while new comers to the parlor join the ongoing conversation. Yet, the source from which
the conversation began goes on, or is reproduced in each new stage or with each new
comer into the discussion. Thus, pertinent to this study, it becomes essential to examine
the root, not join in the ongoing conversation. To simply join in the conversation for its
own sake is to aimlessly prattle in a heated discussion, not knowing whether it is even
proper to put in one’s oar. But in examining the roots, one is in better position to judge if
the ceaseless conversation based on one leitmotif is worth one’s valuable breath and
energy, i.e. to join in the conversation. This is to say, by understanding the roots, one is in
better position to discern whether the endless conversation has veered off topic, has been
misconstrued, or the present conversation has nothing whatever to do with the initial
topic, etc. This way one better understands the conversation.
Recapitulating what has been said thus far (so as to refresh the reader’s mind,
thereby, avoid confusions), scientific rationality exists in the abstract world (of the mind)
brought into concreted existence through scholarships. Herein lies the root of scientific
rationality, i.e. the scholarships; after all, just as the root germinates from the seed,
likewise, the abstract scientific rationality sprouts its roots in the form of scholarships.
And just as the root absorbs nutrients from the soil in order to sustain the plants (in other
words, nutrients from soil are absorbed by the root which then passes the nutrients to
different parts of the plant), so similarly, once scientific rationality is given a form, i.e.
textualized, all future scholarships materialize from the initial root. As a result, scientific
rationality is constantly reproduced. This perennial reproduction also means the
prevalence of “textual attitude”; hence, numerous academics may discuss different issues,
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yet the root from which they approach their examined issues nevertheless invariably
remains the same—scientific rationality.
This attitude, with regard to development, leads one to easily justify the
prominence of scientific rationality because it affords one to assume away all the untidy,
uncertain, unorderly aspects of society, and concentrate only on its facile aspects: the
methodologically neat, systematic measurable features of society. When academics or
experts come face to face with the puzzling uncertainties of development because nothing
is said in influential texts about issues one is faced with, they heedlessly gloss over those
experiences as something frivolous or insignificant.13 Instead, they concentrate on the
scientifically definable terms, since, by virtue of being scientifically defined, the term is
devoid of any perplexing reservation about its objectivity. As Malinowski reasons, the
definitions “in reality...are condensed formulae which contain extensive recipes for the
organization of perspective in field-work. And this really is the hallmark of scientific
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One vivid example of such nescience is Jared Diamond’s, Guns, Germs, and
Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997).
In it he begins by trying to answer a native New Guinean’s, one Yali, question: “Why is
it that you white people developed so much cargo and brought it to New Guinea, but we
black people had little cargo of our own?” (Diamond 1997, 14). The answer to which
Diamond proffers is: environmental variables, such as: continental differences
influencing the availability of wild plants and animals for domestication, migration and
diffusion affecting crops, livestock; climate and latitude of the geographic regions;
ecological barriers; differences in the size of the population and area (Diamond 1997). No
doubt, being an evolutionary biologist did induce Diamond to conceive of a scientific
answer. Yet, what Diamond is unaware of is the nature of Yali’s question. Yali is not
asking a scientific, materialistic question, but a cultural and human query. The fault lies
in Diamond’s narrow lens because it is rare for a scientific researcher to be asked such a
subjective cultural question, since nothing is talked about on questions of such nature in
the influential scientific texts. Yali’s question is not about the material poverty of his
society, instead his is about his bafflement on “white people” fixation with material
goods. So, the 25 years and 547 pages it took Diamond to answer Yali’s question is
irrelevant to the nature of the question asked.
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definition.”14 The neat systematized definitions forming concepts resemble the objective
inquiries of exact sciences, where, according to Douglas North, the explanations “are
logically consistent and in principle subject to empirical verification.”15 While others
insist, one ought to “discard adventitious and fortuitous happenings”16 in scientific
studies of culture because they are unscientific, non-empirical events and are “beyond the
reach of the methodology of empirical science.”17
The exigency for certainty in human society can be, North argues, increased by
“the accretion of knowledge,” and through generalization that “makes us good not only at
modeling “reality,” but also constructing theories in the face of real uncertainty.”18 Yet,
generalization is only possible by discarding non-empirical happenings or even rejecting
the existence of such experiences. This is what Foucault identified as the mechanisms of
exclusion, where certain kinds of experience or knowledge are buried and/or disqualified
as inadmissible to hierarchy of eruditions and scientific inquiries.19 Furthermore, to
disregard the essential aspects of culture by labelling them as non-empirical,
“adventitious and fortuitous happenings” means writing off that which gives meaning and
significance to the term society.
14

Bronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1944), 115.
15
Douglas North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005), 16 and 4n.
16
Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture, 5.
17
Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1951),
329. Many leading scholars from various disciplines in ‘social sciences’ have been very
much influenced by his work (especially this and The Structure of Social Action),
certainly the institutionalism as well as the positivism in economics and political studies,
which now dominate these fields, are very much influenced by his work.
18
North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, 73, 27.
19
Michel Foucault, “Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the College De
France, 1975-76, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 32, 8.

65
By slanting toward natural sciences, social analyses attempt to become more
scientific in its approach by ordaining clear-cut, generalizable canons, variables,
parameters, definitions, methods, etc.20 The relevant discipline, according to Parsons,
must duly adhere to “the basic norms of scientific knowledge”—empirical validity,
logical clarity and consistency, and generalizability of the “principles” involved.21 Thus,
Malinowski espoused, every event in human society and culture has to be reduced to
generalizable statements, where “every statement and every argument has to be made in
words, that is, concepts. Each concept, in turn, is the result of a theory which declares
that some facts are relevant and others adventitious.”22 Parsons, likewise, held similar
views, as he insisted on the use of scientific methods in social inquiries since, according
20

The notion of generalizable concepts, parameters, etc. are espoused because, by
virtue of generalizing, it makes the concepts, parameters, methods readily applicable to
any society regardless of their relevance. Alex Inkeles asserts, for instance, the main task
is to improve the “conceptual tools and methodological equipment to make us more
effective in the study of any society (italics in original).” See, Inkeles, “Understanding a
Foreign Society: A Sociologist’s View,” World Politics 3 (January 1951): 269-280.
Meaning: ‘any’ society can be readily studied by applying the conceptual tools, methods,
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to Parsons, advancements stem from the generalizability of knowledge, concepts, theories
along with the development of special investigative methodologies.23 Therefore, to make
“the study of man more scientific,” science becomes an indispensable tool.24 This in turn,
as North maintains, “enormously improve[s] the usefulness of social science theory in
confronting human problems.”25 Jeffrey Sachs, as if to make this point, also asserts,
“Science has been the key to development from the very start of the industrial revolution,
the fulcrum by which reason is translated into technologies of social advance.”26 One
could indeed see the laudation Sachs accords to science in the development of societies.
Other scholars put to heart the call made by Malinowski and Prasons: Lipset, for instance,
affirms the importance of hypotheses and empirically testable statements in social
analyses.27 This is why Rostow, for instance, claimed his study of society along with its
pertinent stages of economic growth as the general “theory about modern history as a
whole.”28 Enthusiasm such as these led North to assert, models and theories in social
science have pragmatic ends, where the results spewed out of such studies afford
practical policies to be enacted to produce the intended results.29
No wonder, in desperation to become science, we see Inglehart and Welzel carry
out social investigation by means of survey (and opinion polls) and apply them to
23
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statistical probabilities; they qualify their study as scientific or empirical, to which one
author in the foreword hailed their work to be the “grand theory” in human
development.30 This is of course, a very bold claim because such “grand theory” (i.e.
grand theory of everything) has not even come to pass in the natural sciences. Also any
astute reader or scholar will find this troubling because how did opinion and survey polls
become science; if this is science then we are indeed in a very sorry state as far as
advancement in human knowledge is concerned. Certainly, the greatest scientific
achievements—quantum physics, electro-magnetism, gravity, theory of atomic structures,
etc.,—were not the result of surveys or opinion polls.
Not to be outdone by the above authors, Paul Collier claims to show the reality of
the poorest societies by the means of “statistical evidence.”31 In other words, the actual
lives of human being are reduced to statistical probabilities and numbers. For Collier, the
realities of the living, breathing person are of less significance than the “statistical
evidence.” For him, the reality is numbers not actual human lives. Here, one of the tools
for our understanding becomes the understanding and the reality. No longer is emphasis
30
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given on the need to understand, rather central importance is placed on methodologies
which are, then, mistaken as understanding. Malinowski objurgates the unscientific
methods of historians and humanists because, for him, means other than scientific
methods are “immoral”; he urges social sciences to “lay their foundations…on the
bedrock of scientific method,”32 which is staunchly adhered to by today’s experts,
academics, and professionals.
William Easterly certainly was in congruence with this view of Malinowski; for
him, the only way forward for development programs to be successful in the poor,
traditional societies was through “scientific evaluation,” where expert professional staffs
are “trained in the scientific method…who will evaluate random samples” of agencies’
effort; furthermore, these agents and agencies “must be constantly experimenting and
searching for interventions that work, verifying what works with scientific evaluation…”;
they “must [furthermore] carefully track the impact of their projects on poor people using
the best scientific tools available… (italics added).”33 Easterly disregards the human
aspects of unfortunate societies, which he so steadfastly advocates in his polemics. He (as
well as other academics, experts, NGOs, aid agencies) is unaware of how the most benign
of intensions helps bring misery if all that matters are the scientific methods, experiments
and/ or how to improve scientific evaluations, because the emphasis of such demands is
no longer on the social, cultural, spiritual, moral well-being, but on the tools of research
and evaluation. In other words, scientific tool becomes the acme of understanding,
everything else becomes peripheral.
32
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One can see from what has been expounded thus far that there is an inherent
predilection in the examined scholarships to invoke the necessity to borrow and apply
methodologies of natural science in the social sciences. Yet, in such blinkered zeal, they
failed to realize what Gramsci had once remarked about applying methods borrowed
from different disciplines, he wrote: “To think that one can advance the progress of a
work of scientific research by applying to it a standard method, chosen because it has
given good results in another field of research to which it was naturally suited, is a
strange delusion which has little to do with science (italics added).”34 The verity of
Gramsci’s statement stands on its own. It is indeed a “strange delusion” to replicate the
methodologies of natural sciences in queries concerning social phenomena because
methods which natural sciences utilize are “naturally suited” to the nature of their
inquests. One will see in the following two sections how such appeal is perpetuated.
This section tried to elucidate how the acme of scientific rationality demands
social inquests to become more scientific, by borrowing methods from the natural
sciences. However, in order to make social analyses scientific, it necessitates the need for
concrete isolate factors as well as for human activities that best represents the
quantitative aspects of society: modern institutions and economy. This concomitant is
only logical: prominence of institution and economy follows acme of scientific rationality
because they are inseparable aspects of the aforesaid rationality that render social science
scientific.
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Therefore, the next section (section III) explicates how the primacy of scientific
rationality necessitates the acme of institutions; section IV discusses scientific rationality
and acme of economy.
Scientific Rationality and Institution
For any discipline to become scientific, it requires narrowing of discipline’s scope
of interests, which is also a precursor to the specialization of the field. This means
recognizing the object of study, establishing methodological canons, parameters,
concepts, isolating factors/variables relevant to the discipline, establishing general or
universally valid laws, etc., viz. what the narrowing, with it the specialization, does is to
jettison all the clustered disordered aspects of a discipline, thereby retaining only those
features that can be grasped and dissected in a methodologically tidy fashion. In regard to
the scientific study of society, this means isolating an aspect of society for concrete
analysis. This aspect, for Malinowski, is institution, which we know today to be central in
socio-scientific (quantifiable) analyses.35 It is hardly surprising then that Ronald A.
Heiner proffered how predictable behavior emerges out of uncertainty. 36 He argues, in an
uncertain, chaotic world, the flexibility of agent’s behaviors must be restricted so as to
35
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conceive a set of institutional rules, thus, producing recognizable, predictable patterns of
behavior. Simply put, it highlights the evolution of institutions due to the presence of
uncertainty, where certain sets of behavior or norm, deemed acceptable to (agent or)
society, are established. Of course, one of the main rationales behind his paper was to
support the scientific explanations and predictions of human society and behavior. Heiner
was not shy to claim how his theory was applicable to all disciplines concerning human
activities. No wonder, North asserts, it is “the development of the institutional framework
that has undergirded (italics added)” the development of science; moreover, “an intricate
mixture of new knowledge, applied knowledge, and techniques were integrated together
by institutions…to realize the potential of this [i.e. scientific] knowledge.”37 In other
words, “the growth of knowledge is dependent on complimentary institutions which will
facilitate and encourage such growth.”38 This means that the development of science is
facilitated by rational institutions because it requires rationalized institutions to make use
of scientific knowledge. North has made a big claim by asserting institutions as the basis
for the development of science, but what is of more interest, pertinent to this study, is
how institutions are directly equated with science. Perhaps, this no doubt provides a clue
as to why institutions form the core of contemporary social scientific examinations.
Institution39—well established rules, procedures, customs, norms, values, etc.—
for Malinowski, is the concrete reality, the real isolate factor needed for the scientific
37
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study of culture. The concept of institution, for him, already implies “a number of
generalizations or scientific laws of process and of product”; therefore, factors other than
institution, he argues, are incorrect.40 For him, any study where culture is the main
object, institutions cannot be ignored; they must, in other words, be the center of
analysis.41 North, in parity with Malinowski, places institution at the center of social
examinations, especially with respect to societal changes. He saw institutions—by
increasing the stock of knowledge and replacing standing systems—as the restorer of
order and certainty in a non-ergodic, disorderly human world; this way, the non-ergodic
world becomes predictable with institutions stipulating rules, limits, principles, choices,
and incentives for every aspect of human activity.42 In the quest to transform social
studies into science, institution—be it family, religious, social, or economic—becomes
the general, universally valid law of society. What is more, for Malinowski, culture is a
means to an end, an instrument;43 culture, in other words, is to be studied, analyzed,
rather than to be understood. This way the close resemblance as well as the intimate
relation with natural sciences provides, to the theory of culture, a specific answer to the

foisted. Furthermore, the present study dichotomizes standing values, norms, practices,
belief systems, i.e. shibboleths, of the traditional world, from modern institutions of the
developed world. The term ‘institutions’ is not used in reference to traditional society’s
values, norms, habits, belief systems because one will find the term ‘institution’ is an
inaccurate designation. In many traditional societies there are no such concepts as
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systems (moreover, all aspects of society are seen in combined holistic manner, i.e.
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chaotic actualities of society. In sum, the quantifiable aspect of the study offers predictive
power, forcing the observer to answer either positively or negatively to a series of
questions purported in the analysis.44 This way, specific answers, rather than
indeterminate answers, are ascertained. The room for grey area (good and bad, or yes
and no, etc.) is discarded in favor of binary coded answer: 0 or 1, yes or no, this or that,
etc.
Malinowski as well as others had grasped the influencing power of institution; not
only is it quantifiable and thus a fulcrum from which to transform social sciences into
scientific discipline, but he also realized how “the processes of training, of drill, of
implanting of correct attitudes and manners are inherent in the working of each
institution,” and how “every organized institution provides for specific apprenticeship, in
which the newly incorporated member has first of all to learn the rules of trade, of social
duty, of etiquette, and of ethics.”45 Malinowski was right to have such an outlook because
institution reinforces, rewards, punishes certain kinds of habits, norms, etc. “The animal
psychology,” writes Malinowski, “teaches us one important fact: a habit which is not
reinforced becomes unlearned, “extinguished.” It disappears. We can apply this fully to
culture…When a habit ceases to be rewarded, reinforced, that is, vitally useful, it simply
drops out.”46 Expressed differently, it becomes important to reinforce the norms, habits,
practices, and customs of the rationalized institutions in traditional societies; in doing so,
the traditional shibboleths cease “to be rewarded,” thereby they become “unlearned,” or
“extinguished.” To achieve the desired goals, the prevailing shibboleths need to be
44
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undermined, eroded: “the life of a society when the traditional structure is undermined
piecemeal,” insists Rostow, “…the modern elements, values, and objective achieve a
definite break-through; and they come to control the society’s institutions; and then,
having made their point, with their opponents in retreat or disarray they drive to carry the
process of modernization to its logical conclusion (italics added).”47 When the existing
shibboleths are eroded, modern institutional values are implanted without difficulty,
thereby changing the very nature of traditional societies. This way, one of the principal
hurdles standing in the way of development is removed: cultural attitude towards foreign
modes of thought. The following remark by Parsons makes clear about the intention
stated in the previous sentences:
The place of science in Western society is part of the ascendency of a cultural
tradition which involves a high valuation of certain types of rationality of
understanding of the empirical world…. Once such valuation is established and
built into the institutional system, it comes to be strongly reinforced by the
practical fruits…. In all probability only when such a combination has become
firmly established does it become possible for scientific investigation to acquire
the level of prestige which it had enjoyed in the modern Western world (italics
added).48
What it means is, “the rules of trade, of social duty, of etiquette, and of ethics” of
the new institutions are implanted into societies; it means that society is indoctrinated
into unchallenged superiority of scientific rationality, while labeling other modes as
absurdities; it also means derision of preexisting beliefs as irrational or unscientific that
deserve to be replaced by rational institutions. By indoctrinating new beliefs, society
begins to change so as to realize the idealized goals espoused by scientific experts: how a
developing, traditional society must look like or become.
47
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Parsons, likewise, maintains, “the main non-empirical problem areas is [sic]
“culture bound” because empirical science does not have the same relative position in
other cultures as it does in that of the modern Western world”:49 This means that not only
is the non-western world lingering in backwardness, but they also have to be guided by
rational, civilized societies, otherwise how can they jettison their incorrect, wrong belief
systems: their beliefs in myth, supernatural, and so forth. Therefore, in order to steer
these backward societies toward the correct, right belief system, i.e. scientific rationality,
they must be guided by the benign hands of the civilized world. Collier, consistent with
such attitude, remarks, these societies, “coexist with the twenty-first century, but their
reality is the fourteenth century,” riddled with “plague” and “ignorance.”50 Indeed, the
justification to what gives developed societies the right to decide not only which mode of
thought to supersede the standing irrational and unempirical knowledge of the natives,
but also what kind of institutions to be implanted comes from the benevolent image they
have of themselves. Perhaps this is why Rostow asserts: “There may not be much
civilization left to save unless we of the democratic north face and deal with the
challenges implicit in the stage-of-growth, as they now stand in the world, at the full
stretch of our moral commitment, our energy, and our resources”; we must do so because
traditional societies “have the right to live their time in civilized settings, marked by a
degree of respect for their uniqueness and their dignity…”; as such, these societies “have
the right to expect the world of advanced democracies to help on an enlarged scale
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(italics added).”51 It is obviously clear from the above statement how Rostow has already
decided what is good and civilized for other cultures. The gage which serves as a measure
of civilized society is his own society, thus assuming the superiority of beliefs he is
nurtured with. Even his claim of “respect for…uniqueness and…dignity” of traditional
societies is negated by his assertion of “the right to live their time in civilized settings”
because dictating what is good and what counts as civilized, and imposing those values to
justify the right to civilized life only undermine the human dignity and respect he so
ardently speaks of.
North, echoing parallel views, sees traditional societies trying to shed their old
beliefs as they move towards modern institutions; he argues, these societies must prevail
over “the process of disintegration [as they wrestle]…to overcome the rigidities and
erroneous beliefs that confront societies attempting to make fundamental changes (italics
added).”52 North already assumes traditional societies to be in a state of discontentment
and wanting change; yet, he ignores the unquenchable novel needs and desires that
modernity necessarily brings, and how such novel needs in turn create dissatisfaction
with the old belief systems. And, for North, anything traditional is “erroneous”;
“erroneous” because (as dictated by logic) the society he lives in is affluent, hence what
other societies are adhering to must be incorrect, otherwise they should be like his own
society. Similar sentiments are echoed by Sachs: “Human institutions…should be
designed in the light of reason precisely to control or harness the irrational side of human
behavior (italics added).”53 By “irrational side of human behavior,” Sachs means those
51
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belief systems not considered to be rational, as ascertained by the developed world—as
he alludes to Kant, Comte, Adam Smith, Condorcet, Locke, Hume to define what rational
human behavior means. Collier, likewise, affirms, there are people in traditional societies
who want change, therefore, developed societies “can do much more to strengthen the
hands of the reformers. But to do so we will need to draw upon tools—such as military
interventions, international standard-setting, and trade policy… (italics added).”54
Collier sees societies everywhere in need of guidance. Hence, according to him, it is only
proper not to leave these cultures alone; rather they should be baptized in the virtues,
norms, and values of the benevolent developed world. This certainly means bringing all
societies in uniformity with the developed world, which cannot be achieved without some
form of universalized institutions, which Collier feverously supports. Therefore, Easterly
notes, the only hope for poor traditional societies is to borrow “ideas and technology
from the West.”55 Of course, Easterly thinks it sensible for the rest of the world’s society
to emulate and adopt “ideas and technologies from the West,” after all who wouldn’t
want to be like them.
Thus, traditional societies “must focus their minds on the task of development,”
by “appealing to those values in the west”; moreover, they must also work towards and
“accept a large part of responsibility for making those values [i.e. values in the west]
come to life, in terms of their own societies and cultures.”56 Congruently, Collier
54
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designates those embracing values, norms, and institutions of developed societies as
“heroes” and urges to support “the heroes in the struggle that is already being waged”; as
he continues, “It is important to us [i.e. the developed world] that these people win their
struggle (italic added).”57 It is abundantly clear that no opportunity must be passed to
disseminate the ‘civilized’ values and belief systems. Put differently, no occasion must be
missed to establish one universal mindset. For North, to help society means, one must
first understand it then carry out changes.58 He is not satiated to leave cultures as they are,
instead they are in need of guidance because they are trapped in their old beliefs awaiting
Prometheus to steal fire from the gods to illuminate their darkened world, and Hephaestus
to provide tools, metals, and crafts to ignite their ingenuity. And why is there a need for
change? The answer is, development and economic prosperity, i.e. civilization, requires
“fundamental institutional reforms.”59 And the reforms initiate by foisting the ideas of
science, for Parsons, “constitute[s] the primary source of initiation of change in the more
general belief system of the society.”60
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Evident thus far are the pillory of non-western cultures. Indeed, it reminds one of
the way most Occident habitually viewed the Orients because to the former, the latter is
inferior in every seemingly way possible: from culture—languages, arts, modes of
thought, science, music, alphabets, etc.—to the most trivial matters such as dress, facial
expressions, even the manner they carry themselves.61 One has only to read the work
Modern Egypt by Sir Evelyn Baring, The Earl of Cromer (the first British Viceroy of
Egypt), to reify the long held attitude of Malinowski, Parsons, Rostow, North, and others
of the superiority of the Western beliefs, mindsets. The Earl was quick to pass judgment
about the Orients by claiming they were incapable of reasoning, lack logical faculty,
cannot perform a simplest of arithmetical task, alien to reason, incapable to walk on a
paved road, have no personal hygiene, easily believe in magic or supernatural, they were
docile, meek and submissive, lack any moral standards, and so forth.62 The contemporary
view of non-western cultures by academics or experts is no different from views held by
Earl of Cromer. Of course, today’s pillories are wrapped in language of scientifically
neutral, objective terms: lack rational belief systems, modern institutions, proper
investigative faculties, and pervasiveness of myths, other non-empirical beliefs, etc. Yet
the sentiments behind these platitudinous terms are the same; they arise from the long
held convictions about the inferiority of any non-western shibboleths. Robert Heilbroner
denigrates traditional societies by remarking, “the underdeveloped world has no
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history,”63 treating them as if they were not even human. Implicit in Heilbroner’s
statement is his view that traditional societies are savages—even close to animals—and
hence they do not possess cultural or social history.
Rostow, displaying facsimile views, asserts the development of West as the
function of expansion in scientific knowledge, i.e. “spirit of science,” and absences of
traditional belief systems.64 From such a perspective, it means anything—be their belief
systems, practices, faculty processes, etc.—that is Western is right or correct; while
anything that is not is wrong, incorrect, hence, they must be changed. North, Easterly,
and Inglehart and Welzel, in analogous with Rostow, assert how society’s progress
depends on its cultural heritage, i.e. “path dependency,”65 meaning, society’s responses
to social problems very much depend upon its cultural heritage: “Their cultural heritage
will, in many instances, determine the success or lack of success of the actors. To the
extent that the cultural heritage has equipped them to deal with such problems they may,
in fact, make responses that make that environment more predictable. If they have not
been so equipped they may make inappropriate responses or relegate the issue to
63
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witchcraft and /or similar anti-rational responses (italics added).”66 One can see from the
above statement the disparaged views toward traditional societies and their beliefs, as if
these were something abnormal, unevolved, or something not even human. Note how
easily North relegates societies that cannot increment certainty or predictability to “antirational” and “witchcraft.” But why? Because, for North, if a society does not make its
environment more predictable, then this is due to the “inappropriate” response since to be
appropriate means to be rational, thereby augmenting certainty; this way society’s
success is equated to cultural heritage—like those of the developed world, which he
speaks so fondly of in his work. Differently put, traditional societies are not developed
because of their cultural heritage. Furthermore, for North, since developed societies are
well-advanced and traditional societies are not, it is obviously the traditional systems that
are incorrect, or “anti-rational.” And because social science practitioners see culture to be
a means to an end, a tool, an instrument, it can be modified, replaced, or improved just
like any generic, mass industrial product being replaced by its plentiful undifferentiating
exchangeable parts. No longer is there a need to appreciate, accept cultures as they are.
Being a tool, any traditional society in its present state is viewed as something
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undesirable, something to be transformed into something sublime—such attitude only
reminds one of Stendhal’s crystallization.
Implanting new beliefs, i.e. new institutions, brings stark changes to societies. As
Rostow fervently advocated, traditional societies must “become prepared for a life of
change and specialized function (italics added).”67 Certainly, those who espouse change
care not the actual lived consequences that befall upon the natives, who invariably will
have to bear the brunt of the idealistic fantasies of development. The espousers of
development care only in so far as their ideas are implemented or embraced by the who’s
who in the world of academics, experts, professionals, policymakers.
Moreover, there is often a benevolent outlook about the changes endorsed. This is
because for Sachs, modern institutions “help foster economic system that spread the
benefits of science, technology, and the division of labor to all parts of the world”; they
also “help promote science and technology, grounded in human rationality, to fuel the
continued prospects of improving the human condition (italics added).”68 So, for Sachs
and others, how can this not be beneficial to traditional societies? After all, modern
institutions grounded on “human rationality” are bound to “foster economic system” that
ignites societal development. This logically leads one to assume, since modern
institutions help societies develop, because it is rooted in rationality of science, the
process of transition for any society is always at equilibrium, or what Parsons calls,
homeostatic equilibrium: meaning, when one part of society changes, other parts
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accordingly change, thereby, maintaining stability within the whole social system.69 This
is to say when one institution faces social change, remaining institutions must change
accordingly to maintain equilibrium, or bring the society in disequilibrium, due to change
to equilibrium. This is to say that there is a linear progression to societal changes.
North, displaying similar views, asserts, “changing just one institution in an
attempt to get the desired performance is always an incomplete…activity.”70 North is, of
course, referring to the point of disequilibrium, which results due to the lack of change in
the corresponding societal institutions to bring society, in transformation, back to
equilibrium. In unison with Parsons and North’s view, Inglehart and Welzel assert
societal (human) development is attained with concurrent changes in socioeconomic
institution, which increases the existential security; cultural institution, which proliferates
rational-self expressive values; and political institution, which promotes democratic
values.71 Thus, for Parsons, North, and Inglehart and Welzel, society always transforms
at equilibrium, i.e. it requires complete alteration. If transformation is not at equilibrium,
then it is the fault of a given society, since it is limiting the change to one (or few)
69
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institution instead of the required transformation of all its institutions. Undoubtedly, for
the aforementioned authors, transforming at equilibrium shows how well a society is
adapting to “novel situations” and how well they have evolved, as these illustrate the
proper development of human mind; hence, the society will become better-off. However,
if society has (or is) not developed as envisioned, then they have failed to adapt, evolve,
and lack proper development of human mind, since, according to North, “that much of
our behavior is genetically driven.”72 One can see the contempt towards non-conformist
cultures: to reason a culture is traditional because it has not fully evolved, genetically, is
to jettison the complex aspects of human society by reducing them to genetics and
evolution. Such reductionism enables North to implicitly accept the view that since all
human behaviors are genetically driven toward modern civilized lives, it must mean
traditional societies haven’t yet evolved genetically. Thus, the blame ultimately falls
upon the society, not on those who naively advocate societal transformations.
In any culture, standing shibboleths encourage certain kinds of behavior while
discouraging others. Some may encourage communal harmony, conviviality, shared
property, dependency, while others may encourage mass consumptions, individual
achievements and independence, market and monetization of society, productivity,
competition, efficiency, etc. And all of these depend upon the lived experiences of
society and the day-to-day social realities in which persons navigate in order to maintain
some kind of harmony. Different values, customs, ethics bring about their own unique
blend of social norms which everyone must in many ways abide by. As such, in
supplanting existing shibboleths by modern institutions, they promote their own specific
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kinds of beliefs, thought processes, human activities, analytical investigations, and
societal institutions. It also encourages incentive toward certain kinds of skill and
knowledge; it will increase certainty and pay-off for those adhering to the new
institutional rules, while simultaneously increasing its bias towards the old system.73
It is crucial to understand one specific element within institution (which is itself
brought to fore by the need to make computable scientific inquest possible) that plays one
of the vital roles in its self-perpetuation: conformity or uniformity. The element of
conformity is never explicit in institution; yet it is an ever present state that gives
institution much of its form, just as our unconscious-self, nevertheless, influences our
everyday conscious being, even when we are unaware of its presence or effects.74
Likewise, to properly elucidate (so as to help the reader properly recognize) the role of
institution in social-scientific inquiry, it becomes essential to dig-up or bring to light, if
you will, the hidden aspect, thereby, revealing the much obscure element that necessarily
underlies institution, i.e. the relationship between institution and conformity. The
For instance, “The development of well-specified property rights…will make
the overall environment more predictable but will increase uncertainty for those who
traditionally have used the land in question without having formal title.” Ibid., 59, 15. It
matters very little to North about those who adhere to the old system; for him, it is only
rational that old beliefs be superseded by modern institutions since they are a hindrance
to economic efficiencies of civilization. Similarly, Hernando De Soto reasons poor in
developing societies possess unrealized capital—in the form of properties without proper
documentations and ownership rights. As such, actualizations of these properties into
‘capital,’ by means of instating property (titles) rights and other predicated institutions
will enable the poor to sell or mortgage their properties/lands, thereby, facilitating
development, growth, and prosperity. See, De Soto, The Mystery of Capital (New York,
NY: Basic Books, 2000). What is evident in De Soto’s argument is the inherent call for
traditional societies to conform or move towards institutional systems of the developed
world: property rights, capitalization/monetization, loans, etc.
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obscurity of conformity, however, does not mean it is frivolous; rather, like any genius of
an architect or advisor, its obscurity only suggests the magnitude of its importance.
Certainly, many will find any examination of conformity tedious, especially due to its
abstract, turbid nature; even its empirical substantiation can only be suggested indirectly,
never directly.75 Nevertheless, the relation between institution and conformity is only the
logical progression of scientific mode of thought, since institution, the real isolate factor,
is itself predicated on scientific rationality. Indeed, for Malinowski, North, and others,
institution is the center of any social analysis; it makes scientific study of culture and
society possible by making the non-ergodic world ergodic: predictable, uniform. Just as
scientific methods demand conformity regarding its methods (while disqualifying those
deviating from the established methods as unscientific, irrational, novels), similarly
modern rationalized institutions (themselves predicated on scientific rationality) demand
conformity (while punishing deviant persons or belief systems); after all, conformity
enables the transformation of the non-ergodic to the ergodic world.76
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Parsons was thus especially keen on such aspects of social structure, especially
because of persons’ inherent tendency to conform. The reward-punishment mechanisms
very easily reify persons’ conformity, since, as Parsons argues, they “…give sufficient
rewards for conformity and punishments for deviance to tip the balance in favor of
conformity.”77 What is more, the person who deviates is punished not because of the
nature of the offense, but is punished in order to strengthen the values espoused by the
institution. This was perhaps first highlighted by Durkheim; he saw punishment had
different sets of function other than to simply punish the deviant and protect the society;
it had another facet, a ritualistic aspect, which was in place to uphold the institutionalized
values of society. Punishment served to unite as well as reinforce the values of society,
thereby strengthening a group’s cohesion. Moreover, punishment was not directed at the
deviant, but at others who potentially might deviate from the professed institutionalized
values, norms, etc.78 North, echoing similar sentiments as Parsons, also sees the necessity
to punish those digressing from the institutional values; He maintains, “All members of
society have an incentive to obey and enforce the rules and that a sufficient number are
motivated to punish potential deviants.”79 Note how the term deviant is used to designate
digressers of the preached norms, as if they were some odd, abnormal persons. For
Parsons, this was an essential aspect in ridding non-empirical beliefs from any traditional
society. This way new values are not only institutionalized, but are also internalized by
persons in society. And this internalization of the new values is ascertained by disrupting
77
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the stability within the society by imposing strain upon existing shibboleths. The
instability undermines society’s “cognitive content” and thus their belief systems. As
such, “new equilibrium signifying the internalization of new value patterns [is]
attained.”80 This is an important point to remember because when certain values are
internalized, they become the very part of one’s nature; they define the person (or
society). This was clearly indicated by Freud on how one easily internalizes values,
beliefs, or actions through conscious purgation of unwanted events or memories in one’s
life that may otherwise negate one’s internalization; once a person’s internalization
process is complete, the internalized values begin to define the very nature of the person.
81

Likewise, when new values or beliefs are internalized, they begin to define, anew, the

characteristics of traditional societies in general, such as the manner in which society
views its own culture, thus, creating disenchantment with the old belief systems.
Here, conformity becomes an essential requirement to perpetuate and provide
rationale for the newly foisted institutions. Moreover, confomity is a logical consequence
of scientific rationality. Conformity, as North argues, increases certainty and
predictability to an otherwise non-ergodic human society.82 Here, one is not suggesting
conformity is good or bad, nor is one suggesting scientific rationality is good or bad.
Rather, one is merely indicating the conditions as they are. Scientific rationality requires
conformity. To allow any deviation, in the concepts or methods, is to invalidate the
edifice of scientific queries. Scientific inquiry, thus, entails conformity in its methods as
well as in its measure of variables, concepts, etc. Hence, any society adhering to scientific
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rationality necessarily involves their values, norms, beliefs to be not only in conformity
with those of other rationalized societies, but also requires persons within its own society
to conform to the professed rationalized values and beliefs of the new institution. This
way computable human society is conceived and brought under universalized concepts,
which are assumed to hold true for all places.
North makes this utterly clear, because he sees the presence of “Shared mental
models,” no doubt alluding to scientific rationality, reflecting the common beliefs of
society, that is further translated into sets of institutional rules deemed legitimate; these
rules are seen to be binding provided “first, that the same people play the same game with
the same pay-offs and risks; and second, that the uncertainties about the future remain
constant (italics added).”83 The above statement shows how the transformation of beliefs
makes it possible to conceive a predictable human world. This is why North states the
condition sine qua non (as Heiner had endorsed): the same people playing the same game
with the same pay-offs, risks with invariant levels of uncertainties. What this proviso
does is make human and societal activities predictable, hence, quantifiable. The first
stipulation, by the virtue of repetition, makes human activities malleable to prediction and
uniformity by subjecting them (and constructing computable models based on variables:
number of games played/repeated, pay-offs, risks, etc.) to statistical probabilities. It also
means the need to conform in order to make statistical studies possible, for without
members’ conformity, uniform universal concepts, methods, definitions which are
primary in scientific study, become impossible. The second stipulation negates the
uncertainty in human society altogether, thereby removing one of the key barriers which
83
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hitherto rendered the study of society unscientific, unquantifiable. By removing (or at
least—abstractly—having control over) the uncertainty in human society, it sheds its
unpredictable aspects, and becomes fixed. The investigator then assumes it away or, even
better, supposes gradations of uncertainty (as if uncertainty can ever be discerned into
scales) as he carries out his scientific studies. It must be understood that uncertainty in
scientific inquiry is an anomalous condition. However, by eliminating (or controlling)
uncertainty, the normal condition is thereby established permitting the usage of
sophisticated mathematic equations in inquests regarding societal phenomena. Notice
how the immeasurable, disorderly, and unsystematic aspects of society (or person) are
transmuted into orderly, systematically quantifiable activities. Also note how the
alterations are made possible by beliefs advocated by (modern) institutions, through
conformity, indoctrination, reward-punishment, internalization, etc.
Many fail to realize conformity as the necessary feature for the realization of any
or every mass modern society. This is because the word itself undergoes semantic
transformation. Conformity is not viewed as something forced; rather—as Gramsci has
pointed out—it is transmuted to mean “consent” with professed institutional values for
society’s benefits. Not surprisingly, North, iterating Parsons’ sentiments, maintains
conformity as “the internalization of social norms so that individuals want to behave in
ways conducive to the existing social order and/or social control (italics added).”84 North
sees conformity to be beneficial, as indicated by his use of the word “conducive.” Indeed,
he quickly adds “ways conducive to existing social order”; of course, by this he has in
mind here the state of a society immediately after the new institutions have been foisted;
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after all, he sees them to be beneficial for any society. This way he implicitly designates
the existing social order to be modern institutions, thereby equating conformism with
behaviors sustaining the permanency of new institutions for the boon of society.
What this does is serve to discourage members of society from deviating from the
norms of rationalized institutions. To deviate is an assured punishment, but punishment
can be in many forms. Moreover, there is an even bigger psychological role of
punishment in maintaining institutional values, more precisely, the person’s fear of
alienation from the society: to be left out. Fromm insightfully elucidates how individuals
are bound to conform, because they fear they may be alienated, which also happens to be
their principal fear, if they digress from the accepted rules.85 Individual’s fear of being
alienated or isolated from the society is one of the most effective means to ensure
conformity, because to digress means rejecting “the accepted honour and generosity
code, [thus] the individual cuts himself off from the community and becomes an
outcast.”86 As a result, societies are “forced to behave in certain direction regardless of
their own preferences and inclination.”87 Fear of isolation abets the indoctrination of
society to conform to standardized norms, beliefs, principles. Without indoctrination,
which conformity nevertheless evinces, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a
modern mass society. This is substantiated by Konrad Lorenz who succinctly elaborated
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on how individuals in modern society were extremely penchant to indoctrinations.88
Václav Havel also shows of how conforming to standard ideologies, beliefs leads to
blatant automaton of persons, in the process of which the proselytized beliefs are
established as fact and reality. He, furthermore, shows the subliminal meaning behind the
blatant conformism to standard beliefs reminding people of the expected behaviors, the
appropriate conducts, and rules of the game, if they do not wish to be alienated.89 The
blatant conformism, by persons in society, perpetuates the manufactured beliefs as
reality. This was pointed out by Freud. He argues when numerous persons place their
ego-ideal on the one and the same object, “their intellectual and emotional acts become
increasingly dependent on reinforcement by being repeated in similar ways by other
members of the group. The superegos of the majority of individuals become thus
increasingly rigid and intolerant.”90 By such means, the internalization of certain beliefs
is attained, which then becomes the idée fixe of society.
The internalization of new institutional values is also helped by the process of
education, i.e. indoctrination. This is why Malinowski was eager to insist, the “growing
generation has to be prepared, enlightened, and advised” on the rule of the trade, ethics,
and so forth by the process of education or training.91 For him, preparation and
enlightenment meant indoctrinating through standardized education of citizens to the
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acceptable values of implanted institutions. Socrates was perhaps the first to suggest the
powerful indoctrinating process in any civilized society, as he remarks “…imitations, if
they are practiced continually from youth onwards, become established as habits and
nature, in body and sounds and in thought.”92 In Apology, Socrates further illustrates this
case. When Socrates was put on trail for the corruption of the youth, he initiates his
defense by declaring the difficulty to substantiate his case to the jury because, as he
remarks, “they spoke to you at an age when you would most readily believe them, some
of you being children and adolescents, and they won their case by default, as there was
no defense (italics added).”93 Similarly, the one-way process of proselytizing the values
of modern institutions, with concurrent evisceration of traditional shibboleths, invariably
makes it difficult for society to think otherwise. Thus, society ascribes itself those
attributes hammered into their very mode of thinking. Hence, society simply begins to
think, say, and hold dear those beliefs as a part of their very nature: such as, development
is good, necessary, and inevitable. Critical understanding, in such a manner, is lost as
citizens are perpetually indoctrinated from very early age about the virtues and goodness
of rationalized modern institutions: which implicitly means, Conformism.
Parsons, in parity with Malinowski, also held a similar attitude. He stressed the
importance of training school children to the values of the “specific-universalisticachievement system,”94 i.e. systems of the developed society, so as to alter traditional
social structures. Similarly, North maintains, in order to transform the process of
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learning, it is necessary to build a “common institutional/educational structure… [that]
will result in shared beliefs and perceptions.”95 Once this is set up conformity is easily
achieved.96 Lipset, likewise, argues how better education provides a sustainable condition
for economic development and democratic institutions. According to Lipset, education
makes “better citizens”; of course, what he really means by “better citizen” is
population’s conformity, by the means of standardized education, to modern
institutionalized values. Thus, he maintains, “The higher one’s education, the more likely
one is to believe in democratic values and support democratic practices.”97 This is not
surprising because the more educated a society, the deeper it is indoctrinated into the
dominant facile ideologies of an industrial democratic system.
From such perspective, it is possible to justify rationalized institutions’
superseding of the old shibboleths through implantation of new beliefs; thus, making
societies conform to the newly implanted norms. This is evident in Rostow’s work, as he
maintains, any change in the society necessarily entails “a radical shift in the society’s
effective attitude towards fundamental and applied science,” where population “must be
prepared to accept training for…an economic system whose methods are subject to
regular change (italics added).”98 There is complete transformation in the “effective
attitude” of the society, as Rostow—echoing Parsons and Malinowski’s sentiments—
makes it clear, because “involved here is not some vague change in psychological or
sociological orientation, but a change translated into working institutions and
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procedures.”99 These changes in the “effective attitude” are achieved by proselytizing
certain beliefs, practices in harmony with implanted institutions, viz. placing higher
rewards, approvals on those practices in accordance with accepted institutionalized
norms, while disapproving, punishing those in tangent. It is, therefore, not surprising to
find why traditional societies are habitually asked to change their belief systems with
regard to development. Professional experts, academics, specialists from the developed
world flock into the developing world. They, then, disdainfully put the blame of
underdevelopment on traditional societies themselves, labelling their beliefs as primitive,
irrational, unscientific, absurd; or they are seen to be lingering in, as Rostow boldly
claims, “pre-Newtonian” era, as opposed to the developed world who whole-heartedly
embraced the “spirit of science.”100
Only through such means can and must the new belief systems be rooted into an
alien society. It requires the targeted society to be humiliated by showing the supposedly
superiority of developed society’s science, economy, wealth, values, and culture; the
purpose of which is to show the concerned society’s inferiority in every aspect
conceivable. For Rostow, “humiliation by foreigners” serves as one of the most powerful
and influencing motives for traditional societies to transition into modernity. 101 Because
Rostow sees modernity to be inevitable, he saw imperial powers play a constructive role
in sterilizing traditional, colonized societies of their incorrect belief systems by
transforming their knowledge and intellects; thus ushering in the age of modernity into
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these places.102 This way, the unfortunate societies invariably abandon their belief
systems; they begin adhering to new values, in the hopes of attaining development, as
propounded by experts; or, as Inglehart and Welzel proudly defend, “Rational science
and its belief in technological progress becomes the new source of authority in a highly
mechanical world.”103
Introduction of a new social structure constructs new realities for societies. It sets
the condition in which certain specific types of societal activities or institutions are
espoused. New needs and desires, which hitherto did not exist, are created; it also
generates new patterns of motivation and behavior: from shared property to individual
property rights; from barter to monetized system; from laidback, satiated society to
emphasis on (economic) productivity; from norms and values based on each society to
universalized norms and values; from beliefs in myths, supernatural based on lived
experiences to empirical beliefs based on scientific rationality; from local concept of
time, where time is seen as one continuous filament, to standardized linear concept of
time, where it is devolved into hours, minutes, seconds, milliseconds, etc., and so forth.
One of the central features of such changes is the transvaluation of unmeasurable
experiences of society into quantifiable activities. Scientific rationality inexorably gives
special prominence to quantifiable concepts in an effort to make the study more
scientific. Thus, easily measurable features of society are given special place: money,
private property (land, capital, etc.), (economic) productivity, time, etc.; concomitantly,
stigmatizing incomputable experiences: shared communal property, barter, continuous
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unvarying notions of time, satiated attitudes, and lived experiences. The following section
discusses how such demands lead to the acme of economy.
Scientific Rationality and Economy
With institutions as the locus from which to begin the scientific analysis of
society, attention is given to the most computable aspect of human activity: economy. Of
all the human activities, economy (or house-keeping, which is what it was actually
called) is the most quantifiable and, hence, most empirical. This activity includes
conjuring around with some basic numbers regarding cost-profit, selling-cost price,
discount, interest, growth, value, depreciation, etc. In economics, basic measurable
methods for the purpose of accounting or house-keeping are indispensable. Given the
nature of the study of economy, i.e. its quantitative nature, the whole examination of
society (and of culture) is made to revolve around this single aspect.104 And what better
ways to transpose the unquantifiable, ascientific nature of society into a full-fledged
scientific discipline than by basing every aspect of society to the most quantifiable
feature: economy and its predicated institutions. In fact, Malinowski ardently believed
economic theories to be indispensable in the study of society.105 Echoing Malinowski’s
views, Parsons saw economy as a crucial aspect in the examination of society; he saw it
to be “concerned with the phenomena of rational decision-making and the consequences
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of these decisions within an institutionalized system of exchange relationships (italics
added).”106 For Parsons, economy formed the primary locus in any social interactions
since it occupied the key position in understanding any societal change: motivations,
needs, gratifications, etc.107 The pre-eminence of economy as the fundamental basic lens
from which to base the scientific study of society, as propounded by Malinowski,
Parsons, and others, dominates contemporary social sciences. This, no doubt, led Sachs to
advocate for approach in development to be “much more like modern medicine,” since
doing so will “improve dramatically if development [experts, academics] take on some of
the key lessons of modern medicine, both in the development of the underlying science
and in the systematization of clinical practices”; no wonder he terms such an approach as
“clinical economics (italic added).”108 Not to be outshone by Sachs, Easterly praises the
economists who, he claims, do a lot more to help traditionally poor societies than anyone
else through their “experiment[s]” and subjecting these to “ruthless testing to see if they
really work.”109 One could hardly miss the constant reference to science to justify the
propagation of single view, as if science is the ultimate arbiter of absolute objectivity,
impartiality, fairness, or, better still, even what is good for every society.
This naïve attitude to accept economy as the fundamental base for socialscientific investigation, because of its quantifiable features, makes possible the
comparison of different societies not for the purpose of appreciating or accepting
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diversity, but rather how one society is superior (or more developed, civilized) than
others. Comparisons are made so as to ostracize not only the ways diverse societies live
and carry out their day-to-day activities, but also dismiss other modes of thought as
absurd. Limiting oneself to one discipline, i.e. economy, one eo ipso ignores the varied
socio-cultural aspects without which understanding of society becomes a far-cry. Indeed,
one could try to cover one’s laxity by dressing one’s analysis with scientific models,
formulae, hypotheses, etc. Nevertheless, in doing so one disregards essential aspects of
society. One could, no doubt, argue that even if, for instance, one approaches solely from
an economic stand point, one nevertheless takes into consideration the socio-cultural,
political, along with other aspects of society. Yet, by virtue of limiting oneself to one
specific aspect, one deliberately narrows one’s lens to the aspect (i.e. economic) from
which one is approaching the study. To give one example: from an economic stand point,
one of the ubiquitous claims against traditional societies is the manner in which they
spend less time engaging in productive economic activities and instead spend much of
their time lolling around, sleeping, wallowing, enjoying the nature. This, according to
economic studies, is the cause of underdevelopment and poverty (of course, by poverty it
means material poverty) of traditional societies. However, as anthropological study
reveals, traditional societies are not lazy just because they work so few hours a day or
week, rather they are freer (than those in developed societies) and lead a much frugal,
simpler life. Because their lives are simple, most material needs—which amount to basic
necessities of life—are easily satisfied. More paradoxically, traditional societies, deemed
to be inefficient, indolent, or lazy, are better able to meet the needs of all their persons
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than the more affluent societies.110 One can, therefore, see society is a complex organism
which cannot be understood in its particularity, for it distorts the multiple bond holding
the society together, where one aspect of society not only invariable affects and sways the
other, but are also concatenated with one another.
As a result, a person with narrow lens concludes by stating: traditional societies
are such and such because they cannot think in a scientifically rational manner, hence
they lack any kind of clear logical mindset; therefore, such and such society is
economically underdeveloped. The only way to make such and such society developed is
to discard the existing shibboleths by injecting rationalized institutions. It is only the
minds of those who do not understand that lead them to make such facile categorization
of human beings and societies as developed, developing, traditional. Differently put, all
those whose living standards are horrid or do not measure up to our (developed world’s)
standards are languishing in destitution and, therefore, they must be educated in our ways
of thinking so they may live in a condition, which we have defined, fit for humans. In
other words, since we are the keepers of the great enlightened minds, and they are not; we
have the duty to define what is good for them. Indeed, for North, things couldn’t be
otherwise because “Modern economic growth has as its source the growth in the stock of
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knowledge that is associated with the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. What is the source of this attitude, procedures, and experimental
methods that characterized this revolution? It was a Western phenomenon and obviously
related to the institutional development that led to the rise of the Western world (italics
added).”111 Here, North implicitly shoulders that there have been no developed societies
prior to “the rise of the Western world.” He also accepts not only had there been no
scientific advancements prior to the sixteenth and seventeenth century, but also there
have been no scientific advancements outside of Europe. North saw every scientific
advancement to be the product of the Western world.112
Sachs proffered similar remarks. He maintains, the reason why industrial
revolution and thus the development of Western society first occurred in Great Britain
(i.e. Europe) and not elsewhere (in China, i.e. Asia) is because Great Britain had modern
institutions: political liberty, parliament, free speech, protection of private property
rights; but above all it was “one of the leading centers of Europe’s scientific
revolution…. Modern physics emerged from the astronomical discoveries of Copernicus,
Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo…. The decisive breakthrough came with Isaac Newton’s
Principia Mathematica (italics in original) in 1687… By showing that physical
phenomenon could be described by mathematical laws, and by providing the tools of
111

North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, 101.
Certainly, North can be easily forgiven because he is after all a ‘social
scientist,’ a product of his day and age, i.e. age of academic over-specialization. North is
unaware of the advancements in science dating back prior to the 16th and 17th century.
Moreover, the age of Renaissance, which he alludes to numerous times, has its origins in
the Islamic civilization—where numerous advancements in the natural sciences were
conceived. One could certainly go on to show the numerous scientific advancements
made in Babylonian, Egyptian, Indian, Chinese, and Islamic societies—even prior to the
West—and how modern (natural) science is still predicated on those discoveries, but this
is not the point of the present study. Hence, it is best to leave it at that.
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calculus to discover those laws, Newton set the stage for hundreds of years of scientific
and technological discovery, and for the Industrial Revolution that would follow the
scientific revolution.”113 Leaving aside Sachs’ errors, in parallel with North’s
inaccuracies, about the history and development of science, what is evident here is the
static mindset about the supremacy of science as well as values of the West. Hence, how
can the developed society not feel what it has to impart in respect to development—such
as, propagation of scientific rationality, modern institutions, etc. — is not valid or correct,
the moral justification being its material wealth.
The banality of comparison is also vividly evident in Collier’s work; he recalls
with much pride the following episode in which he was asked by the government of the
Central African Republic for advice on development, he notes: “When I settled into
discussion with the government, I asked them a question that I always ask when advising
a government, because it forces people to get concrete and also serve as a measure of
ambition: which country did they wish to be like in twenty years’ time (italics added)
?”114 The problem is not so much the content of the question, but such question was
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asked at all. If one genuinely wants to help societies, when one is asked to give advice,
the question would not be which country a given society wished to be in a so and so
period of time, but rather what can be done (assuming only if the given society wants
change) to accommodate societal development without decimating the foundations of the
society, nor weakening the society spiritually, culturally, socially, or morally. To ask
what a society wished to be like in given period of time, or, more importantly, to ask such
question in the first place, only epitomizes the acme of scientific rationality (of Collier, as
well as of other academics) that forces one to continually measure oneself as well as
one’s society against another, where it becomes a necessity for one to emulate, i.e. be
like, the other because the other is considered to be more developed, modern, or
technologically advanced. Yet, the reality, which the academics and experts alike fail to
realize, is that no matter what one does to become like the other, the emulator can never
become that which is emulated.
Much in the same way, the scientific rationality along with the numerous modern
institutions can and will never attain the idealized aims being mounted onto traditional
societies because of incommensurable historical, culture, social, spiritual experiences that
shape every society in its own unique ways. It is as if one is trying to become a better
human being by only changing the exterior, i.e. the outside appearance, without changing
the interior, i.e. the quality of one’s character, which is much more essential. Such
exterior embellishments will not make one into a better human being. Or, better still, if
one is trying to emulate or be like Gandhi. No one in the world can become like him
because in order to do so one must have experienced exactly the same life experiences:
same childhood, family, friends; same societal, historical, educational, personal, cultural,
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political, economic, spiritual, philosophical, religious, linguistic experiences; same
feelings, emotions, sentiments; same sense of love, hate, pity, empathy, sympathy; same
communal practices, traditions, and views of the world. As one would have already
noticed, it is not possible for any two persons to go through these same exact, parallel life
experiences. If this was possible then the whole of India would have become Gandhi.
Likewise, it is not possible for any society, because of its diverse lived experiences, to
become like the sublime developed world. Installing scientific modes of thought, modern
rationalized institutions, modern beliefs, norms will not make traditional societies like the
developed, rather it will only create animosity and untold human sufferings.115
Misguided judgments, mentioned above, nevertheless induce one to erroneously
assign the superiority of developed over traditional.116 Rostow, hence, saw scientific
rationality and its application as the purveyor of economic progress and modernity, as is
evident in this following statement:
once man conceived of his physical environment as subject to knowable laws, he
began to manipulate it to his advantage; and once it was demonstrated that
growth was possible, the consequences of growth and modernization…unhinged
one traditional society after another, pushed it into the treacherous preconditions,
from which many,…[of] the world’s societies have now emerged into selfsustained growth through the take-off mechanism… (italics added)117
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Evident from the above statement is Rostow’s beliefs in the invariable progress of
modernity and with it the “spirit of science” even for “pre-Newtonian” societies. This
inevitability is apparent in Rostow’s stages of growth which, he proffers, every society
must inexorably face: from traditional society, to preconditions for take-off, to take-off,
to drive to maturity, to age of high consumption. These stages, for Rostow, are not
merely descriptive, but they also have “an inner logic and continuity… an analytical
bone-structure.”118 This linear movement from one stage to another—mainly due to a
move away from pre-Newtonian to Newtonian science, i.e. scientific knowledge—is
marked by similar pattern of choices promising similar structural evolution for every
society, i.e. uniform outcomes for every society. 119
Sachs, years later, echoes a similar conclusion: after giving a brief example of
women working in Bangladeshi sweatshops and how such sweatshops are for these
women their “first rug on the ladder” towards development, which is Sachs’ own version
of Rostow’s takeoff stage, he goes on to vilify the traditions of the old, after which he
sings paean about the forces of economic growth, development, and how it is
empowering women; he writes, “Virtually every poor country that has developed
successfully has gone through these first stages of industrialization. These Bangladeshi
women share the experience of many generations of immigrants to New York city’s
garment district and a hundred other places where their immigration to toil in garment
factories was a step on the path to a future of urban affluence in succeeding generation
(italics added).”120 Likewise, Inglehart and Welzel argue: every society as they develop
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goes through two phrases or stages—industrial and post-industrial (which is their own
version of Rostow’s stages). In the industrial stage, the society becomes more
rationalized and secularized; whereas, in the post-industrial stage, the society becomes
more self-expressive in terms of individual, socioeconomic, political, and intellectual
autonomy.121 Certainly, such conclusions as envisaged by Rostow, Sachs, and Inglehart
and Welzel are only the logical outcomes of the rationality they utilized. And, since the
aforesaid authors approach their studies scientifically, it is not surprising to find sociocultural uniformity or universalization as their end results. Yet, as pointed out by
Hirschman, “the idea,” as envisaged by Rostow and others, “that development, once
started, will proceed smoothly for some considerable time until the problems of
“maturity” and “old age” appear, gives a misleading image of the growth problems of
underdeveloped countries.”122 There is merit in Hirschman’s arguments, because no
society can or will experience the same societal conditions as imagined by scientific
minds. The “inner logic and continuity” may be a helpful analytical tool; still society
follows neither the logic nor the continuity of an abstract scientific rationality.
One may certainly think it is unfair to move the culpability from scientific
rationality to the paramount of economy; however, this is not the intent, because an astute
reader might well have observed, the principal of economy in societal inquiry is
conceived due to the fascination of social studies to become more scientific in their
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approach in order to qualify themselves as science. In mimicking natural sciences, the
purpose of investigation is altered: means become end. Whether or not scientific criteria
are met become the purpose of an inquiry, not whether one understands the examined
issue.
It is well to keep in mind that in scientific study, the answer to a query depends on
the concepts, variables, parameters, and methods utilized. Thus, it is completely logical,
in scientific study, for the answer to any given question to be dependent upon any of the
variables selected. Thus, if institution is the key concept in an inquiry, then the answer as
well as the culprit to the problems of development, in such studies, will inexorably be
rationalized institutions and the standing societal shibboleths, respectively. In other
words, the solutions to the question are already determined from the outset by the
questioner’s preference of the certain variables selected for the inquest. Thus, there is an
inherent limit to application of scientific methods in social sciences. When natural
sciences’ methodologies are transposed from their natural milieu to artificial
environment, social sciences, they lose their potency, their objectivity. This is because the
object of study, which scientific methodologies were constructed to investigate, is
different. And, as Aldous Huxley makes clear, it is precisely for this reason, i.e. different
objects of study, that natural science’s methodologies cannot be extended to the social
sciences.123
Moreover, how does one implant such rationalized institutions, derived from
questionable methodologies that pass for science in social sciences? For the professional
experts and academics, the answer is simple: through training or indoctrinating the
Aldous Huxley cited in George A. Lundberg, “The Future of the Social
Sciences,” The Scientific Monthly 53 (October 1941): 347.
123
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society into the deemed correct manners—be they rules of the game, ethics, duties,
principles, etc.—of the rationalized institutions. To realize such an exalted state, as
fantasized by experts, new rationalized institutions are implanted; with it comes the
internalization of the (new) institutionalized values harnessing the social structure of
motivational behavior, which in turn creates new roles, values, practices, and
expectations for the society.124 With such transformation, traditional societies begin to
deride their existing values; they even begin to feel ashamed of their past histories and
beliefs. In such manners, the dissemination of uniform thought process and ways of life is
completed. Traditional society now begins to think, even begins to aspire for the same
kinds of societal development and progress, as visualized by experts, academics.125
It is one of the raison d'être of scientific rationality to construct universal
concepts, methods, norms. In doing so, it creates a canon through which varied subjective
human world is filtered into the dispassionate world of science with uniformity as its
essence: universalized values. As such, what happens is, by virtue of economy being the
center of all social scientific inquiries, as it is the logical outcome of scientific rationality,
it leads to universalization of economy and its values. Thus, one hears of universalized
economic values to be intrinsic to every society: such as free market, monetization of
society, accumulation of wealth, concepts of rich and poor, private property, investments,
transformation of every other organic entities, including humans, into resources (human
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resources, natural resources, etc.), profits, optimizing behaviors, consumerism, as well as
the claims that pursuit of selfish interest leads to social good (as proselytized by neoclassical school), etc. As Easterly affirms, “The free market is a universally useful
system,” for “market instincts are hardwired into human nature (italics added).”126 Note
how Easterly implies economic freedom (i.e. free market) as universal good. He boldly
claims “market instincts” to be part of human nature as if these were some innate human
emotions or feelings—like love, compassion, and pity. However, why is “market
instincts” and “free market” universal? The answer, as Easterly proffers: because the
“Economist[s] have mathematical proofs.”127
It is also important to note that economic freedom is not the only value to be
universalized; there is also the universalization of political freedom. These two
universalized values are inextricably interlaced with one another. “Economic freedom,”
writes Easterly, “is one of mankind’s most underrated inventions, much less publicized
than its cousin political freedom.”128 Meaning: there is an inherent predilection in
“mankind” towards economic—free market—and political freedom—democracy. Hence,
Lipset associated democracy with economic development. He fervently alluded to how
Easterly, The White Man’s Burden, 72, 74.
Ibid., 74.
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most traditional societies, lacking democracy, were economically underdeveloped.129 No
wonder, Rostow proclaimed the same sentiments, for he saw, like Lipset, “the democratic
creed can easily be translated into the terms of other cultures: it is broadly speaking, what
most human beings would choose, if the choice were theirs (italics added).”130 We see a
very bold generalization in Lipset’s, as well as in Rostow’s statement, for they are quick
to reduce the pith of humanity to values of institutions they were brought up with, after
all, only a non-human, savages will prefer to remain traditional and non-democratic
(since, for Rostow, any human being would choose democratic creed, for it is universal).
Implicit also in such an argument is Lipset’s beliefs that every society must adhere to a
modern democratic industrial system, since it is only proper for any rational society to
follow such a system.
Mindsets such as these are only concurred by Easterly who sees traditional society
to be in need of quality institutions: such as democracy, free market, rule of law,
contracts, etc.; all of which will bring an end to their cyclical poor growth.131 These
Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” 73-75. Such arguments
continue to be endorsed; for instance, Przeworski et al. argue societies fostering
democratic institutions experience higher economic growth and development. Przeworski
et al. paralleling Lipset’s arguments, also affirm democracies to survive in wealthier
societies than in others. See, Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio
Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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institutional reforms—such as, democracy—are necessary because, as Easterly reasons,
they provide economic growth and development.132 No wonder, Inglehart and Welzel
saw modernity to bring “cultural changes that make democracy the logical institutional
outcome (italics added).”133 Or, for Collier to assert, “One body that could propose
political standards would be the European Commission. After all, the EU has explicit
standards of democracy that are required for membership. It should not feel squeamish
about projecting those standards onto a wider stage than Europe (italics added).”134 Note
the authors’ assertiveness in the beliefs of their society; also note how easily they equate
their values to the universal, as if these were the emblem of humanity. One can clearly
trace the essential logic behind universalization of concepts to scientific rationality.
Given the essentiality of economy in the scientific study of society, Malinowski
and Parsons praised its indispensability to the construction of unified, scientific theory of
culture, or what Sachs calls “science for development.”135 When certain features of a
society are elevated as the principal of social examination, it is perfectly logical for that
features and their predicated aspects to become the fulcrum of what is the correct, bona
fide way to understand or analyze. With economy as the framework, economic
132
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attributes—capital, property rights, land, resources, employment, incentives, investments,
technology, material resources, goods, productivity, outputs, etc.—become primary
features of social queries. Furthermore, the apex of economy also brings economic
redefinition of what is to be valued, honored, or esteemed: prominence of money,
individual success, productivity/performance, accumulation of individual wealth,
property, profits, competition, industrialization, income, etc. In sum, there is a whole new
orientation for the society, i.e. conformity to the new institutional beliefs.
Malinowski saw the essentiality of land, capital, property, etc., in the study of
society;136 Parson, likewise, saw money, because of its “unambiguous quantitative
measurability,” to encompass the whole symbol of success. This meant, “all acquisition
of the symbols of achievement should be possible only by the appropriate achievement
(italics added),”137 which is to say, there is a well-defined set of norms dictating the
legitimate means to attain the legitimate feats and accomplishments. The legitimacy here
means that which is considered to be legitimate by the new institutions; thereby,
perpetuating their own prominence. It is no secret that Parsons had no liking towards the
traditional, for it represented a disorderly, unempirical world, where each society’s
standards or norms were based on its particular context. However, modernity was
different. For him, modernity signified the trend towards universalism because it was
linear, systematic, thus, objective and neutral by context. He even saw kinship solidarity,
which hitherto maintained harmony within traditional societies, as a hindrance to
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development. So, he endorsed reduction in kinship solidarity.138 These views are
fervently echoed by Lipset, Rostow, and other social scientists.139
As if to make this case, Lipset was quick to ween that traditional societies lacked
all sorts of progress: in terms of per capita income, level of industrialization, degree of
urbanization, education as well as in ratio of vehicles, radios and telephones per person,
newspapers per thousand, and so on.140 Parallel sentiments were displayed by Sachs years
later, when he used similar variables to advocate for societal development.141 Easterly,
exhibiting similar views as Lipset’s, writes jubilantly about how technology in Nigerian
film industry skyrocketed, he recalls: “New technologies have been spreading, giving
Africans more information, more entertainment, more choices. The number of TV sets on
which to watch Nollywood films has skyrocketed, following previous explosion of
radios.”142 How cretin is it to reason more TV sets for entertainment are better for
138
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traditional societies. Is this what it means to understand a society? Does it mean TV sets
are more important to societies than, say, living with human dignity regardless of the
state of one’s material circumstances? Not to be left behind, Collier maintained, as
Lipset, economic development brings about healthy institutional changes: such as,
democracy, rule of law, transparency, amalgamation of the society into global market,
etc.143
Lipset, moreover, takes the facile, external aspects of society and from them
boldly posits modern economic development (based on his variables) sustains political
stability, while traditional society, lacking modern institutions, suffers from
underdevelopment as well as political instability. Similarly, Rostow asserts, traditional
societies are economically debilitated because of their inability to apply modern scientific
knowledge and technology; hence, their productivity is low and puts upon themselves a
ceiling that restrains the level of output attainable per head. Rostow additionally argues,
traditional belief systems, such as importance of family, clanship connection, etc.
hampers societal development. Therefore, the only way to overcome such hurdles is to
alter the major characteristic of society “in such ways as to permit regular growth: its
politic, social structure, and (to a degree) its values, as well as its economy.”144
Inglehart and Welzel similarly maintain, “Industrialization brings rationalization”
to society that helps “establish and sustain the institutions best suited to maximize human
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choice—in a word, democracy.”145 One can see the authors’ favorable view toward
institutions already in existence in the developed world. Moreover, they proudly
maintain, as society develops or modernizes, they create a “socially liberating effect” that
frees individuals from the “bounding ties of closely knit groups, enabling people to make
and break social ties readily (italics added).”146 There is no doubt about the authors’
derision toward the traditional beliefs; still, it is certainly vacuous to be panegyrical about
“socially liberating effects” enabling people to readily “make and break social ties.” Even
if persons within society readily make and break ties, it cannot be conceived without
some form of malady to the society itself. Anomie, which Durkheim147 speaks of, plagues
modern society precisely because of the rootlessness of the persons. The meaning and
purpose are lost, the root itself is ousted; thereby, leading to social, moral, physical,
spiritual atrophy. Only those unaware of the consequences of societal atrophy blindly
advocate or write odes about that which they have no understanding of.
What is more, with economy as the base for social inquiry, it is not surprising to
equate one’s understanding of society to this one aspect. Thence, economy becomes the
nucleus of social query. Rostow, like Malinowski and Parson, thinks this to be so as he
asserts his study of the stages of growth to be not only a “theory about economic
145
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growth,” but a “theory about modern history as a whole.”148 Attitude such as these no
doubt led Easterly to proffer: the whole problem of development is, “not the failure of
economics, but the failure to apply the principles of economics in practical policy work
(italics added).”149 For Easterly, it is not economics, nor its importance to be blamed;
rather it is the improper applications of “principles of economics” that hamper
development processes. No wonder, he sees economics to be scrupulous because it is
empirical with principles derived from scientific methods; so, how can science or
economics be wrong? Instead, people unaware of economic principles are to be blamed.
Such bold assertions (of Rostow or Sachs by reducing not only history but society, as
well, into a predicate of economy) are possible because the economy has become the
principal hub of social inquiries. Implicit also, in Easterly’s arguments, is his naïve
assumptions about the universality of economics, signified by the term “principles” (no
doubt trying to give an air of verity by mimicking the principles in exact sciences).
Easterly, here, fails to realize the universal homo economicus, and as such economics, is
an idea rooted and constructed by the modern Western man, it is not universal.150
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Consequently, we also see social scientists assert the same sentiments as Rostow,
Easterly, and Sachs: For instance, Mancur Olson decided to base the rise and fall of
society on how the fight over resources, among special interest groups, hampers the
economy, ultimately, leading to its decline: reducing efficiency and productivity of
society under which they operate.151 One can also look at Acemoglu and Robinson’s,
Why Nations Fail: the authors highlight the importance of western (plural inclusive)
economic and political institutions, and how lack of such institutions invariably leads to
the downfall of societies. By following, they assert, the inclusive institutions of the West,
developing society can become better-off. They give an ostentatious tone to the path
taken by Western Europe as the proper path for any society to (and must) follow if it
wants to develop.152 What is of interest of these works (as well as many others) is not
only their grand titles (such as: Why Nations Fail or The Rise and Decline of Nation)
foreboding the rise and fall of society or of modern history, but they equate such episodes
to a period of lapse in the economic aspects of society: it is the unfavorable institutions of
society, or the fight over economic resources between groups, or the unfavorable societal
practices, norms, and so on.
With economic dimensions firmly embedded in the thought process of society,
one very easily falls back on economy to find solutions as well as to understand any
problem which one necessarily encounters. What propagates from such state of affairs is
the idea that not only:
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…economic progress is possible, but that economic progress is a necessary
condition for some other purposes, judged to be good: be it national dignity,
private profit, the general welfare, or a better life for the children.
Education…broadens and changes to suit the needs of modern economic activity.
New types of enterprising men come forward…willing to mobilize saving and to
take risk in pursuit of profit or modernization… Investment increases, notably in
transport, communications, and in raw materials in which other nations may have
an economic interest. The scope of commerce, internal and external, widens.
And…modern manufacturing enterprise appears, using the new methods (italics
added).153
Thus, development of society becomes one dimensional. By virtue of equating
societal development in terms of economy, as seen from Rostow’s statement, other
aspects—be it cultural, political, or social (even morality)—of society become predicated
on economic factors. Even the methods of query are borrowed from this field: use of
statistical probabilities (or, econometrics). The above statement makes clear about the
priority of economy not only as a means to economic growth, but also as the source of
beneficent good to the society: brings forth “benefits,” “profits,” “welfare” to the
“society,” “individual,” “children,” “nation.” Even the purpose of education is transmuted
to serve “the need of modern economic activity”; every societal activity is concentrated
to sustain economic activities—investment, manufacturing, producing capital, trade,
markets, communication, transportation, etc.—which are deemed necessary for
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development. Likewise, for North, even the growth of knowledge is only meant for
economic purpose, as he maintains: “the application of scientific knowledge (with its
origins in the renaissance) to solving economic problems, [has led to]…an immense leap
in economic productivity and human well-being and longevity.”154 While Inglehart and
Welzel even go so far as to affirm, “Economic growth and growing material prosperity”
increases “people’s sense of existential security (italics added).”155 Note how the authors
reduce “existential security” to “economic growth and growing material prosperity,”
thereby, amplifying the importance of economy.
However, what constitutes person’s or society’s existential security is neither
limited to economic, nor material prosperity. There is indeed more to existential security
than just economic or material prosperity: such as sense of human feelings, emotions,
sentiments, sense of pity, connectedness, compassion, love, sympathy, empathy, etc.
Without these human aspects, societies’, let alone a person’s, existential security cannot
be conceived. Take, for instance, in the modern technologically advanced societies,
which do not lack in economic or material prosperity, many of their population
nevertheless suffer from depression (leading to over usage of medications, which does
not actually cure the depression, hence, an increase in suicidal tendencies), despair,
melancholy due to alienation, dissatisfaction at work, meaninglessness and
purposelessness in their lives, privation of inner reflection, privation from what is natural
to human beings (persons), i.e. want of human emotions and feelings.156 Still, these
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portents are not heeded. The reason being: productive economic activities, it is argued,
will negate the foul societal consequences, in due course.
In such manners, economy becomes the meaning of human society and
understanding. “Market exchange,” writes Easterly, “makes it possible for us to
determine what we are good at, to specialize in producing it, and to trade it for other
things produced by people good at producing those things (italics added).”157 The
problem here is not so much with the trading or exchange of goods, after all humans have
been trading since time immemorial, but with the author’s emphasis on economic aspects.
Easterly espouses society to organize itself according to the needs of the market—
implicit is his attention to economic activity as the ontology of society. He also supposes
what each person is good at, i.e. “what we are good at,” is determined by market
exchanges. However, one becomes aware of one’s ability, i.e. “what we are good at,”
through one’s human emotions and senses. So, does it mean we, as human beings, must
plan our lives according to the needs of the market and not on the needs we have as
human beings? This is what Easterly forgot to ask himself. Society purely operating on
the needs of the market is never a healthy society, it is highly doubtful such a society can
even exist without amassing enormous societal pathologies.158
The scintillating power of economics—ignores social maladies, on the one hand,
and, on the other, claims to offer solution by transforming the non-quantifiable inquiry
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into a scientific study of social phenomena—even seduces the most erudite of scholars: in
1945, John Maynard Keynes proposed a toast before the Royal Economic Society, he
proclaimed, “I give you…the toast of the Royal Economic Society, of economics and
economists, who are the trustees not of civilization, but of the possibility of
civilization.”159 Of course, what is evident here is Keynes’ explicit supposition that
economic deeds or accomplishments not only make civilizations possible, but, more
importantly, sustain them.
No doubt, such mindset led Rostow to assert economic take-off to be the great
watershed in any society, where old traditional resistances to steady growth are
overcomed. With economic growth, new industries begin to dominate. Modern
techniques are introduced into the agricultural sectors. Agriculture, as a consequence,
becomes commercialized as increasing numbers of farmers come to accept new methods
along with profound changes they interminably bring to their existing ways of life. By
unleashing the forces of modern economic activities, according to Rostow, “growth
becomes the normal condition” and “Compound interest becomes built…into its habits
and institutional structure.” In other words, the basic economic, social, and political
structure of society changes in such a way as to accommodate as well as sustain
growth.160 Ultimately, as society begins its path towards development, it undergoes
successive stages of higher growth, which to Rostow are the logical steps of modernity.
However, to strike the match, if you will, something is needed to serve as the catalyst to
jump start this logical process. The answer, for Rostow, is the West. He reasons, we (i.e.
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the West) “have the resources and the pool of technical assistance to play a major…role
in making sure the underdeveloped areas…move through the preconditions and through
take-off,” for “there will be…no return to the old-fashioned…era. The traditional
societies have moved too far into the pre-conditions for take-off for that to be
possible.”161 One can see how the author inextricably interlaces traditional societies to the
path of development and modernity.162 However, even the technical assistance, according
to Sachs, is not enough, since it is “the ability to use modern, science-based ideas to
organize production (italics added)” that leads to development.163 In other words, society
without scientific rationality cannot develop.
Economic take-off, as imagined by Rostow, occurs when, as North maintains,
traditional shibboleths are supplanted by modern institution. North, like Malinowski,
Parsons, Lipset, and Rostow, saw such transformation as a benign effort on the part of the
developed world to “improve the performance of the third world economies,” as he
further goes on to argue, because “institutional change has altered the pay-off to
cooperative activity, increased the incentive to invent and innovate, altered the pay-off to
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investing in human capital, and lowered transaction costs in markets.”164 Here, North
implicitly assumes such mechanisms make civilized, modern societies possible, as if
every society in the world gyrates around pay-offs, incentives, innovations, transactioncosts, capital, etc. For him, what constitutes the core problem of development is the
inability of societies to transition from old belief systems to modern rational
institutions.165 Consistent with Rostow and North’s view, Inglehart and Welzel assert
development is possible only when societies move away from their traditional belief
systems. The authors further go on to illustrate how democratic, developed societies have
entered the post-industrial service oriented stage with rational-secular beliefs asserting
primacy of self-expressive values, while developing societies being undemocratic, with
their traditional beliefs still intact, are heavily reliant on agricultural sectors.166 Therefore,
by changing their existing belief systems, one can go on to tackle the core challenges of
development, as Collier argues, this way lack of economic growth can be reversed by
foisting in modern institutions: democracy, trade, capital investments, technological
skills, instituting international standards, laws, charters, contracts.167
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One would have, at least, thought these scholars would pay acute attention to realities
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Unswervingly evident in the works examined, hitherto, is to take their own
society as the standard from which to gage other societies. The touchstone becomes their
institutions and the values they disseminate. They desire traditional societies to embrace,
accept these values unreservedly. Yet they seem to be ignoring the fallacies of their own
rampant institutionalized values, as Illich notes, “When values have been institutionalized
in planned and engineered processes, members of modern society believe that the good
life consists in having institutions which define the values that both they and their society
believe they need (italics added).”168 This way institutionalized value not only perpetuates
itself as something indispensable to the society, thus leading to further institutionalization
of society’s values, but also begins to frame or define the social reality itself. Hence,
Inglehart and Welzel after asserting how modern beliefs, values, institutions are better for
development, ask: “Does our approach propose a uniquely Western standard that cannot
be applied to non-western cultures?” Their answer to which they proffer is a resounding,
No. Their approach, they argue, is applicable to all societies around the world, as they
affirm, “All the empirical evidence indicates that these are universal human aspiration”
and on this “point there is no difference between human societies (italics added).”169

faced by developing societies. Still, at the same time, it is only obvious for them to make
such vacuous arguments, because of their limited understanding of societal realities, and
being educated (and now teaching) in developed societies, they are indoctrinated
gradually into the orthodoxy of theories and methods, thereby, adhering to de rigueur
facile generalization of development. Indeed, they consciously lost their sense of lived
experiences either due to constant dose of anesthetic medicine, i.e. scientific rational way
to view the world, or due to implicit pressure to conform so as not be isolated by the
academic world. Or, it may so happen, both factors played a role in making them
oblivious to lived societal realities of the developing world.
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applicable to the rest of human societies are fervently promoted in the name of progress.
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Certainly, the authors conveniently skip through thousands of years of history, lived
experiences, memories that shaped each society. The authors simply reduce diverse
human societies into their hidebound variables of modern aspirations, which they
adamantly preach. They automatically assume, by virtue of being ‘advanced,’ the
institutional beliefs they espouse are morally and ethically superior to traditional
shibboleths. Moreover, they also assume, every society must follow the path taken by the
developed world, i.e. the inevitable path towards modernity and democracy, since this
path is the universal path for all humanity. In other words, for the authors, if there is—as
Plato’s theory of forms supposes—the perfect form of human beliefs, then that perfect
form is the existing values of the developed world; hence, every society should not only
strive to become like them, but also embrace their values.
Apparent in the works examined is their “belief in the role of modernization as the
only force capable of destroying archaic superstitions and relations, at whatever social,
cultural, and political cost. Industrialization and urbanization [are] seen as the inevitable
and necessarily progressive routes to modernization. Only through material advancement
could social, cultural and political progress be achieved.”170 In other words, every society
must be like ‘us’ (i.e. developed society), uniform: at least, pertaining to material needs,
desires, and organization of society. Every society must accommodate the materialism of
progress; new values comparable with modernity must be instituted, viz. new
meaningless economic values must replace the meaningful traditional shibboleths. Yet,
modern values—economic materialism—are in and of themselves meaningless, created
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out of, what Ivan Illich identifies as, the wasting of culture, i.e. out of destruction of
cultures.171 The new values that usurp the old ones are not values, instead they are
“disvalues”;172 they serve no purpose, nor provide meaning to the society in which they
are imposed. Of course, such malefic effects are ignored by the enlightened minds
because to acknowledge such pernicious effects is to acknowledge also the limitations of
economic materialism, thereby acquiesce to the essentiality for diversity. However,
diversity, in its strict sense of the word, is a threat to the uniformity of scientific
rationality and progress. Thus, such horrid effects have to be ignored.
With such an outlook, path towards human progress only seems inevitable. More
importantly, explicit in the assured progress of human society is the idea of development
based on rational schemes derived through scientific means. The rational schemes are
given an air of superiority, over other modes of thought, by alluding to scientificity of
their empirical proofs or results. So, the schemes inexorably involve rationalization of a
given traditional society, where modern social institutional behaviors are implemented in
order to aid the development process. The dogmatic proclivities of scientific rationality,
however, does very little to serve the ultimate purpose of that which one claims to be
doing. Rather it prevents burgeoning of alternatives. When alternatives are silenced, it
creates an environment in which there seems to be only one way of thinking, one way of
what is considered to be pragmatic.
From what has been discussed so far, it must, by now, be apparent to the reader,
the acme of scientific rationality in development discourse. Consequently, the form
which scientific rationality takes is the preeminence of institution and economy as the
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principal elements from which to probe into social phenomena. Therefore, it would be
proper to examine in brief the consequences or what follows when one mode of thought
is accorded prominence over others.
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CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENT AS CULTURAL ATROPHY
The Episodes
The previous chapter discussed how scholarships in development are rooted in
scientific rationality. In this chapter, however, we will explicate the progression or
influence of scientific rationality from the roots to its actual applications. Put differently,
(note: ‘→’ = influence) how scientific rationality → scholarships →
organizational/institutional schemes → actual applications of development schemes. To
illustrate this, three episodes are examined: the United Nations Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), Transmigration in Indonesia, and Villagization in Tanzania, which will
be dealt separately in the following three sections.
One could view this chapter as the continuation of the preceding chapter. Here the
main focus is not so much, for instance, to establish the apodictic of one’s reasoning
through the empirical episodes chosen; instead the principal concern is to illustrate the
influence of scientific rationality. The three affairs or episodes are examined because they
perhaps provide the best means to inquest into the principal concern of the present
inquest. Moreover, the three episodes provide some concrete existential events enabling
the reader to grasp the influence of scientific rationality. Sure, the three events are some
of the most ambitious development goals and schemes carried out in modern history.1
Yet, their magnitude counts for little in this study because it is not the purpose of the
MDGs, one of the most ambitious goals set-up to address some of world’s most
vexing problems (i.e., development), is the result of the largest gathering of world leaders
in history; the largest transmigration program in human history, Indonesia; and one of the
largest (and the largest during the years of its occurrence) forced resettlement carried out
in independent Africa, Villagization in Tanzania.
1
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present query to prove or establish an undisputable (natural) truth with the examples
selected. Rather, these events are examined in order to illustrate or bring to attention what
happens when one mode of thought is given paramount place in social inquests.
Undoubtedly, one could argue, the present study is alluding only to negative or
pathological episodes. However, it is essential to recognize that in order to understand
what one queries into, one must first understand the negative, pathological episodes.
These are the basic means of arriving at an understanding of phenomena. We know of
many occasions in physics, astronomy, mathematics, and physiology where the prober
not only understood the phenomenon, but also advanced their disciplines by examining
pathological or negative episodes. The establishment and acceptance of the heliocentric
view was in a sense possible by querying into the problems of Ptolemaic view and its
unresolved perturbation, even with Ptolemy’s adjustments by introducing quants and
epicycles, of Mercury’s orbit. The founding of Non-Euclidean geometry was based on
probing into Euclid’s notorious fifth postulate, which states: if a straight line intersects
two straight lines and the two resulting interior angles are less than the sum of two right
angles, the two lines, when extended indefinitely, will intersect invariably.2 Or take the
wave theory of light. It enabled better understanding about the nature of light by
examining the negative episodes, i.e. Newton’s corpuscular theory of light, which could
not adequately explain many phenomena. Even the indispensability of our thyroid glands
in the production of hormones, by Emil Theodor Kocher, was achieved only by looking
into its pathological episodes: attempts to treat exophthalmic goiter and myxedema. In
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sum, no advancement in human knowledge, or in science, is possible without looking into
the negative events.
It is essential to remember that the three episodes are considered only for the
purpose of elucidating to the reader the influence of scientific rationality. As such, it
matters little to exhaustively analyze the events, since: first, there are numerous thorough
scholarships in respect to these episodes; and second, these affairs are examined only in
so far as to explicate the deeply entrenched habitual tendency to lean towards one mode
of thought. Thus, doubts or questions concerning the selection (why these episodes and
not others) as well as the thorough analysis of events are superfluous to what the study
intends to explicate.
Before commencing the critique of the three episodes, it would be proper to note
an essential caveat. This is done so that the reader would not misconstrue the intention
behind what is to unfold in this chapter. It must be noted: The study is not trying, as
mentioned in Chapter One, to romanticize traditional societies, nor is it trying to suggest
that no problems exist within these societies, or that there is only happiness and goodness
in everything they do. Like any human society, traditional societies have problems of
their own; however, it is up to them to deal with their own problems; there is no need for
anyone to meddle in someone else’s internal difficulties. Furthermore, the critique of the
episodes may seem, to the reader, as if the present study is idolizing traditional societies,
yet the study is only stating what it is stating not to romanticize them, but to contend
against the habitual conceptions (held by developed societies) that view native societies
as if they have no redeeming qualities whatsoever (of course, this view stems from the
fact that since traditional societies do not embrace scientific rationality, the developed
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world immediately assumes everything—habits, beliefs, knowledge, modes of thought,
etc.—they do and everything about these societies to be barbarous, backward, or
primitive). Hence, a scientific person may perhaps see the arguments put forth as the
revivification of the old idea of the Noble Savage. However, noble savage is itself a
pejorative term. The only reason why such concept will pop-into the reader’s mind is
because the reader is misunderstanding or has misunderstood what is being or been
reasoned in this study. Indeed, Rousseau’s concept of noble savage (after all it was he
who was among the first to advocate on behalf of the savage) interested him (as well as
Marx, Engels, and Montesquieu) only in regard to the autonomy enjoyed by these
savages, otherwise Rousseau (or for that matter Marx, Montesquieu, Engels) had very
little interests in (preserving) social systems or ways of life—beliefs, knowledge,
customs—of these savages.3 With this caveat, let us begin by examining the episode
concerning rationalized goals: United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Millennium Development Goals
It is important to recognize that we are, here, more concerned with the nature of
the goals rather than whether the set targets have been successful attained. The MDGs is
of concern because it illustrates the preeminence of scientific rationality, thus making it
possible for those who adhere to such a mode of thoughts to formulate them in the first
place. As mentioned in the previous chapter, because scientific rationality dictates how
inquiry ought to be carried out in development studies, it simplifies or generalizes
complex human reality into vacuous quantifiable variables. This is because scientific
analysis becomes cumbersome or well-nigh impossible without standardized reductionist
3
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variables. Furthermore, technicians of development4 have become so dependent on
scientific means that these rational tools render them virtually oblivious to the realities of
society. Since technicians of development are very much dependent on scientific means
to ascertain every nook and cranny of what they inquest into, the only way for them to
comprehend is to compress numerous complex societies with all their myths, memories,
histories, cultures, and other societal elements into a few statistical variables. Technicians
generalize numerous aspects of traditional societies into undifferentiated monadic units.
Certainly, generalizing makes their job a lot easier; yet, such a facetious approach—
guised under the term science—ignores complex edifice that builds each society in its
own unique image. As such, agents of development are lackadaisical—because
everything is reduced to generalized variables—in their approach to understand societies.
As, one eccentric development expert puts it: “to ‘move the money’ they have been
charged with spending, ‘development’ agencies prefer to opt for standardized
‘development’ packages. It thus suits the agencies to portray developing countries in
terms that make them appropriate targets for such packages. It is not surprising,
The term, ‘technicians of development,’ is here referring to academics
(economists, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists), government agencies,
non-profit aid agencies, even journalists along with numerous non-governmental
organizations. The term Technicians is more fitting, because by virtue of being a
technician, one is required neither to think critical nor to understand. This is, of course,
what technicians of development do; they have no understanding, nor are they pensive
about complex cultural shibboleths constituting the traditional world. These technicians
thoughtlessly take given conventional scientific knowledge as truths, and assume them to
be applicable in every society regardless of obvious diversity among societies. And just
like technicians whose utilities lie in their ability to perform tasks they are taught to do
without much thinking, for they are conditioned by their profession to do so, so it is with
technicians of development, where to think critically and to understand is to delve into
the realm of fables. Furthermore, technicians like to mention ‘laymen’ when referring to
those who are not part of their over-specialized (i.e. sub-divisions of sub-divisions of subdivisions) fields, yet in reality these technicians are more of laymen within their own
fields as they are outside; they are, in other words, ‘intellectual laymen’ themselves.
4
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therefore, that the ‘country profiles’ on which the agencies base their interventions
frequently bear little or no relation to economic and social realities (italics added).”5
When nescient development agencies (as well as technicians of development) cannot be
bothered to accept societal realities, the pre-packaged standardized plans certainly
become most desirable. One cannot but be amaze at such languid efforts undertaken by
technicians; yet, it is at the same time equally amazing to see them being so flippant,
when it comes to their understanding of the complex traditional world.
This brings us to the MDGs, an example of scientific rationality in motion. The
MDGs are the product of Millennium Summit which transpired into the largest gathering
of world leaders in New York in September 2000. The Summit adapted the UN
Millennium Declaration, now known as the Millennium Development Goals: The MDGs
are the “time-bound,” “quantified targets” set to address extreme poverty in all its
numerous aspects—hunger, lack of shelter, income poverty, education, gender equality,
health, environment sustainability, etc.6
Here, the MDGs assume all developing societies face analogous problems;
therefore, ways to deal with them are also equivalent. As is evident from the eight MDGs,
they are as follows: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary
education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality;
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improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure
environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development.7
These goals were conceived precisely because of the generalized views on
traditional, developing societies. If the emphasis on generalization seems familiar, from
the authors discussed in the last chapter, to the reader, one would be right, after all the
primary author of the MDGs was none other than Jeffery Sachs who called for “science
for development” to improve human conditions.8 Indeed, generalization is also
emphasized, for instance, by Malinowski who espoused for every societal event to be
reduced to generalizable statements, or Parsons who insisted on the generalizability of
knowledge, or North who maintained generalization enables one to make good models
and theories to face real uncertainties of the world.9
This generalization thus affords MDGs to view, for instance, poverty as
something ahistorical or acontextual, i.e. something already present or a priori, not
realizing it is the intrusion of external norms and values that create poverty in traditional
societies. Norberg-Hodge shows a Himalayan society in Ladakh with no previous notion
of poverty to an emerging one, where new economic practices along with the introduction
of western goods, and technologies brought modernized poverty, thus leading to a
breakdown of community ties and bringing irreversible changes.10 It must be remembered
7
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that poverty is not some ubiquitous features of traditional societies. In many non-western
societies it was introduced from the outside. As one Yupik Indian from Alaska recalls:
‘Poverty’ has only recently been introduced to native communities… for
thousands of years people subsisted from the land and ocean along the west coast
of Alaska. It was a hard life, but it had none of the frustrations and stigmas of
poverty, for the people were not poor. Living from the land sustained life and
evolved the Yupik culture, a culture in which wealth was the common wealth of
the people as provided by the earth….
…. The new economic system … began replacing food and fur with cash,
cooperation with competition, sharing with accumulating.
…. It is not so well known that the economic impact of western civilization
was every bit as devastating to the well-being and spirit of the people … these
new ways of doing things can be as disturbing to the life of a person or of a
culture as the Measles infection is to the life of a body (italics added).11
The above statement is quoted at length because it provides one with the
existential realities that negate the simple lackadaisical attitude to assume universal
values, which the author(s) (headed by Jeffrey Sachs) of MDGs did, such as the a priori
supposition to assume every society goes through analogous societal experiences:
poverty. It is out of the vacuity of a person that such generalization becomes inevitable,
since it simplifies complex human expressions. Certainly, in many societies across
Africa, Asia, and the Pacific (i.e. the Oceanic), poverty was introduced either through
colonial powers or through civilizing efforts to modernize the natives. The British in
Kenya, the Germans in New Guinea, Australians in Papua and toward Aborigines, the
Dutch in East Indies, and the French in West Africa created a new reality, i.e. poverty, by
introducing poll tax made payable only through the means of money, i.e. cash, the failure
of which meant, for the natives, facing long jail sentences.12 This induced natives to work
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as manual laborers in plantations and in other civilizing works for the Europeans in order
to procure cash. As one scholar, observed: “The poll tax and hut tax to which natives are
subjected have been used as a means of forcing them into the European economic system
(italics added).”13 This is what Chamberlain meant in his speech to the House of
Commons in 1926: “Under all circumstances the progress of natives toward civilization
is only secured when they shall be convinced of the necessity and dignity of labour; and
therefore I think that everything we reasonably do to encourage the natives to work is
highly desirable (italics added).”14 The imposition of developed society’s institutions,
which have been discussed thoroughly in the previous chapter, as evident in
Chamberlain’s speech is so obvious that those who authored the MDGs seem to be
following what the ‘enlightened’ Europeans had done prior to them.
The same attitude is evident in MDGs approach to universal education. The
technicians (such as authors of MDGs) assumed: the standardized and highly mechanized
modern educational systems, based on the ones from the developed world, would be
beneficial for traditional societies since technicians have already decided the natives’
education, based on each society’s realities, must be eliminated. For them, these are not
even education; rather they are assortments of primitive superstitions. Every corner of the
world should, therefore, be brought under one mass universalized education system, just
like the standardized modern mass consumer society. As one author argues, traditional
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societies instead of living by their ancestral laws must be educated in scientific outlook.15
Yet, the modern education system has nothing whatsoever to do neither with the
liberation of traditional people nor of their minds. Instead, it is but a blatant colonization
of thought. Forget the archaic colonization of people, land, culture by force and imperial
domination, for that is much too antiquated; today there is the colonization of thought,
which is much more refined, dressed in the gown of progress. After all, by depriving
persons or societies of their freedom of thought, which is the essences of human
freedom,16 they very easily succumb to outside manipulation, whereby, they are
cultivated to virtues, values, beliefs, norms desired by the manipulator or the dominant
society.17
Under colonialism, in the name of progress, many societies were introduced to a
modern education system, where the content along with what was taught had nothing
whatsoever to do with societies’ reality. However, it did one thing with immaculate
result: it proved to be an indispensable tool for acculturation of the natives to the values
Garth N. Jones, “Strategies and Tactics of Planned Organizational Change:
Case Examples in the Modernization Process of Traditional Societies,” Human
Organization 24, no. 3 (1965): 192-200.
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of their colonizers, thereby, destroying their cultures; it created new needs which hitherto
did not exist; it fostered new dissatisfactions in the society; it was an effective means of
destroying society’s self-esteem; and it disrupted traditional societies without
empowering them to have control over conditions affecting their everyday lives.18 This is
manifestly apparent if one looks into the case of Native Americans. One of the best
means that destroyed the culture and society of the Native Americans was education. For
instance, the United States government in order to deal with the “Indian Problem”
established numerous boarding schools where native children, from a very young age,
were required to attend. These were places where the civilized society sanitized the minds
of young savages. There native children were exposed to new haircuts, given English
names, introduced to Western dresses, and schooled in educational models of the
civilized society.19 One can, for example, call to mind how the Native American children
were domesticated through government-controlled schools through art education, such as,
the Sherman Institute in Riverside, California and the Albuquerque Indian School in New
Mexico.20 The purpose behind such kinds of school were simple: they served as means to
assimilate Native Americans by instilling values, norms, and ideals of mainstream
society; they also served to transform “little savages” into civilized men and women; and
to show the system was succeeding in its aims, artworks of the students were displayed at
national conventions or exhibitions which functioned as evidence of the natives’ progress
toward civilization.21
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Similarly, the French in its colonies also established schools as an instrument for
cultural modification. Here, schools educated natives on French language, its ideals of
respect, order, politeness, cleanliness, obedience, and good habits, as well as meaning for
terms such as charity, compassion, justice, altruism, respect, pity, concepts with which
the French presumed the natives were unfamiliar. The most important lesson, however,
was the need for loyalty to France and its interests; furthermore, natives were taught to
despise their own cultures and traditions. The French, moreover, proselytized to the
natives that since Whites were much more advanced and better educated, it would be
better for them to work for the white man, this way they will become intelligent,
industrious, and progress more rapidly.22 Introduction of modern education meant
destruction of native cultures and societies, as one Dadacha, an elder of Borana tribe in
Kenya, recalls the ruination brought into his society: “I think of it [modern education] as
a device whereby the enemy is out to make people forget what they already know. The
device whereby he destroys our age-old wisdom, by making it impossible to pass it down
to the younger generation. In such schools, our children, far from studying their own
language, are thrown out of school for using it….”; however, “Worst of all is that they
also force our young to abandon our own customs and to adopt this borrowed one along
with them. In this way our great customary system is denied its natural place.”23
Certainly, the purpose of education, which the new system instilled upon the younger
generations, was to show the inferiority of local societies and superiority of enlightened
22
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Western/European societies. What the young learned in their schools had no relevance to
the actual realities of their daily lives. The traditional ways of educating their young,
about contributing to society’s needs, maintaining harmony, conviviality, self-reliance,
all of which were meaningfully adapted in accordance to the actual needs of their
societies, were eviscerated. The sanitization of traditional societies by means of new
schooling systems transformed other parts of the world into ready-made consumers, who
are made into conformist, work-oriented beings or, to use Marcuse’s term, onedimensional man.
It was such destructive features of modern education that Gandhi advocated
against. He was against the Anglo educational system because it did nothing but destroy
the ancient village organizations that emphasized self-support, conviviality, compassion,
caring, and other human values appropriate to Indian life. And what Gandhi did was a
threat to the colonizer’s interests of disseminating its values in Indian society, or rather
the British saw his teaching to be in opposition to progress.24 For Gandhi, “Not only was
[the education system introduced by the British] irrelevant to the learning needs of the
millions, but it constituted a major…instrument for their enslavement and the destruction
of their cultural roots…. The object of this education was called ‘progress’, although it
represented new processes of isolation, destitution and dependency for the grassroots”;
because education, for Gandhi, meant an “all-round development of human faculty,” it
had to be rooted in one’s “natural, social and cultural environment. It does not isolate
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[one] from [one’s] life realities.”25 Modern education system, which is standardized and
mechanical in nature, indeed does very little, if anything at all, in the overall development
of human faculty—critical thinking, building one’s character, one’s spiritual knowledge,
one’s artistic and creative sensibilities, and so forth.26 This is because abstract
institutionalized values of modern education are devoid of societal actualities. What is
worse, each cultural knowledge or collected wisdom passed down for generations
addressing the actual needs of society are replaced at the same time new institutionalized
values are being foisted.
Take for instance education of the young in the BaMbuti community in Congo.
Here, games children play are the imitation of their parents. Children love to mimic their
adult idols, i.e. their parents; this is the beginning of their education. Fathers will make
miniature bow and arrow for their sons; likewise, mothers will weave, for their daughters,
miniature nets, carrying baskets, etc. The “playing house” of the children is reenactments
of their elders, where girls build miniature houses, while boys hunt with their bow and
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arrow shooting an ear of corn or a stray plantain.27 The interesting aspect here is: children
soon find “the games they have been playing are not games any longer, but the real thing,
for they have become adults. Their hunting is now real hunting; their tree climbing is in
earnest search of inaccessible honey; their acrobatics on the swings are repeated almost
daily, in other forms, in the pursuit of elusive game, or in avoiding the malicious forest
buffalo. It happens so gradually that they hardly notice the change at first, for even when
they are proud and famous hunters their life is still full of fun and laughter.”28 The
education of the BaMubti is rooted in social, natural, and cultural actualities of their
society in which they are placed. The lessons they learn, by means of children’s play,
have special meaning, purpose, and significance; their actions and curiosity are answered
by the world around them, where they imbibe on the age-old wisdom passed on by their
elders. Through inquest into wonders and mysteries of the world around, they slowly
begin to learn and become a conscious being. They acquire social consciousness teaching
them the special meaning and special importance of everyone and everything in their
world.29 Children are brought into a world filled with meaning, with purpose; they fill the
27
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child’s imagination and give the child a sense of awe and amazement. This way, for the
BaMbuti, education is cultivation of human faculty, becoming a thinking being, a being
of conscious, a social being that is continuously in a state of becoming, so as to maximize
one’s potential for humanity.30 Certainly, manners in which the BaMbuti educate their
young are suited only for their society; after all, context is important, for education serves
the need of their society in accordance to their particular context. One cannot blindly
institute every society under one form of universalized education system jettisoning
social, cultural, natural context of diverse communities, and expect to provide meaning to
those who adhere to it.
What is more, modern systems of education, foisted to replace a native’s ways of
teaching their young, have little, if at all, to do with enlightening minds. Illich shows how
modern education is itself rooted in indoctrinating institutionalized values, thereby,
leading to decadence of persons and growing misery in society: psychological impotence,
social polarization, and physical pollution. Illich reasons: schools (in modern society)
serve a double function: to create new needs and to prepare persons for their role as
consumers.31 They become means of social control, dictating what is deemed acceptable,
what is not; it creates pre-packaged values and instructions for citizens (starting from
children)—hence, increasing the perennial demand for endless mass consumptions.
School in developed society is but a factory through which pre-planned citizens are
produced to satisfy endless consumerisms, thus manufacturing the next generation of
consumers. The meaning of education is corrupted; children are forced to learn things
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that have no relevance to them, which in turn only stuns their creative, artistic abilities.32
“Stupefying education,”33 therefore, becomes the culmination of modern education.
Certainly, the call to transform education to serve economic purposes is clearly evident in
MDGs call for universalized education. 34
Societies schooled in modern education system are instilled with the notion that
everything in the world—from babies’ intelligence, nations’ development, person’s
imagination, learning, personal growth, progress towards peace (calculated in terms of
body count), to man itself—is gradable or quantifiable. Moreover, if something is not
measurable then it is immediately viewed with suspicion. It also burgeons the need for a
standardized approach towards everything: societies and countries are categorized like
castes according to average years spent in modern education systems; schools and
universities are graded or ranked, which has little to do with education and everything to
do with their conformity.35 No wonder, there is a call for universal education. This way
32
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the dissemination of one mode of thought deemed proper is actualized, because, as Illich
had argued, once people begin to accept measurement for themselves, they soon apply it
to everything and everyone around them.36 No wonder, technicians, therefore, assume
modern education will drive traditional societies toward progress, after all look at the
developed world and how its systems of education have advanced them, in terms of
material wealth. The MDGs assumed away messy contexts and prefer to lie in the cold
bosoms of scientific rationality and its detached generalized parameters.
Analogous sentiments drive the MDGs view in respect to women, health (and
diseases) and environment. Essentialities of context rarely matter because they are
cumbersome to the eyes of the universalizers or generalizers. Thus, they see women
everywhere, outside of the developed world, to be in absolute oppressive conditions. Just
because the position of women does not resemble or is not analogous to ones in the
developed world, it is automatically assumed, traditional societies are—by employing
platitudinous terms as—bad, immoral, backward, or primitive. Technicians view status of
women elsewhere in a different light without considering their differing contexts. It
matters very little to these technicians to give a moment’s thought on how every kind of
society, tradition, belief, etc. is framed according to its cultural contexts. To disregard the
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context by measuring or comparing different societies’ values and norms, only
illuminates one’s inanities.
One will find in many traditional societies the role and position of women are as
equally important as of men. For instance, among the Ilongots in the Philippines, the role
of men and women are complimentary, one is required for the other. There women are
seen to be stable and reliable producers upon which the survival of the family depends;
they are the foundations of family; they can join in men’s conversations; even join them
on their hunts. Though there are certain expectations of men and women, these are not
some sort of hierarchical gradation; rather these are complimentary to each other: both
men and women help each other in taking care of the household chores, gardening, etc.37
While among the Meratus in Indonesia, men and women are not confined to specific
categories, both are seen as equally essential in respect to societal issues. Even in regard
to marriage, it is about mutual understanding and assistance upon which survival of the
family depends. A wife is not seen to be a domestic servant who takes care of her
husband’s cloths, foods, etc.38 Whereas, among the Mbuti in Congo, women occupy an
important position; they are important in the furtherance of their society; they are the
givers of life, they signify life, the splendid manifestation of the goodness of the forest,
the Mbuti believe. Furthermore, they go on hunts with men, for it is, after all, a joint
effort; they take part in free discussions with men; both men and women also assists each
other in taking care of the house, picking mushrooms, or taking care of their children,
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etc.39 The point which one is here trying to elucidate is this: one should not presume
traditional society to be a priori anti-women; or that they have nothing else better to do
than to contemplate on how to keep women oppressed and downtrodden.40
Such a kind of parochial mentality also leads one to suppose that these societies
have no sense of good or clean health, are disease ridden, have no knowledge of medicine
whatsoever. Yet, traditional societies are presently plagued by health crisis not because
they have been this way since time immemorial, but rather their age-old collected
wisdom on how to care for the health of their bodies and of society has been
systematically annihilated, in favor of modernized education proselytizing the superiority
of the developed world’s sciences, medicines, manners of life, processes of thought, and
inferiorities of the rest. What is more, many new diseases were introduced into traditional
societies with the dissemination of progress: civilization.41 Weston Price in his
voluminous work shows how contact with civilization displaced traditional foods by
modern commercialized foods, thus spelling disaster for traditional societies: Swiss of
Switzerland, Australian Aborigines, Islands of the Outer and Inner Hebrides,
Melanesians, Polynesians, the Eskimos of Alaska, Native Americans, Central and Eastern
39
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African Tribes, Maori of New Zealand, Malay tribes north of Australia, and Peruvian
Indians. The displacement brought about dental caries, birth defects, complications
during birth, face and feet deformities, tuberculosis, heart diseases, affections of internal
organs, arthritis, susceptibility to disease, crowded teeth, narrowing of facial structures,
and other chronic diseases, all of which were hitherto unknown to traditional societies.
Moreover, conditions that caused dental decay also promoted other diseases not known in
these societies. The reason was simple, civilized man’s food lacked essential nutrients
causing dental decay and physical deformities. Price found traditional diets contained as
well as provided essential body building nutrients essential for good health, in general;
these also provided resistance to tooth decay and many other modern illnesses.42
Even in terms of medical knowledge, each traditional society utilizing its own
collected wisdom abetted each in curing numerous indigenous health maladies specific to
it. Consider the Eastern Africa tribe of Masai. For hundreds of years they are reported to
have known the carrier of malaria; they knew it was mosquitoes. Furthermore, they also
knew how to prevent serious spirochetal infections caused by syphilis; they exposed
members of their tribe who were infected with syphilis to malaria to prevent serious
infections. Yet, modern medicine investitures itself as the pioneer discoverer of using
malaria to relieve or prevent further syphilitic infections. Price even considers Masai’s
tribal veterinary knowledge to be comparable with modern veterinarian science (at least
relative to the period of his study).43 Traditional societies aren’t oblivious to the world
around them, as assumed by most social scientists. In the field of medicine, old collected
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wisdom taught society how to cure many diseases. For instance, modern science claims it
discovered vitamin C. But it was native Indians in Canada who had known, for a long
time, how to cure scurvy.44 The contribution of traditional knowledge is not just limited
to scurvy. Consider the following, the modern agent for treating allergies and other
serious digestive tract ailments is kaolin (or aluminum silicate), i.e. clay. But this
knowledge is already well known among many traditional societies all around the world.
The Aboriginals in Australia, the Central African tribes, and indigenous societies in
South America, all had knowledge of kaolin.45 They always tipped their ball of clay into
their foods and drinks before consuming. It was later found by modern science that the
clay (kaolin) helped prevent serious digestive ailments, and other bacterial infections of
the gut. Modern science, latter came to show clay (kaolin) helps collect toxic products or
substances. Furthermore, the clay or kaolin acts as an absorbent that helps in remedying
modern allergies.46
One should remind oneself about the importance of collected wisdom for the
traditional world: take numerous African societies prior to European’s mission
civilisatrice, for instance: here most societies were immunized against malaria, they were
even vaccinated (for life) against small pox. All these were possible because prior to
outsiders interruption, natives knew their environment where they resided, which taught
44

Ibid., 75.
Of course, they were not known by the name ‘kaolin’; rather it was a ball of
clay which was one of the ubiquitous items in these societies.
46
Price, Nutrition and Physical Degeneration, 266, 418. The following account
by Price sums up the irony of modernity, i.e. introduction of natives to development and
its consequent physical degenerations: “The cook on the government boat was an
aboriginal Australian from Northern Australia. He had been trained on a military craft as
a dietitian. Nearly all his teeth were lost. It is of interest that while the native aborigines
had relatively perfect teeth, this man who was a trained dietitian for the whites had lost
nearly all his teeth from tooth decay and pyorrhea.” Ibid., 181.
45

150
them, in return, how diseases can be avoided or cured. These were complex civilizations
all well adapted to their ecological milieu. Contact with modernity, however, destroyed
natives’ ways of life; hence, what we find in Africa, presently, is societies unable to
remedy themselves against those diseases which they hitherto were immunized against.
Presently, malaria is one of the most serious diseases in the whole of Africa. The native
African societies knew how to circumvent malaria. How they combated malaria was
simple common sense: living in small groups in dry and high places spreading over large
areas. This way the risks of malaria were thus avoided. However, destruction of
traditional cultures and knowledge meant vast rural population, who previously lived in
small groups, crammed into urban towns, thereby increasing population’s vulnerability to
infectious diseases. The large urbanization is now a big hurdle to many African societies
who once lived in tranquility within their environment.47 The European civilizing mission
also introduced diseases which were previously unknown, for instance: smallpox, in the
Incan society.48
Certainly, illnesses found among traditional societies were endemic or
indigenous. Hence, they learned how to cure native aliments confined within their milieu.
There is a reason why collected wisdoms are of principal importance to natives: they
provide protection and safety, be they curing aliments or providing purpose, meaning,
hope. Thus, within their own milieu, until their contact with outside civilized people, they
had essential skills and knowledges helping them overcome local indigenous maladies.
They did not require elaborate machines, specialized skills or technologies precisely
47
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because they had no need for them, conditions did not arise for these to be needed. And
from Price we know the consequences of their contact with the civilized man, in terms of
their physical health. Hence, it seems rather imprudent to view traditional societies to be
plagued with diseases which they cannot cure, while at the same time dismissing
responsibilities for the many non-indigenous maladies introduced into these societies
with their contact with the modern.49
It would be a gross misunderstanding to assume modern medicine along with its
universalized health system to be better if not superior to what has been destroyed in
traditional societies, i.e. societies’ ability to care for themselves by means of collected
wisdom. Surely, appeal to universalized health system, as in modern societies, is but the
institutionalization of society, thereby depriving each person the freedom of autonomous
choice. Here, the person’s freedom to die is deprived due to technical organizing of
society and the medical system; the whole society is universally medicalized and highly
49
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maladies were known prior to their contact with the developed. Third, because there is no
prior history with the new diseases, traditional societies are unable to cure novel maladies
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at its best).

152
medicated (and made dependent on it).50 Furthermore, people are made into patients
without even being sick. This way they are institutionalized and are made dependent on
professional physicians for the rest of their lives. The professional medical technicians
employing their mystical esoteric languages and medical rituals, to fool patients, decide
what is to be counted as illnesses, what is to be labelled as deviance, etc., i.e. what counts
as normal, what constitutes health needs, what must be provided. Indeed, advancement in
modern medicine is also accompanied by increase in iatrogenics.51 Human illness is
transformed into technical error; the patient is not seen as an organic being, rather it is
seen as a mechanical thing, like Descartes’ clock made by the divine Watchmaker; hence,
the mechanical thing (for the person is transmogrified) is to be corrected by medication
which does not actual heal the patient but induces the patient to become dependent on the
professional. Illnesses in modern society, which are actually due to limitless
industrialization, commodification, and monetization, are nevertheless blamed by
medical economists, professional physicians as the result not of the system itself—which
50
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atrophies social, psychological, cultural essentialities of a person—but blame some entity
that has entered the body of a consumer, for human beings in such societies are but a
conformist, standardized consumer.52 What is more, modern medicine brings reemergence of diseases, old and new (drug resistance bacteria, viruses). While the beacon
of humanity, i.e. development, brings with it its own developed diseases (such as:
bilharziasis, sleeping sickness, even malaria).53 Indeed, most of the epidemic diseases,
such as, measles, smallpox, cholera, plague, flu, and tuberculosis, are what is called
zoonoses, transmitted from domesticated animals—through pests such as mosquitoes,
rats, mites, ticks, fleas, and mice, that invariably accompany animals—to humans. Here,
mass crowding, which civilizing process inevitably brings, is key to the transmission of
these diseases.54 In fact, as Scott notes, many traditional societies, such as the Zomia for
instance, understood such relations and took measure by living and keeping safe distance
between themselves and the civilizing states.55
Even in terms of environment, traditional society has much to impart to the
developed about preserving nature. The unlimited consumption and demand of modern
developed societies as well as the needs to satisfy them depletes the environment; the
Earth is consumed and defiled all in the name of progress. They say nature is to be
manipulated for the advantage of human beings, but in this process we as, humans,
invariably have to perennially remake and remold ourselves in order to fit into the new
52
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environment we create by sullying the Earth; in a sense, we will be our own undoing.
Modern manufacturing and agriculture defiles the environment and drains the soil of its
nutrients. The scientific revolution in agriculture with scientifically enhanced seeds to
yield more outputs per given acre only exhausts the soil and organic world by consuming
indiscriminant amounts of water in conjunction with increased usage in pesticides,
insecticides, fertilizers, energy, etc. What is more, such mode of agricultural practices is
proselytized in societies where agriculture is still primitive or traditional.56
Diversity in agricultural practices and societal context in which such practices are
applied is of little relevance to the uniform myopic ken of modern scientific man.
Uniformity is the crux from which modern man is not allowed to digress, for man is
conditioned to be so. Thus, for instance, the supposed superiority of, as proselytized by
developed world, monoculture over polycropping as practiced in many traditional
societies. In the eyes of modern scientific agriculture specialist, the obvious superiority of
organized, systematic monocultures is leaps and bounds ahead of messy, highly
disordered polycroppings. The following episode shows the inanity of myopic mindset:
the indigenous agriculture system in West Africa, for centuries, has relied on
polycropping, where diverse arrays of crop along with equally diverse subspecies have
been simultaneously farmed on the same field. Yet, for modern agricultural specialists,
polyculture gave the visual effect of messy sloppiness of the natives. The disordered
chaos of confusing plantation of numerous crops, to the Western eyes, was a symptom of
MDGs justified such practices under the platitudinous term ‘sustainability.’
They assume such practices ‘sustain’ and replete the environment. Perversely, they
suppose such practices to be superior and more nature friendly than traditional modes of
agriculture, which are seen to be primitive. See, J. E. Davies, and W. F. Edmundson,
Epidemiology of DDT (Mount Kisco, NY: Future, 1972); Keith Mellanby, Pesticides and
Pollution (New York, NY: Collins, 1967).
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society’s backwardness and their reliance on primitive techniques. As such, campaign
was launched to rid polycroppings in favor of monocultures, which were carried out
feverously by colonial administrators and later by the local successors.57 However,
Western scientific agriculturalists ignored the reason as well as the context—ecological,
climate, tropical soil—behind natives’ practice of polyculture. Polyculture in the tropics
helps preserve the thin layer of soil from erosion, be it through sunlight, rain, or wind.
Furthermore, agriculture in this climatic zone is directed according to the timing of rain;
thus, polycropping helps farmers protect their crops from too much rain or too little rain
by cultivating as many varieties of crops that can best take advantage of local rain and
soil conditions.58 It offered a variety of combinations not only to meet changing
circumstances from season to season as well as within each season, but it also afforded
farmers to meet changing ecological and soil conditions. This enabled each farmer to
plant crops according to the farmer’s individual needs and preferences.59
Chaotic polyculture violates methodical systematic cultivation of scientific
monoculture, yet behind the seemingly unscientific chaos, there is hidden logic (which is
not hidden for the natives, because for them it is just ‘good sense’) which very few astute
57
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outsiders discovered, as one colonial mycologist describes of Europeans initial reaction to
polycropping:
The whole scheme seems to him [i.e., the European] laughable and ridiculous, and
in the end he would probably conclude that it is merely foolish to crowd different
plants together in this childish way so that they choke each other. Yet if one looks
at it more closely there seems a reason for everything. The plants… have been
planted at proper distance on hillocks of soil arranged in such a way that when
rain falls it does not waterlog the plants, no does it pour off the surface and wash
away the fine soil… and although several kinds of plants are growing together
they were not sown at the same time nor will they be reaped together: they are
rather successive crops planted in such a way that the soil is always occupied and
is neither dried up by the sun nor leached out by the rain, as it would be if it were
left bare at any time…. This is but one of many examples that might be given that
should warn us to be very cautious… before we pass judgement upon native
agriculture. The whole method of farming and outlook of the farmer are so
entirely new to us that we are strongly tempted to call it foolish merely from an
instinctive conservatism.60
Therefore, just because cultures still rely on traditional methods of agriculture, it
does not mean they are ignorant. Their collected wisdom plays a crucial role in abetting
them to sustain their society, and doing so with as little (to no) harm to the natural world
as possible. In other words, there is, as Claude Lévi-Strauss once reasoned, an inner logic
behind the apparent chaos and disorder in the ways of the native.61 Furthermore, their
ways of farming even help modern societies understand problems of their own: heavy
reliance on scientific industrial agriculture that, in turn, depletes the soil of its nutrients.
As Stamp notes agricultural practices in Nigeria, where the farmers have developed a
scheme for farming which, in principle, cannot be improved or be bettered. These
schemes, Stamp argues, afford almost complete protection against loss of soil fertility and
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soil erosion.62 Polycropping defying systematic scientific monoculture can be seen
elsewhere. Edgar Anderson notes of such cropping in Nicaragua, where to the eyes of
Westerners the garden may seem all at the same time like a beehive, an orchard, a dump
heap, a vegetable garden, a medicinal garden, and a compost heap. Yet, Anderson
reasons, it is more than what the superficial exterior visual effect might otherwise
suggests. This polycropped garden affords foods and vegetables to grow all year round;
moreover, the year round vegetation protected the soil from eroding. The thick vegetation
provided essential humidity during dry seasons; furthermore, the variety of plants
cultivated on the same soil, checked insects, pests, and other diseases.63 On the contrary,
monocropping increases the problem with insects, where massive acreages of land are
devoted to a single crop. This in turn leads to increase usage as well as dosage in
pesticides and herbicides, consequently leading to soil erosions.64 An astute reader would
have likewise noticed how devotion to single mode of thought atrophies one’s
understandings of the human world.
Even traditional shifting cultivations, considered by scientific agronomists not
only as backward and sloppy but also damaging to the environment, actually help in
forest regenerations, preserve essential soil nutrients, and limit soil erosions. Here,
swidden plots cultivated in the previous year are let to fallow allowing the soil to restore
its fertility, while large trees are allowed to remain; this prevents soil erosion and helps
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with the structure of the soil. However, from the Western viewpoint, such practices have
backwardness and ignorance written all over—the heaps of brush to be bruned, field halfcleared with branches and stumps with interspersed crops, which are not even sown in a
straight line.65 In other words, traditional practices violate the Westerners’ tidy,
structured, and scientifically methodical approach. Thus, native practices are stigmatized
as ignorance, backward, and dangerous to the environment.
Just because traditional societies are not modern, one should not instantaneously
assume they threaten the environment. The Mbuti, for instance, sees the forest to be
sacred, their survival depends on the survival of their forest; thus, they work to keep the
forest uncut and intact. The forest, for them, is the essence of their very existence; it is the
source of everything good, and good. They sing, whisper, shout, talk to the forest
addressing to it as their father, mother, or both. To Mbuti, the forest is their father and
mother, who provide food, shelter, clothing, warmth, and affection.66 Indeed, these are
the most basic essentialities for the existence of any person or society, especially, if a
society (or a person) is not to be undone. Theirs is a world filled with meaning and
purpose, where everything has its own entelechy, something that contributes to the world
that is beautiful and divine. As such, it is out of one’s stubborn attachments to one’s
blinkered beliefs that make one to view traditional societies as a threat to this organic
world. Traditional societies are not interested in the hackneyed term such as
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sustainability (which the developed world is so found of); rather they preserve and tend
the nature, they are one with the nature.67
There is a reason why traditional societies have lasted as long as they have and
with them the ability to keep the environment without much destruction or destitution.
The destruction of environment is the result of industrial revolution that took place in
Europe. Traditional societies have the ability to limit their needs to essential necessities
of life, thereby limiting the blatant destruction of their environment. They have occupied
the world for most part of human history with little obliteration to the natural milieu, in
general. However, modern man, which is but less than a husk compared to the existence
of traditional man, has managed to annihilate and bring to ruin the environment upon
which life on earth depends. It is therefore hypocritical for modern man, the man of
science, to preach to traditional societies how to preserve nature by proselytizing the
phantasmagoric benevolence of modern science and its techniques.
One can see from what has been mentioned so far in this section, the context, the
polyvalence of society’s practices, beliefs matters very little to technicians. Therefore, it
is of little wonder that technicians espouse global partnership for development (as stated
in the MDGs). Of course, the global partnership is but the mass standardization of various
societies, who are there to be brought into the modern world; or to bring parts of the
67
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world not presently under its grasps—be they socially, politically, or economically—to
be brought within the system. The target (as justified in the MDGs): to foist rule-based,
open, predictable trading and financial system; and good governance. By open,
predictable, rule-based financial and trading system, it means the economic system
preferred by or utilized in the developed world. While by good governance, it means the
democratic system. No doubt, an astute reader will recognize these targets to be very
reminiscent of what was discussed in the preceding chapter.68 Certainly, MDGs are
geared to serve economic ends since according to MDGs: education, hunger, health,
environment, gender equality are a means toward economic productivity, growth, and
development.69 The MDGs blatantly direct the goals to meet economic ends through
societal (institutional) changes, as is evident in the professed universalized objectives.
However, simplifications of societal reality, by universalizing human conditions
as evident in MDGs, are only to be expected because it is rooted in scientific rationality.
68
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The methodologies of scientific rationality are an utter giveaway to the expected outcome
of universality. Take, for instance, the essence of scientific rationality, i.e. methodology
of scientific analysis (this example is extremely relevant and fitting, as one will see). The
process of carrying out an inquiry in a scientific manner requires a strict procedure: offer
proposal for the study, state the research question, postulate some hypotheses, elucidate
the methodologies, state the variables, review the literature, state the novelty of the study
(which is being undertaking), cite empirical evidences, how hypotheses are to be tested,
generality of the findings, significances of the study, not to mention the avoidance of first
person pronouns, such as I, Me, etc. because objective studies cannot allow any
subjectivity. In other words, there are strict dogmatic rules from which one cannot
deviate if one’s inquiry is to be deemed scholarly or scientific. If any of the strict rules
are bypassed or ignored, then the study is subjective, neither scholarly nor scientific. This
is to say, every kind of inquiry must be carried out in the same uniform manner,
regardless of the applicability of the methods/rules to the subject of inquiry. Here,
adherence to dogmatic methods, not understanding of phenomena, is privileged. When
phenomena are analyzed by following the same strict uniform methods, it is only obvious
for scholarships of development (or social sciences, in general) to call for social changes
that disseminate sameness into every culture. And just as scientific rationality cannot
tolerate any tangent from the uniformity of its methods, so can no society differ from the
uniformity which developmental progress invariably brings. Indeed, the issue of
standardization is a matter of course in every aspect of the developed world, from
standardized education, examination, health care, etc. to standardize culture—thereby,
eliminating diversity under platitudinous terms: country or nation-state. Certainly, one of
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the ubiquitous steps promptly undertaken in any development analysis is the facile
generalization of traditional societies, from which technicians go on to draw a picture,
which is but a figment of their phantasmagoric society, where diverse aspects of society
are relegated under the term ceteris paribus or put under brackets. The animated human
aspects of society, jettisoned. What the nineteenth century French writer, Alexandre
Dumas, speaks of seems a far cry to technicians: “All generalizations are dangerous, even
this one.”70 Hence, one can see here how universalization becomes the logical outcome of
MDGs.71 This generalization is only the manifestation of developed society’s mindsets:
“Present-day industrial society organizes life around commodities. Our market-intensive
societies measure material progress by the increase in the volume and variety of
commodities produced. And taking our cue from this sector, we measure social progress
by the distribution of access to these commodities.”72 Without doubt, MDGs measure the
traditional using commodities as the standard by which development, modernity,
civilization, or human development (as indicated by the facile United Nations Human
Development Index, HDI) is computed. One will find goals itemized in MDGs to be a
70
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measure of how well societies have integrated into modern market-intensive system. So,
technicians take their cue, for development, from the “distribution of access to” the
market-intensive commodities. Everything is tailored for economic purpose.73
Development, for MDGs, is one-dimensional, like the rationality it arises from.
Transmigration in Indonesia
Let us now examine what happens when universalized human conditions are put
into praxis for development. For this purpose, we will be examining two episodes of
73
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development: Transmigration in Indonesia and compulsory Villagization in Tanzania.
However, it would be helpful for the reader to note the following qualification: the two
examples are of interest to this inquiry only to the extent that they afford better means to
show the acme of scientific rationality in development—from its rationality to its
schemes to its practices. Furthermore, these are not comprehensive analysis of the cases
because numerous other scholarships have done a cogent task in their exposition of the
two episodes; hence, it would be superfluous, pertaining to this inquest as well as in the
broader contexts of its place in scholarships concerning Tanzania and Indonesia, to
regurgitate another exhaustive examination.
Take, for instance, the largest transmigration program in human history
undertaken in the name of development in Indonesia.74 Certainly, the program of
transmigration is not the sole idea of the Indonesian government, but rather it arises from
the colonial periods. Since 1905, the Dutch began moving population from densely
populated inner islands to outer islands for plantation purposes.75 This program continued
even after Indonesia’s independence from the Dutch. The validation remained the same,
however: it was to reduce the pressure of over-population and unemployment in the inner
Islands of Java and Bali.76
During the second half of the 1900s, the plan became relatively more urgent.
Here, the plan was to move millions of landless poor from central Indonesian islands of
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Java, Madura, Lombok, and Bali to sparsely populated outer islands: West Papua,
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Flores, Ceram, Halmahera, and Timor. The problem, however,
was its assumptions: assumed the outer islands to be underpopulated and underdeveloped,
when in fact they were home to numerous indigenous societies that have developed and
adapted themselves to a sophisticated, yet, interlacing relation with their prevailing
environmental circumstances. What transmigration did was, it isolated and deprived
indigenous societies from their ancestral lands, hence ruining their cultures. They were
forced to participate in development projects, thereby, destroying the whole basis of their
existing ways of life.77 It is not surprising then Western educated technicians, who were
indoctrinated or who bought into the scientific mode of thought, filled the departments
responsible for such abstract and uniform understanding of realities of the outer islands.
Technicians of development, in this case, assumed away78—because it is easier to negate
various societal complexities by assuming or enclosing under the term ceteris paribus—
diverse cultural contexts of the outer islands, thus, giving an apodictic generalized view:
these islands are all the same, underdeveloped and underpopulated. By taking a scientific
approach to the program, technicians assumed away animated diverse cultures hitherto
populating the outer islands. Indeed, such generalization discarded the fact that Indonesia
has nearly 300 distinct ethnic groups, each with its own distinct culture.79 The result:
indigenous people were utterly dispossessed from their ancestral lands, resources, and
The Ecologist, “Open letter to Mr. Clausen, Retiring President of the World
Bank, and Mr. Conable, President Elect,” The Ecologist 16, no. 2-3 (1986): 58-60;
MacAndrews, “Transmigration in Indonesia.”
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livelihoods. It also created ethnic tensions between the indigenous and transmigrant
communities. The indigenous peoples of the outer islands became a minority in their own
land; robbed not only of their land, food, and shelter, they also became victims of mass
atrocities. Furthermore, they were forced to abandon their traditional ways of life and
integrate themselves into the transmigrant settlements in order to conform to the national
goals of development and progress.80 The development project was also more or less an
operation to carry out mass ethnocide against indigenous people with the sole aim of
eliminating ethnic diversity.81
The project afforded the chance to get rid of indigenous populations along with
their cultures. These societies were seen as isolated, backward and alien people, simply
because they were not integrated into the mainstream Indonesian society. Under the guise
of development, full-scale annihilation of cultural diversities was launched. The reader
will find, as we move forward, even the rhetoric used to justify the cleansing of diversity
is in parity with polemics utilized by MDGs as well as in works examined in the previous
80
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chapter. As an internal document from the Department of Social Affairs (Government of
Indonesia) justified the programme by stating, development is necessary since indigenous
societies are devastating the environment with their primitive farming techniques, these
techniques pose danger to ecological equilibrium; their religion is still animistic; their
diets are inadequate; their health conditions are below the accepted norm; they lack any
kinds of formal education; they are illiterate; their arts and cultures are predominantly
magico-religious in character; they still depend on barter system and monetary form of
exchange is largely unknown to them; they are ignorant of state’s or government’s
existence and have no sense of duties as citizens; and because they largely depend on the
natural environment, they must be brought into the mainstream society so as to enable
state’s administrative control over them, i.e. brought from illegible to the legible
system.82 Note the parallel between the above polemics and those in the preceding
chapter and previous section. The same ubiquitous trite dictions are used to illustrate the
cultural inferiority of the indigenous in order to warrant the uniformity of development.
Under such pretexts, the social and economic organization of tribal societies was
to be structured according to “rational” and “modern” principles. This meant resettling
them from their ancestral lands and dwelling places to government assigned settlements
which were linked to national administration by roads. These resettlements were carried
out forcibly and against the will of indigenous groups.83 The project legitimized the
resettlements by arguing: it is done to prevent shifting cultivations, decrease soil erosions,
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increase soil fertilities, reduce loss of valuable timber from non-commercial logging,
employ unskilled laborers in the logging industry, increase education and standards of
living, facilitate development, etc.84 Moreover, traditional rituals, ceremonies, as well as
curing practices were banned in order to undermine indigenous customs, thus creating the
perception of cultural inferiority. Their ancestral religious practices embedded in the very
fabric of their society were banned; in their place monotheism was proselytized—
especially giving significant privilege to foreign missionaries.85 Tribal societies, such as
the Dani in West Papua, were forced to be clothed, their hairs shorn; anyone who
disobeyed was imprisoned. Modern education was introduced to emasculate traditional
customs, and children were forcibly taken to schools.86
Surely, it may seem methodically tidy to assume away or put under brackets all
the complexities of indigenous world, in addition, “rational” and “modern” principles
may seem to succinctly illustrate the present as well as the future of the natives; yet,
reality has the tendency to always mock at abstract systematic rationality of the human
mind put down on sheets of paper, journals, books, or reduced to statistics. Evident from
the development project is its aims to sanitize anything different, for differences are
anathema to the uniformity of scientific principles. Anything different is an eyesore for
the scientific minds, it reminds the man of science that the world is not like they imagine
it to be; so to defy nature, because they cannot accept the world as it is, they try to
Gerard Persoon, “From Affluence to Poverty: The “Development” of Tribal
Isolated Peoples,” in Poverty and Interventions: Cases from Developing Countries, eds.,
Leem Boer, Dieke Bujis, and Benno Galjart (Leiden, Netherlands: The University of
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manipulate and change the world so that it would be transformed into their fantasized
idea. In trying to transform reality into a systematic, un-chaotic, certain world, they
reaffirm in themselves the validity of science, viz. it is a process to re-establish their faith
in the illusive truths or validities of scientific rationality in face of the majestic, nonconformist human world. Therefore, indigenous communities are forcefully brought
under the grasp of modernity; it is not enough for these communities to be left alone as
they are and leave them to dwell in the innocence of their natural world. For technicians,
such communities nullify the sameness of progress, thus traditional societies must be
brought under the legible modern system.
Moreover, technicians cannot fathom the possibility of societies wanting to live
outside rationalized civilization. James Scott insightfully shows how societies
intentionally shy away from civilizing process. The Zomia, for instance, stretching from
Northeastern India to the Central Highlands of Vietnam traversing five Southeast Asian
states and four provinces in China, is an illustrative example of such societies. These hill
societies, over the course of two millennia, have been fleeing and going out-of-the-way of
civilizing processes such as conscription, epidemic, slavery, warfare, taxes, corvée labor,
etc. Furthermore, their oral culture, as a means to keep civilized society at arm’s length,
makes them an anathema to the uniform and legible (or writing) processes of civilization.
And because these societies could not be brought into the system of civilization as they
are, they are, therefore, stigmatized as primitive, barbarian, or raw.87 No wonder, the
transmigration project likewise aimed at acculturating indigenous communities. This was
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done by resettling them into new settlements which were connected to national
administration by roads, i.e. to bring them into legible system.
The resettled communities, however, experienced marked decline in their
nutritional standards; their health likewise deteriorated because these hitherto isolated
communities were introduced to non-indigenous diseases. The resettled communities
were moved from their relatively disease-free areas to malarial infested zones. Even the
claim to increase self-sufficiency for the indigenous was a way to make them dependent
on the market-cash system, which they were unfamiliar with; they, therefore, became
corvée labor in plantations in order to procure cash.88 The indigenous were resettled in
cookie-cutter housings with a plot of land in perfectly symmetrical rows, like the
numerous mass produced cookie-cutter suburban areas in the developed world, signifying
the systematic, methodical scientific approach to development. However, technicians in
their infinite scientific ken failed to consider everyday realities of the natives, as
Colchester elucidates, “Such housing is made of non-local materials which are provided
initially by government, but which can subsequently be repaired with materials only
available through the cash economy.” As such, natives who were previously independent
were now made dependent on market cash economy. Thus, “The houses are designed
according to a model of social organization that conflicts directly with traditional social
structures…. In fact, such modern dwellings frequently provide less effective protection
against the elements and against insect-borne diseases than the traditional houses.”89
Colchester, “Unity and Diversity.”
Ibid., 95, 95-96. What is more, settlers were forced to dwell in houses designed
for nuclear families. This is because traditional long-houses, hitherto utilized, were
considered by technicians as unhygienic, uncivilized. It was argued such traditional forms
of housing only encouraged sexual promiscuity, sexual orgy, and low morals. See,
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Indigenous lives and their cultural identities were thus sanitized; new realities were
imposed—such as monetary system of exchange—by making them a factor in continuous
regurgitation of the nouveau social system.
It never occurred to technicians that, may be, traditional societies are content with
the way they are; that they do not place importance in individual competitions over
communal harmony; that being one with their community, with their environment
(nature) is of outmost primacy than material benefits; that nature provides them enough
of everything essential for sustenance of their society such as fruits, wild-games, plants,
nuts, subsistence-agriculture, etc.; that sustaining and handing one’s society to future
generations is much more important than seeking material prosperity; that passing on
one’s societal subjective values, myths, legends, memories are most essential to them
than passing on baleful rationalities of science; that passing one’s ancient myths, one’s
accumulated wisdom is one’s Gift to the next generation is much more important than
welcoming future generations into a world deprived of meaning. Studies reveal that in
many traditional societies—Native Americans, Eskimos, Pygmies in Congo, Nilotic
Nuers, Dayaks in Indonesia, Aboriginals in Australia, Maoris in New Zealand, Ilongots in
Philippines, among many others—passing their world with all their ancestral myths and
accumulated wisdoms are regarded one of the most significant responsibilities for any
generation, for such knowledge gives meaning to their world and welcomes future
generations into a world filled with human love, meaning, purpose, and significance.90
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This is a gift to be passed from one generation to the next; it sustains communal harmony;
provides meaning as well as dignity to every single person in the community; accords
each person in a society to live a full, frugal life. When such essential aspects of society
are ignored because they are considered irrational, subjective, or cannot empirically be
tested in a laboratory, scrap of paper, or sophisticated calculating machineries, one is
completely discounting the pith of each society.
Moreover, because features of the traditional world cannot be measured nor
generalized into a formula, what goes amiss is, “The essence of preindustrial societies is
their variety and local adaptation. Each is tied to a specific habitat and has evolved its
own cultural and behavioral expression. The wide variety of resulting human social forms
is a response to an equal variety of habitats, each with a set of distinctive environmental
constraints.”91 These local adaptations which are specific to certain habitat cannot be
measured; each habitat provides its own resources, advantages, and hindrances which in
turn shape the norms, mores, or customs of each society. Such richness of cultural
diversity can never be entertained by technicians because, for them, the interesting human
world in its diversities must be eliminated into a dull monotonous world of science.
Certainly, for technicians, cultural complexities or contexts are too particular to
succinctly fit into their scientific projects: development. The result of such forced
development is the utter cultural collapse. Torn from their socio-cultural fabric, that
hitherto gave societies a sense of meaning to their lives, societies begin to wither from
within. The result is the growing sense of anomie, sense of personal alienation, as well as
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destruction of personal intrinsic values and self-respect leading, in the other islands, to
societal breakdown: increase in drunkenness, cultural collapse, prostitutions, etc.92 Here,
simple platitudinous assumptions such as outer islands are empty, underdeveloped, less
man-to-land ratio, employment, productivity, progress, development, and so forth easily
neglected actual human expressions. In the project’s efforts to be practical (highly
emphasized among the academics, professionals, and experts), human actualities are
relegated as something insignificant, or, as fervently advocated by Malinowski,
“adventitious and fortuitous happenings.”93 This is because understanding complex
realities only baffles and confuses technicians, since they are conditioned to be myopic as
well as conditioned to suspect anything which cannot be quantified. Thus, the empty
underdeveloped lands, used to justify the transmigration program, belonged to numerous
animated indigenous ethnic groups. This meant dispossessing natives from their ancestral
lands; after all, what can the natives do, as large-scale military operations were launched
to disinfect lands from their rightful owners.94
There is a difference in values between those implementing or concocting
development projects and those whose actual lives are affected by them. For instance, for
the indigenous groups in West Papua, one of the outer islands designated for
transmigration program, their lands were not just a commodity or a resource to be
exploited and used for the advantage of man, rather their lands had profound significance
in their lives: the lands were sacred, something to be cared for so as to sustain their
Colchester, “Unity and Diversity.”
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94
See, Arnold Kohen, and John Taylor, An Act of Genocide: Indonesia’s Invasion
of East Timor (London: Tapol, 1979); Carmel Budiardjo, and Liem Soei Liong, The War
Against East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1985); Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War.
92
93

174
society, they gave meaning, a purpose to their life, they were the singularity of their
existence, they were the apotheosis of their culture and history. As is made clear by
Colchester, “For the Papuans, land is a sacred good, held in trust by the living both for
the dead and for those yet to be. For the invaders of their territories, however, land is
merely a commodity, a material good to be given and exchanged like any other.”95 The
Papuans (i.e. Melanesians), like other indigenous groups of the other outer islands, did
put-up resistances against transmigration, for they were opposing to maintain their very
cultural identity and existence: “It is almost a spiritual war against the material world.
The Melanesian is still largely a spiritual beings, and thinks of worldly things as not as
important as spiritual things and elements. Should his way of thinking be reversed, so that
he values worldly things more?”96 Questions such as this pose no concern for technicians
or experts, because to consider such a question would only substantiate the fantasy of
scientific rationality and its applicability in answering actual human concerns. Hence,
little thought is given to concerns of actual lives in the actual world; and to
decontaminate one’s mind of real human questions, one firmly holds true to abstraction
of the actual world as well as quantify, as much as possible, aspects of person, society,
Colchester “The Struggle for Land: Tribal People in the face of Transmigration
Program,” The Ecologist 16, no. 2-3 (1986c): 109. Colchester elucidates on the ethnocide
of Papuan culture, where they were dispossessed from their lands. The transmigration
sites, where new settlements were built, belonged to numerous ethnic groups. Still, for
indigenous Papuans, these lands were much more than land, they weren’t resources,
rather they were sacred, the nucleus of their existence. The lands were their past, present,
and future; they were there to be taken care of, to be preserved for the future generations.
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and culture, thereby reducing them to impersonal variables or concepts under pretexts of
practical-ness or pragmatism.
The disasters against indigenous peoples were augmented by the fact that the
development program designed to increase transmigrants’ living standards became an
utter failure. Their lives actually became worse and their living standards reduced. The
transmigrants had sold what they had in their home towns prior to their migration in the
hopes that they will (as promised by the government) be provided with homes to live in
and plots of land to farm on, none of which were adequately fulfilled by the state; what is
more, the program only increased landless farmers, which was opposite to what the
project had intended—reduce landlessness and unemployment.97 Technicians assumed
since the outer islands were underdeveloped and underpopulated, these islands would be
fecund for agriculture. And since migrants will be given plots of land to farm on, this
will, in turn, increase their livelihoods and living standards. Nevertheless, because
technicians, too keen on scientific schemes, emphasized abstract methods and assumed
away complex realities of the outer islands, they failed not only in recognizing the
delicacy of the soil in the tropical rain forests, but also failed to consider Indonesia’s two
monsoon seasons, which any Indonesian can tell (just as any sub-continent Indians can
tell the yearly monsoon), that play a key role in determining the nature of Indonesia’s
ecology—types of soil, climate, trees, forests, plants, crops, etc. Modern technologies can
augment man’s power over nature, but it cannot make the nature yield to what it does not
fancy. The plots of land given to migrants were unsuitable for farming, which were made
Mariel Otten, “‘Transmigrasi’: From Poverty to Bare Subsistence,” The
Ecologist 16, no. 2-3 (1986): 71-76; and Colchester, “Banking on Disaster”; R. M.
Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985);
Hardjono, Transmigration in Indonesia; MacAndrews, “Transmigration in Indonesia.”
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all the more arduous by wild animals because new lands being cleared for transmigration
sites were homes to numerous wild animals. This was not helped by torrential tropical
rainfalls98because technicians in their infinite ken disregarded local ecology and climate,
which were regarded as tertiary to the primacy of their statistical figures. The lives of the
migrants, thus, actually became worse.99
One could, certainly, argue this developmental scheme was undertaken by a
developing state; hence they are to be blamed, not the developed world. This may be so,
but it does not make up for the fact that by the end of 1985 “Western Governments had
collectively poured nearly $800 million into the programme.”100 How does one justify the
Charles Secrett, “The Environmental Impact of Transmigration,” The Ecologist
16, no. 2-3 (1986): 77-88.
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support and money poured into the project by the developed world? Why did the World
Bank, one of the leading backers of the program, along with United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) (currently known for its MDGs), USAID, numerous
other NGOs, and other developed societies—West Germany, Netherlands, France, United
Kingdom—keep on supporting and financing the project even when there was evidence
of the Indonesian government carrying out mass atrocities and ethnocide against its own
indigenous people?101 Furthermore, the idea of transmigration did not just come to the
Indonesians one fine midsummer’s eve; rather the idea “has its roots in the ‘Kolonisatie’
policy of the Dutch Colonial Government. The Dutch viewed a large part of the
population of Java as constituting “surplus people.” It was argued that resettling this
“surplus people” elsewhere would improve social and economic conditions on the island
by reliving the pressure on land.”102 This framework of transmigration was inherited by
the nationalist leaders, who were mostly Dutch educated, after their independence; it first
announced a program to move 48 million people over the period of 35 years, this grand
scheme was later reduced, or, rather, made palatable by deciding to move two million
people every five years from Java to the outer islands.103 The same argument was used by
the Indonesian government to justify transmigration of millions of peoples; this was
vehemently supported by developed societies and agencies of development: such as, the
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World Bank, UNDP, and others.104 In lights of such material, it would be hypocritical to
solely blame the developing society.105
Villagization in Tanzania
Let us consider another episode where the actuality of human societies is
discarded in the name of development: the compulsory villagization or Ujamaa in
Tanzania. During the late 1960s, Tanzania decided to embark on a radical road towards
development with villagization as the center piece of the whole project. The compulsory
villagization was an attempt to permanently settle Tanzania’s largely scattered traditional
settlements. This was done by bringing the country’s largely scattered population into
planned villages with planned local economies, layouts, and housings.106 Indeed, for
Nyerere, then the President of Tanzania, villagization was essential for the development
of his country; in his words “To Live in Villages is an Order.”107 The hand-hoes
technology, he zealfully declared, will no longer satisfy the country’s needs for
development: the aim was to increase agricultural production for exports utilizing modern
technologies, ploughs, fertilizers, tractors. Hence, to use modern tractors for cultivation,
he reasoned, villagization was absolutely essential because without these machineries all
104
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attempts for development will come to not.108 To deliver his people from, as Nyerere
saw, the “life of death,”109 a standardized order was imposed, thereby disregarding the
actualities of his society. For technicians, who carried out Nyerere’s visions, it was
simply a matter of manipulating peasants to extract surplus food for the purpose of
feeding the cities and for exports.110 On paper, technical designs with numbers were
simple, neat, and ordered, they were neither complicated nor messy. Reality, it seemed,
was as ordered or technical as represented on papers and in the technicians’ mind.
Mentality such as these, on the other hand, encouraged the belief in the superiority of
European and American experts, mechanical power, and technological solutions to
problems.111
The blanket villagization writes off societal circumstances en masse. Tanzania,
for instance, has four climatic zones: wet savanna, dry savanna, coastal climate, and
highland climate. Under these, rather, unforgiving, inauspicious ecological milieu,
Tanzanian peasants for centuries developed diverse settlements as well as particular sets
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of agricultural practices and animal husbandries applicable to their pertinent climatic
conditions. These skills and practices enabled them to make the best out of given
conditions using hoe, axe, machete (panga) for their tools; and family labor along with
accumulated wisdom passed down for centuries to realize wherewithal of their existence.
This is why, for example, perennial crops were cultivated in areas with well-distributed
and ample rainfall, while annual or drought resistance crops were cultivated in areas with
lower or shorter rainfall with prolonged dry seasons.112 However, technicians discounted
such diverse ecological conditions; instead they concocted the imposition of uniform
reality on every community regardless of its relevance. Yet, for technicians, there is
nothing uniform application of scientifically enhanced seeds, fertilizers, modern
machineries, and scientific minds can’t solve or overcome.113
The actual living circumstances of local population mattered very little to
technicians, who designed the project. As long as the design looked neat on paper in
accordance with scientific rationality, technicians gave little concern over the real world
applications of their design. What an English economist, Ely Devons, said in a meeting
certainly rings true: “If economists wished to study the horse, they wouldn’t go and look
John Shao, “The Villagization Program and the Disruption of the Ecological
Balance in Tanzania,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 20, no. 2 (1986): 219-39. As
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at horses. They’d sit in their studies and say to themselves, ‘What would I do if I were a
horse?’”114 The technicians, as disciples of economics, could not be bothered to
experience for themselves the actual societal realities as well as diverse ecological
conditions affecting traditional patterns of settlements and agricultural techniques before
deciding to blanket the whole country with uniform standardized plan. They were only
too satisfied to “sit in their studies” with abstract numbers in some university or
government offices and perform their pseudo-scientific rituals thereby formulating a neat
technical and methodical plan on how to develop a society. To paraphrase Devons, the
technicians couldn’t be bothered to go and look at the reality that molds a Tanzanian
peasant, rather they sat in their studies while thinking to themselves what they would do
if they were a Tanzanian peasant. This is evident in the manner in which villagization
was made mandatory.
Any technician or specialist planning development eo ipso sees anything
traditional to be anathema to the progress of human society. As such, traditional scattered
homestead settlements and use of primitive agricultural tools signified, for technicians,
backwardness; yet, in thinking traditional settlements to be primitive, they ignored how
these homesteads, traditional tools, and farming practices were actually based on local
ecological conditions. Traditional scattered settlements provided a solution to problems
of soil erosion, and protection from wildlife and other vector-borne diseases. Their use of
hand-hoes, man-powered energy helped sustain their fragile environment and protected
against depletion of the soil’s fertility; their traditional techniques of farming, modes of
production, and crops farmed were a proof of the fundamental soundness of their
Ely Devons quoted in Ronald Coase, “The Task of the Society,” International
Society for New Institutional Economics 2 (Fall 1999): 3.
114
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collected local knowledge.115 Yet, for technicians, villagization was a necessity. As
World Bank, which heavily influenced Tanzania’s agricultural policies, justified by
remarking, “When people move to new areas, they are likely to be more prepared for and
receptive of change than when they remain in their familiar surroundings. And when
people are under pressure to move or see the advantage of doing so, they can be required
to abide by the rules and to adopt new practices as a condition of receiving new land.”116
As one can see from the above statement, the man-land relation along with man’s
dependence on the pertinent milieu matters not to the proponents of villagization. All that
matters to them is people should be settled in new areas, by doing so, the postulated
results, spewed out by scientific studies, for development as envisaged in papers will
surely come to pass. For technicians, this process was only proper because by moving
locals out of their local environment, they would be made into throngs of modern
producers conforming to instructions of experts.117
Thus, under the pretext of development, diversity in settlements, in farming
practices were discarded in favor of modern scientific practices. Local peasants have for
centuries, through application of their collected wisdom, tended to lands so as to procure
not only their needs, but also, at the same time, protect their lands from erosion and
depletion of fertility. They had their own traditional ways to restore soil fertility. In the
highlands and wet savannas, for instance, local peasants for centuries used mulch, cattle
Helge Kjekshus, “The Tanzanian Villagization Policy: Implementational
Lessons and Ecological Dimensions,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 11, no. 2
(1977): 269-82.
116
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manures, crop rotations augmented by fallow cultivations to retain fertility. Whereas, in
the coastal areas and dry savannas, peasants practiced shifting cultivation to retain soil’s
fertility; such practices allowed the soil to be used to the best of its capacity without
depleting it of its precious nutrients or destroying the land.118 Local farmers were deeply
familiar with several varieties of crops, how to tend and harvest them, how deeply to sow
them, how to plant them, and how to prepare the soil. This knowledge was specific to
particular milieu, i.e. place specific, since the farmers had to be knowledgeable about
rainfall, types of soil including the peculiarities of soil within each plot of land they
cultivate. Such local knowledges were stored as collected wisdom of the localities
through oral culture: knowledge about the land, soil, varieties of seed, techniques, and
ecological informations.119 Yet, such particularistic realities were jettisoned because they
would only baffle scientific minds who are only interested in simplifying reality. The
villagization, therefore, took no consideration of such everyday diverse ecological
conditions within Tanzania. This way local knowledge is made useless because by
resettling farmers in different ecological settings, their local or collected wisdom
becomes all but useless, “Thus, when a farmer from the highlands is transported to
Shao, “The Villagization Program.” Technicians also forgot to realize
immense achievements of traditional agricultural systems (including pastoralism) in
protecting soil from deteriorations while at the same time increasing production. See,
Coulson, “Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania.” Tanzanian peasants have for
centuries developed intricate yet subtle agricultural tools and systems in accordance to
their given ecological conditions, thus encouraging specific types of agricultural practices
and settlements: depending on time, duration, amount of rainfall, etc. See, Bernstein,
“Notes on State and Peasantry.” So, for instance, in terms of cattle, traditionally dispersed
settlements or homesteads ensured availability of as well as the usage of all grazing
grounds and water points, while simultaneously safeguarding cattles from wild animals
and thefts at night. For the same reason, it was good sense for each farm to be located in
one’s homestead as it was easier to protect one’s crops from birds and baboons. See,
Coulson, “Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania.”
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settlement camps… he is instantly transformed from an agricultural expert to an
unskilled, ignorant laborer, completely dependent for his survival on the central
government.”120 The villigazation takes farmers from a setting in which they had
particular skills and resources through which to produce and procure much of their own
needs to a setting in which their skills and knowledge become nugatory. The local
knowledge becomes all but futile; and farmers are reduced from self-sufficient persons to
medicants.121
Technicians assumed away, in their boundless ken, complex, particularistic socioecological realities, in order for their minds to grasp, which in their view was, the
sensibility of scientific reasoning. This is evident in the manner in which the sites for
villages were based on strict standardized criteria, analogous to scientific methods
utilized in scheming the villagization program. The program was a scientific utopia:
simplification of reality. It worked out annual planes and targets for agricultural
production and infrastructural projects, set production targets, set work targets for each
year, set numbers of technical callers stationed in each village, it required all villages to
have uniform communal farms of at least 100 hectares. It also established uniform or
standard operating procedures by creating divisions of labor, uniform village with
uniform administrative systems, specialization in particular crops, enlarged technical
apparatus to supervise the fulfillment of targets set, set up uniform work timetables and
rules making sure they are adhered to, monoculture replaced traditional polycropping,
uniformity in rules concerning minimum acreage requirement designated for each crop
120
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for each area, uniform rules for proper cultivation of crops, and fines and imprisonments
for those violating the uniform guidelines. It also established technicians to direct
economic performances in line with set programs. Such technical, standardized rules
were also applicable with respect to agricultural techniques: uniform soil preparation,
application, weeding, planting, fertilizing, and scheduling of labors.122 All these uniform
standardized guidelines further served to quantify or measure progress: numbers of areas
under cultivation, numbers of house lots, numbers of communal farms surveyed, numbers
of water projects, numbers of village buildings, tons of fertilizers delivered, numbers of
people moved, numbers of new villages created, numbers of wells drilled, and numbers
of people mobilized for tasks.123 Just as scientific methods emanate uniformity and
tidiness of equations, or numbers in rows of geometric line, all of which are guided by
canon of rules, scientific technicians likewise impose such orderliness in the real world,
as the following account illustrates the banality of it all: “The desire to have all the
houses in a planned village perfectly aligned… might require that a house be dismantled

Bernstein, “Notes on State and Peasantry”; Cheryl Payer, “Tanzania and the
World bank,” Third World Quarterly 5, no. 4 (1983): 791-813. One could certainly see
the banality of standardized, technical planning of human society: “The settlement pattern
was… uniform throughout the new villages. The site is divided into quadrangles of about
two acres each, allocated one each to individual households for their houses and
“gardens.” These therefore constitute the homesteads. The several homesteads surround a
central service area of fifty acres for a school, dispensary, and so on. Around the several
homesteads and apart from them are the block farms, with different blocks for different
crops designated by the authorities; each block of land is then divided among the
households so that each household can grow each of the designated crops.” See, Shao,
“The Villagization Program,” 233.
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Vide, Bernstein, “Notes on State and Peasantry”; and Scott, Seeing Like a
State. This obsession with measurement relegated the actual well-being of the people. It
allowed technicians to view local population as lazy and accused them of being
ungrateful in the face of what was being done for their own good. See, Bernstein, “Notes
on State and Peasantry.”
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in order to move it a scanty fifty feet to the surveyor’s line (italics added).”124 Or in some
case, “one farmer had to move his large, well-constructed tukul (italic in original) [i.e.
traditional thatched house] some 20 feet so that it would be ‘in line’ with all the other
buildings in its row.”125 In this way, the results predicted on paper, utilizing en vogue
scientific tools, applying statistical probabilities, become reality. Differently put, new
reality is imposed not by the processes of nature, but by strict doctrines concocted by
technicians to fit scientific arrangements while, at the same time, proclaiming how the
predictions forecasted on paper, by the infallible scientific minds, became the reality.
This, they zealously claim, is the truth or superiority of science over every other mode of
thought. This is no different from a character in Sinclair Lewis’ novel, Arrowsmith, who
“was so devoted to Pure Science…that he would rather have people die by the right
therapy than be cured by the wrong.”126 For technicians, villagization “is the result of
scientific and technical laws, and the implicit assumption is that, once built, the task then
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John M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Isaksson, “Villagization in Ethiopia’s Arsi
Region,” Journal of Modern African Studies 25, no. 3 (1987): 449. Certainly, as was the
case in Tanzania, the villagization process in Ethiopia had analogous effect for rural
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time it was made worst due to the dismantling of communal ties, family bonds, local
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88. Hence, technicians of development would rather follow dogmatic methods of
scientific rationality and hence put their entire meager intellectual prowess to abide those
methods—as exemplified in the episodes of MDGs, transmigration, and villagization.
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becomes one of maintaining its form.”127 Therefore, for technicians, nothing is more
unprofessional than to question the validity of scientific methods, reasoning, or schemes.
Yet, these blanketed uniform criteria of villagization ignored not only the actualities of
everyday life, but they went “against all the very grain of Tanzania’s experience.” 128
Apart from the uniformity mentioned above, another uniform criterion was the
necessity of villages to be constructed along the main roads regardless of its
consequences on people and agriculture. People were forced to move from fertile lands to
arid regions and roads were built on the fertile soil, thus hampering agricultural yield.129
Hence, the result was an elongated rectilinear pattern of settlements hugging the main
roads with houses on either side like wagons of a locomotive.130 As was the case in
Indonesia, where new settlements were constructed along the main roads in order to bring
indigenous groups under the legible and monetized system, the villagization program in
Tanzania similarly aimed to “integrate the non-monetarised (or so-called ‘subsistence
sector’) within the cash economy. Given the overall neocolonial structures of the
territorial economy this means integration within the world capitalist system…. Almost
all existing Ujamaa villages have been formed in ‘marginal subsistence areas’ – as yet
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only inadequately involved in the cash economy.”131 Certainly, bringing traditional and
largely subsistence (and self-sufficient) societies into a rationalized system has been one
of the primary aims of any civilizing or developing process.132
Traditional settlements maintained delicate man-land balance; however,
villagization eroded and depleted the soil by overcrowding the land with people and
cattle. The resettlement overtaxed land’s carrying capacities, thereby, worsening the
conditions for peasants. Locals were self-sufficient prior to their resettlements, but
villagization made them dependent on government welfare and support; their housing
conditions were deplorable; in addition, they were greatly exposed to communicable and
infectious diseases. The resettlement disrupted agricultural productions and also
decreased the availability of cultivable lands.133 The villigaziation process gave no
attention to the importance of water, livestock services, availability of land for
cultivations, etc. because the main priority was fulfilling the uniform criteria: uniform
housings, land plots, soil preparations, techniques, procedures, and so on.134 The
villagization was essentially a point-by-point negation of existing traditional practices
based on collected wisdom: polycropping, shifting cultivation, pastoralism, kinship and
lineage authority, small and scattered settlements, living well-off the main roads, opaque
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modes of production and hence outside of state’s control.135 To the scientific mind, such
contextual counterpoints are anathema to the logical, undiluted pattern of rational
geometric formulae and schemes on paper.
Furthermore, the villagization process, when it was not going as planned, resorted
to force and coercion, these became the norm. Between 1969-1974, when villagization
was progressing at too slow a rate, 13 million people were resettled by forced.136 Homes
were destroyed, burned, bulldozed; crops were burned; doors, windows shattered;
villages burned. People were dumped indiscriminately into village sites with no shelter
for the dispersed population. What is more, people were moved from well-watered to
permanently dry areas. The majority of the resettled population was moved to dry
savanna and coastal regions.137 Villagization also broke hitherto communal harmony,
charity, family and kinship ties, communal reciprocity, and conviviality. Traditional
settlements allowed people to help each other as women helped in weeding and
harvesting, while men help each other for the periodic rebuilding of their mud huts.138
With resettlements, however, all communal solidarities were broken. Indeed, such human
135
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needs were irrelevant to the mechanical, one-dimensional mind of technicians equipped
with the narrowest version of science, who found refuge in the neatness of Cartesian
geometric coordinates and abstract statistics.
Certainly, villigazation process was nothing new, for it had its origins in the
colonial policies in Tanzania. The colonial government embarked on “closer settlement”
which was seen as a precondition for real progress. They saw local peasants to be lazy,
good for nothing agriculturalists whose primitive agricultural tools, practices depleted
and eroded the soil.139 Furthermore, Tanzania’s agricultural policies were greatly
influenced by (as in the case of Indonesia) the World Bank. The bank suggested the
continuation of previous colonial policies and urged increases in production of cash
crops.140 It also insisted Tanzania focus on increasing production per acre by intensive
methods instead of prevailing traditional modes of agriculture. Thus, “villagisation
cleared the way for the World Bank’s preferred form of agricultural development, an
intensive strategy dependent on the investment of purchased production inputs in order to
produce higher yields per unit of land.”141 Certainly, World Bank wasn’t alone in
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supporting such projects in Tanzania; as was the case in Indonesia, there were hordes of
other technicians from the developed world.142
Scientific Rationality and Societal Atrophy
The above episodes illustrate the reductionist, simplified view of a complex,
chaotic human world. However, such a simplified view, or a simplification of realities,
very easily leads one to suppose a uniform world with standardized universal values
applicable to every society. While diversity, on the other hand, becomes an anathema to
the geometric simplicity of scientific uniformity. Context of societies becomes
superfluous, while distinctness of each society is nullified. Just as rigid methods dictate
scientific rationality or how scientific studies should be carried out, numerous aspects of
society are compartmentalized, where none hitherto existed, into variables or parameters,
as evident in the three episodes examined in this chapter: their ubiquitous inclination to
standardize societies, as if there exist some perfect human values in perfect algebraic
form. Hence, the three episodes examined, by virtue of being products of scientific
rationality, standardized every aspect of society precisely to nullify diverse local
accumulated knowledges because in the presence of polyphonic knowledges, goals
conceived by the MDGs, or schemes implemented in transmigration and villagization
will hardly seem sensible or even acceptable to the natives. By negating local
knowledges, traditional societies are left forlorn and anguished, thereby, enabling these
societies to be manipulated and changed as envisioned by technicians.
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The wontedness to standardize, evident in the three episodes, is indispensable to
scientific rationality and its methodologies. Therefore, standardized goals and
applications are the logical consequence of scientific schemes, because if every society
had the same societal (social, economic, political, or cultural) conditions, same values or
practices, same mode of thoughts, then a single paradigm, a single model, a single
standard could be applied to all regardless of the particularities of each society. This way
local knowledge, unique to each society, becomes superfluous. As a consequence,
complex actuality is reduced to a simplified reality consisting of concepts, variables,
parameters, with statistics (after ousting the Muses, thereby, holding the beacon of
reason) lighting the way towards infallible truth. Otherwise, how can one justify
jettisoning vast diverse realities: numerous societies possessing different tribes, cultures,
memories, languages, and histories made all the more complex by the subtle differences
even within these vast arrays of variations—disregards evident in Tanzania
(villagization), Indonesia (transmigration), MDGs, and the scholarships. Furthermore,
standardization, and with it its quantification, makes comparison a necessity, since it
provides the single standardized model from which to compare every society according
to society’s fulfillment of targets set by the scientific model. In other words, comparison
means societies’ conformity to idealized aim or target set by scientific models, where the
society is lacking/underdeveloped means it is still not conforming to the model set by
technicians; while society is meeting the aims/developing means it is conforming to
idealized standards envisaged by the standard model. No wonder, disciplines in social
sciences are plagued by standard models and theories, where academics take great pride
in pettifogging over which theories or methods have more merit.
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More importantly, evident also from aforementioned scholarships and episodes
are the almost neurotic-like obsession with results of scientific models, predictions:
unmistakably manifested by the manner in which rational organizations were engineered
by technicians in Tanzania, Indonesia, MDGs as well as the scholarships proselytizing
such predilections. Why are technicians so interested to assuage prediction of their
theories or models? When prediction occupies the crux of any social examination, actual
human needs are neglected because it conflicts with the demands of scientific theories. In
such case, empirical observations and measurements triumph over actualities of living
society. There is, in other words, a move away from the living world to the imaginary
world of the empiricists, where human needs are no longer of concern; they aren’t even in
the vicinity of the scientific models. These models or theories proposed by technicians
are impersonal, alien, supernatural, and even lead to violent dehumanization of persons.
The dehumanization and objectification of human societies through scientific theories are
never far from history. In the name of truth, derived from measurable experiments and
observations, technicians are willing to ignore human concerns. Take, for instance, a
group of scientists in the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. These scientists (led
by director of the laboratory) were against a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Surely, one
could hardly reason banning of nuclear test not to be a good step towards a more stable
world, however this was not the case for the scientists, for them détente was less
important than the experiment. They saw comprehensive test ban as a threat to their
experiments; because, for them, genuine human concerns, the risk of total human
annihilation, are not reasons to ban nuclear testing. These scientists, therefore, in a letter
to the Congress, wrote: “Weapons design experts would inevitably leave the weapons
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program because they could not verify their theoretical ideas with experiment (italics
added).”143 As one can see from their statement, models and fulfillment of theoretical
predictions are more valuable than human survival. Hence, how can one genuinely argue
scientific theories backed by experimental observations address human realities? Isn’t
this dehumanizing of human society? This kind of behavior is no different from Nazi
technicians, doctors of Auschwitz.
Contemporary technicians of development inculcate efficiency of their technical
experiments and empirical observations; this is worrying because this emphasis eerily
parallels technicians of Auschwitz, for they emphasized, “…the technicality of
everything,” as “…doctors and others spoke only about how to do things most efficiently,
about what worked best.”144 Or take Adolf Eichmann a non-thinking, hard-working,
bureaucratic murderer who saw his responsibility for genocidal killings as a problem of
efficiency, objective planning, and organization.145 Presently, technicians of development
busy themselves with these same elements of efficiency, organization, and objective
planning spewed out by scientific models predicting results which are deemed practical
and good. Of course, one is not suggesting contemporary technicians are doctors or
technicians of Auschwitz, but their utter neglect for real human concerns are no different
from doctors of Auschwitz or bureaucratic genocidal murderers like Eichmann.
Hugh E. DeWitt, and Gerald E. Marsh, “Weapons design policy impedes test
ban”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3 (November 1985): 13. Similar reasoning droved
the villagization and transmigration programs; it is what, presently, drives the MDGs.
This is further encouraged by numerous scholarships in ‘social sciences,’ augmented by
corrupt, narrow view of science.
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It could indeed be argued, scientific rationality and its methods afford one to
derive formal rules from which to infer practical, pragmatic means to understand social
phenomena. This may, indeed, be a practical means to answer or solve abstract problems,
questions one has in one’s mind; yet, the solution is appropriate only to the questions one
has in mind, i.e. abstract realm of the mind, not the real world. In the actual world or the
world, however, the practical solutions conceived for questions one poses to one’s mind
is neither practical nor pragmatic, nor even relevant. The questions or problems one tries
to resolve in a theoretical, philosophical, empirical, or research study, as in one’s mind,
has little whatever to do with the same questions’ applicability to the real world. There
always is and always will be an immense unbridgeable chasm between ideas and reality,
just because unresolvable problems or contradictions can be assumed away, solved,
reconciled through one’s rational faculties, it does not necessarily mean such issues in the
actual human world can be easily written off as one has in one’s mind or paper. Human
reality always has the tendency to show the vacuity of ideas; problems or contradictions
will always remain, neither can be resolved nor harmonized; rather we must accept their
presences as part of this complex human world. No amount of ideas, formal rules,
methods, theories, or practical policies can tame diverse human realities.146 For instance,
146

This is certainly true if one is pensive about various mass ideas in vogue,
presently. Marxism runs to an utter illusion evident from its idea of society where
everyone is (or would eventual become) equal—in every sense possible—and to hope
such society will ever come to pass is to expect capitalists to be conscious of their
actions. Or take Capitalism, for instance, its utopic ideas of prosperity based on
individual self-interests run into fantasy when one considers the actual working of
capitalist economies, in all its aspects, where much of it has nothing to do with logic
behind the stated idea and much to do with external or internal interventions—be it
uncertainties, human psychology, or state’s interventions to correct the market. Consider
also the idea of democracy, where the idea promises equality, liberty, political (and
economic) freedom, along with all other phantasmagoric human values. But democracy
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the futility of ideas in the form of formal rules in reality is vividly exemplified by
Parisian taxi drivers’ work-to-rule strike; they sometimes launch such strikes when they
want to make a point to their municipal authorities concerning fees or regulations. It
involves meticulous following of all formal regulations in the Code Routier, thus,
bringing traffic to a grinding halt throughout central Paris. What the action of taxi drivers
illustrates is the hopelessness of formal rules conceived from rational standardized model,
i.e. an idea that following such and such sets of rules or guidelines ensures the smooth
flow of traffic. They demonstrate through their action: in the real world circulation of
traffic is only possible not because they meticulously follow the formal guidelines, but
because they have learned or grasped a certain set of practices evolved contraveningly
and outside of the instructed guidelines.147 Surely, rationalized scientific plans may look
systematic; they may even give the appearance of order to a chaotic reality. Yet, to make
rational guidelines work requires something outside of what is inculcated, as shown by
Parisian taxi-drivers, as well as by the failures of Villagization in Tanzania,
Transmigration in Indonesia, MDG’s, among many others. The above example shows:
society is not an abstract entity lying perfectly on Cartesian coordinates, rather it is
complex, it is animated with human caprices, it is lively, it is dynamic, and it is

itself requires, for its existence, a certain amount of—conscious (as in authoritarians) or
unconscious (as in mass democracies)—mass manipulation and control. Consider even
Plato’s Socrates (or for that matter, even Kant’s noumenon) perfectly abstract, objective
world from which to invoke the universality of a true form of ideas—be they forms of
rule, beauty, truth, virtue, justice, etc. Still, such kinds of ideas run hopelessly into fool’s
paradise, when one tries to apply it to the everyday realities of a person’s (or society’s)
life. Of course, the examples here are simplified but they do get the point across: the vast
difference between an idea that is conceived and the human reality.
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meaningful, unlike Kant’s idea of noumenon, on its own. Hence, Sartre was veracious
when he proffered ideas can never subsume reality. 148
Moreover, traditional societies, mentioned in this chapter, along with their
accumulated wisdoms have long since disappeared (or are disappearing) even from their
own local consciousness by the modernizing and its acculturating processes. What is
more, these episodes and societies may even seem as dated evidence. Yet, they beg an
important question which demands our urgent attention. The principal question here is:
why should these societies and their accumulated polyphonic wisdoms disappear, i.e.
why are they disappearing (or have disappeared)? The answer: they are disappearing (or
in many cases have disappeared) in the name of human progress and development; they
are waning or have waned because certain minorities of the world have decided scientific
rationality to be the only mode of thought fit for human society, while other modes of
thought are seen to be a sign of backwardness; they are vanishing or have vanished
because it seems only material prosperity or wealth defines what progress is for every
society; they are fading or have faded because it only seems prudent for technicians as
well as the developed world to reduce complex distinctiveness of diverse societies to
some standardized norms under the umbrella of modern institutions, which serve as the
emblem of humanity, and make every society conform to them.

One can see the verity of Sartre’s dictum if one looks into the abstract ideas
about ‘lines’ and how they still are the source of much sorrow in numerous former
imperial colonies. The imaginary lines drawn based on an idea by the colonial masters
only show the folly of conceiving a reality devoid of lived experiences. So, lines drawn
on pieces of paper on an imaginary map of the world are what development or ‘social
science’ theories presently are. In here, the natives are removed from any social context
and their actual concerns are put into the dustbins of irrelevant ‘normative values’; hence,
the abortive plebeian ken, which is the gist of development and ‘social science.’
148
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Indeed, Bodley shows why development brings about nothing but misery; he
directs us to the origins of misery plaguing much of the developing world, presently: the
destruction of native societies’ ways of life in order to accommodate the needs of market
economy.149 In the name of progress, traditional societies and their ways of life are
ruined. The idea of development is seen to be good only when it is seen through a
material lens. New values, needs, desires are created giving rise to novel dissatisfactions.
New wants and needs impress upon the natives’ an inferior reflection about their own
culture. Development therefore becomes creation of new material needs, desires, wants
and how to satisfy them. The idea of progress in development, furthermore, lures
traditional cultures, as they are “increasingly pulled by the exciting blandishments,
assumed job opportunities, and unrealistic hopes of the city. These rapid changes
combine to cause the loss in a single generation of arts and crafts that have been
transmitted by social inheritance for centuries, but now are restricted to the passing
generation, forgotten in the break-up of varied preindustrial cultures being replaced or
overlain by relatively unvarying versions of a western model.”150 In this process, the
native’s ways of life are destroyed, utterly.
Bodley shows how independent, self-sufficient indigenous societies were made
dependent on commercial market systems. Because native societies showed very little
desire in obtaining foreign material goods except for those of immediate practical uses,
such as axes, knives, etc., the usage of which is by no means the rejection of their culture,
outsiders quickly learned that in order to bring these societies into a cash economy, the
material satisfaction hitherto provided by their culture had to be undermined. This is
149
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possible only by enticing natives to reject material satisfaction hitherto provided by their
culture and make them desire more commercial goods. Furthermore, outsiders also
realized the need for special pressure to be pressed against these societies in order to
overcome their built-in resistance against foreign material goods, since “acquisitiveness
is not a universal trait and small-scale cultures have developed numerous means of
limiting the over accumulation of material goods.”151 So, what better means than to
depopulate these societies, force them into corvée labor, tax them, and reduce their land
bases thus depriving them of their indigenous food source. This way natives were made
dependent on external goods—as among the many cases were: the Azande by the British,
the Tradjas by the Dutch, the aboriginals and New Guineans by the Australians, the
Philippines by the Spanish, the Micronesians by the Americans, Papuans and Southwest
Africans by the Germans, and Senegal and West Africans by the French.152 All these
helped in transforming self-sufficient societies into cultureless, faceless masses of people
dependent on commercial commodities. Indeed, this is analogous—such as: mass
resettlements, depriving locals of their land and food source, making them reliant on
market or cash economies, destroying their cultures, creating dissatisfactions, creating
new needs for material goods, corvée labor, etc.—to what we have hitherto examined:
transmigration in Indonesia, villagization in Tanzania, the incessant noise of MDGs, as
well as the unremitting blare of development scholarships examined in the previous
chapter.
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accumulation of material goods, see, Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (New York:
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Why does a small minority of humanity gets to define what rationality means;
decide, once and for all, how every society, every individual, every culture should think,
how to organize society, how and where to live, what to eat, what to wear, and what to
belief? Technicians as well as the developed world assume traditional societies to be in
dire need of progress; and because the world is viewed through a narrow ethnocentric
lens, their mode of thoughts ought to prevail and ought to be disseminated. This is
usually justified by eviscerating traditional shibboleths: their beliefs in supernatural,
myth, deified object, ancestor, and so on. Only scientific rationality, it is argued, can
rescue these unenlightened societies. Of course, implicit in such argument is the idea of
uniformity and sameness.153
One could, indeed, thank Descartes, who gave us the modern scientific methods
and who also declared his philosophy to be independent of any tradition, for the
advancement of sameness; for he proclaimed, there is only one way to know a
phenomenon, it is the same everywhere; the only way to know is for one to be rational,
which is present in all of us and is the same.154 He further solidified these aspects by
declaring “cogito, ergo sum.” However, just as he can think, so can everyone else; he
disregards polysemous of thoughts. Just because one thinks or that everyone thinks, it
does not mean, what is being thought is the same for every one; each person thinks, but
153

The sameness is apparent in the manner in which developed society as well as
technicians of development view the world. Just because traditional societies are
materially poor, they instantaneously assume every society should have standards of
living, at least, at a level acceptable to them; material consumptions must be encouraged;
production for profits must be promoted; and individual independence must be stimulated
because communal harmony hampers economic (material) productivity.
154
Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Related Writings, trans. Desmond
M. Clarke (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1999). In fact, the notion of sameness or
changeless of an idea can be traced back to pre-Socratic thinkers.
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what one thinks, how one thinks, why one thinks differ and vary from person to person,
even the thought processes differ from person to person depending upon the contexts of
one’s societal milieu.
With scientific rationality firmly based as the only mode of thought to dictate
human thoughts or actions, it necessarily leads to preeminence of expert professionals.
As Descartes had once stated, “since there is only one truth about each thing, whoever
discovers it knows as much as it is possible to know about it (italics added)”;155
professional technicians, thus, invoke congruent scientific basis as the justification of
their existence: to serve and guide traditional society. Since, according to them, there is
only one way to think rationally as human beings; they are experts, they know what is
best for backward societies, they know how to develop native cultures, for they know all
there is to know “as much as it is possible to know.” As such, they claim to possess
special technical skills to plan and engineer progress, development. Invariably, the
organic nature of society is eviscerated; the term, development, becomes perverted. As
one development agent writes: “Development, as in Third World Development, is a
debauched word, a whore of a word. Its users can’t look you in the eye. Among
biologists, the word means…the realization of an innate potential. The word is good,
incontestable, a cause for celebration. In the mouths of politicians, economists and
development experts like myself, it claims the same approval, but means nothing… It is
an empty word which can be filled by any user to conceal any hidden intention, a Trojan
horse of a word.”156 By disemboweling the organic nature, not only the term but society
155
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Leonard Frank, “The Development Game”, in The Post-Development Reader,
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is transmogrified into something mechanical, as imagined by Descartes. In a mechanical
world, then, there is nothing expert professional technicians can’t do or fix. Nothing is
beyond their motorized ken, the schemes they offer are covered in nimbus of science,
emitting an aura of an impartial god—indeed, in modern society, professionals replaced
gods, priests, churches, and religions.157 The importance of scientific rationality only
elevates the importance of expert professionals, the human aspects are by necessity, of
this preeminence, disregarded.
Thus, “whole armies of international experts and consultants work together to
demonstrate, in all fields, the scientific and superior aspects of modern technology,
modern management and modern economy. No occasion is missed to prove that
157

It is quite obvious why professionals—in every aspect of a society from cradle
to the grave—are now the church in modern market-intensive industrial societies. From
birth to death, a person in modern society is forever institutionalized. The professionals
and their institutions—in politics, economics, health care, education, etc.—decide for the
society what it needs, what it wants, how to produce them, how to consume them, what to
eat, who to elect, who to listen to, how to make love, how to die, how to give birth, what
constitutes as life, what constitutes as health, what counts as education, what counts as
legal or natural death, etc. In industrialized society, professionals instruct, advise, direct,
prescribe what is good and right, for they are the keepers of and interpreters of the
modern technical knowledge. Life is standardized, planned, and engineered; people
transmogrified into clients; and they alone have the knowledge to save the ‘clients,’ for
they alone possess the unquestionable special sapient about human society. Society is
hooked into unlimited ‘need’ for consumptions; every aspect of life is turned into a
‘resource’ to be utilized to meet demands of material products. A person is
transmogrified into a consumer. Alternative to market-based consumer lifestyle is
suspected and labelled as ‘anti-social’; to renounce consumerism is to renounce oneself
as a sane person in the eyes of consumerist society. The essence of a person is
consumption of standardized material and living a standardized life (with standardized
mode of thoughts). This way human autonomy, to think for oneself, is lost, and with it
human freedom. See, Illich’s, The Right to Useful Unemployment; Deschooling Society;
In the Mirror of the Past; Limits to Medicine; and Illich et al., Disabling Professions.
Certainly, development of a society is but the acme of standardization of life, of thought,
thereby making societies completely dependent on market economy; bringing them under
the monetized system; and turning persons into consumers—as envisioned by
technicians.
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monetarized economy and professionally devised technology (whether high-tech or
‘appropriate’) are essential for human survival, under the present conditions. Even with
the dearth of means and resources makes it sometimes economically valid for certain
projects to follow local ways of doing things, these are recognized only when they are
approved on ‘expert advice’ (italics added).”158 The above statement is quoted at length
because the author vividly illustrates the ill-effects of scientific rationality, which we
have been elucidating thus far. When schemes are embellished with terms such as expert,
professional, or science, any critical examination of development becomes impossible;
anyone who criticizes it is considered an enemy of humanity, poor, and developing
societies.159 Must development be understood without any concern for those who actually
have to accept the brunt of abstract policies and theories? Must development be imposed
by experts upon helpless societies who have no say in the manner in which
developmental schemes are implemented? Must expert professional be cordon sanitaire
over lives of those they do not understand? Must scientific rationality be the sole arbiter
of what is good for every society?
Majid Rahnema, “Development and The People’s Immune System: The Story
of Another Variety of AIDS,” in The Post-Development Reader, eds., Majid Rahnema,
and Victoria Bawtree (New Jersey: Zed Books, 1997), 123.
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It is argued that development is a human right—but, of course, forgetting the
fact that what human right is, is defined not by societies concerned, but by the developed
world. Certainly, every society has rights, the definition of which are defined by each
society; however, just because one wants to export development into every society, this
does not justify that one should equate these processes to ‘human rights.’ It is like
reasoning: one likes cake, one should, therefore, equate cake to human rights and impose
upon every society to like cakes. Indeed, replace the term ‘cake’ with any current vogue
ideologies such as ‘democracy,’ ‘individual freedom,’ ‘freedom of speech and press,’ etc.
one will see the banality of such reasoning. If the developed societies are sincerely
concerned about defending human rights, which they incessantly claim to be doing, then
they would leave traditional societies as they are. It is a violation of human rights to
change societies, especially those societies which one does not understand.
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Technicians intoxicated with the most perverse form of science dictate what
should be done to traditional societies: eviscerate existing shibboleths with modern
societal institutions; this is to be attained through economic development and growth
because development of society is economic, i.e. market-intensive, in nature. In other
words, economy along with any and every activity as well as institutions predicated on it
becomes the catch-all phrase of what is defined as development. Every aspect of the
society, culture, and person is directed towards the fruition of economic growth. In such a
subtle manner, every aspect of society including human beings becomes a scarce
resource which is to be managed by expert technicians (or scientists), since to
economists, value is derived from scare-resources—after all, economics, as its most
ubiquitous description goes, is the study of scarce resources and their efficient allocations
or utilities. Society as well as man is altered into a marionette, tailored for consumerism.
Development, which hitherto referred to species, thus, acquires an economic connotation,
with it the assumption of scarcity,160 thereby giving the modernizing process legitimacy
with an air of naturalness. Anyone who opposes economic growth, in general, is
denounced as a romantic, a fool, a psycho-path, an enemy of peace and human progress.
Even Gandhi was reduced to a romantic and a fool; his philosophy perverted—perversion
such as non-violence as economic weapon; non-violent strategies for development; and
his Khadi, i.e. homespun or handspun cloths, which for Gandhi represented an idea of a
self-sufficient, subsistence-oriented society not dependent on market-economy, redefined
as commodity.161
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161

205
The perception of scarcity, which forms the basis of economics, became the
principal assumption for development. Everything in society was scarce; society must,
for this reason, be managed and planned by expert professionals for the efficient and
effective use of scarce resources. In practice as in theory, development means expansion
of market-oriented economic systems, viz. to bring under its umbrella, traditional
societies and activities that hitherto escaped its grasps. Development, therefore, affords
limitless expansion of market-intensive systems, and the destruction of subsistenceoriented societies and activities;162 after all, as Heyneman puts it, “High levels of
environmental pauperization and widely distributed homogenization characterize
industrialized societies in all political and economic systems throughout the world (italic
added).”163 It propagates scarcity-dependent goods and services perceived to be
scarce164—the perception conceived from Mandeville, Locke, Hume, Bentham, Adam
Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, James Mill to Marx.165 As the result of same modes of thought
urging for the same kinds of institution propagating the same kinds of market-intensive
society, what one eventually begets is the highly standardized human actions within and
among societies. This way, as Illich reasons, “The standardization of human action grows

opposes it is label as an enemy of freedom, peace, equality, democracy, modernity,
progress, etc. See, Illich, In the Mirror of the Past.
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Heyneman, “Development and Disease,” 6.
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The perception of scarcity and, thus, the economic view of man is a modern
phenomenon, a mental constitution deeply rooted in the mind of a modern Western man.
Vide, Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (New York, NY: The
Macmillan Company, 1928); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston, MA:
Beacon Press, [1944] 2001); Louis Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and
Triumph of Economic Ideology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); and
Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
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apace.”166 Certainly, development is more or less the regurgitation of same uniform, i.e.
standardized, human responses and actions. Everywhere, societies dance to the same
uniform, unvaried tune played from the same mechanical instrument. The idea of
development brings with it rising expectations, yet, at the same instance, there is a
dwindling of trust in one’s own autonomy and competence, invariably leading one to lose
the ability to care or feel concern for oneself as well as for others.167 Development has
selfsame effect everywhere: societies are made dependent on uniform commodities made
from the uniform sort of equipment, clinics, schools, universities, and other bodies of
experts using identical manufacturing apparatus.168 Such reliance is further satisfied by
manufacturing more of the uniform standardized products. While the future generation of
consumers is proselytized by professional technicians on how to need commodities and
why they are good and of value, they are also trained to devalue anything which cannot
be measured by money or in terms of monetized value.169
Development, in other words, becomes a levelling-off of human societies, the
distinct particularity of what it means to be, for instance, a Javanese, a Balinese, a Hopi, a
166
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Ibid., 21-23. Furthermore, the extension of a market-intensive system
obliterates those forms of work that fall beyond the purview of the system—the so-called
‘unemployed.’ In other words, any form of activity, say for instance, handicrafts, taking
care of one’s or neighbors’ child, subsistence agriculture, building one’s own home in
traditional manner, or any activity not based on monetized system is looked down upon.
Therefore, “Work is productive, respectable, worthy of the citizen only when the work
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the work meets a certified need in a standardized fashion. In an advanced industrial
society it becomes almost impossible to seek, even to imagine, unemployment as a
condition for autonomous, useful work… Only with a license may you teach a child; only
at a clinic may you set a broken bone. Housework, handicrafts, subsistence
agriculture,…learning exchanges, and the like are degraded into activities for the idle, the
unproductive, [or] the very poor.” See, Ibid., 84.
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Mbuti, a Nuer, an Azande, a Zomia, a Meratus, a Melanesian, or an Ilongot is lost.
Instead of socio-cultural diversity, we get a universalized homo economicus with
standardized thought processes, standardized needs, standardized values, standardized
actions or responses, and one who is dependent on standardized goods and services
obtained from the standardized perceived scarce resources. The scholarships along with
the three examples examined in the previous and this chapter, respectively, substantiate
what is being hitherto reasoned. Technicians of development, intoxicated on scientific
rationality, proffer what counts or constitutes as the right mode of thought, what forms of
modern institutions will elevate natives from their primitive backwardness, and what
societal activities constitute as correct means toward progress. Certainly, to a (modern
developed) society deeply habituated and trained to choose among pre-packaged
standardized products, goods or needs, the traditional indeed seems a highly
impoverished option or choice. For people in an industrialized society are “conditioned to
get things rather than to do them; they are trained to value what can be purchased rather
than what they themselves can create. They want to be taught, moved, treated, or guided
rather than to learn, to heal, and to find their own way (italics in the original).”170 In a
way, standardization of everything, which development affords, is only the logical
approach or solution from an already standardized society. It is interesting to note how
the mindless fixation on certainty, predictability, or probability parallels the values of
modern industrialized society: instant gratification. Therefore, contemporary social
analyses are forced to provide an instant prediction about future events. In doing so,
technicians (i.e. today’s academics) disregard one fundamental human aspect: social
170
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phenomena can never be properly understood on a basis of formulae, predictions, or
probabilities, rather each social event or phenomenon unfolds on its own and in its own
fullness of time, the interpretation of which is as polyphonic as societies themselves.
What is more, vicissitudes of progress are seen to be necessary because
technicians err to categorize the accompanying changes as bad.171 What this implicitly
means is problems brought about by development ought to be tolerated, while problems
that are and have been part of traditional societies for hundreds of years cannot be
tolerated, even if natives have found ways to deal with such problems, because, for
technicians, instituting traditional societies with novel modern problems are of immediate
concern, rather than leaving these societies alone or as they are. To the developed world:
why should traditional societies be exempt from the problems of modernity, which are
much more malicious? At least, in this sense, developed societies are truly not prejudiced,
in the strict sense, to spread the problems of modernity.
The scholarships, thus, examined in the previous chapter and episodes examined
in this chapter vividly direct one’s attention to the primacy of scientific rationality,
thereby inversing human’s relations with the outside environment, viz. human relations
171

Because if any scholar is to categorize changes brought by development (as
well as the accompanying problems which are much more malignant than the existing
problems in most traditional societies, prior to their exposure to ‘development’) as bad, it
would mean one’s alienation from the scholarly community and he is, forever, rendered
either as a madman or crank. This is brilliantly elucidated by Erich Fromm and Paul
Feyerabend.
Furthermore, developed society (as well as technicians) perceives
vicissitudes accompanying development to be necessary, because, for them, traditions
have no meaning and communal harmony is regarded as a hurdle to liberate individuals
from their community and their dependence on the soil. Indeed, nothing must stand in the
way of spreading uniformity. Because to be different in a uniform world is not acceptable
nor can it be tolerated; this mentality has its edifice deeply rooted in the most perverse
interpretation of science, which is presently in vogue.
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are seen as tertiary to the vicissitudes of progress.172 Besides, the examined works and
episodes also hold the view that there exist one, more or less, perfect policy, institution,
or norm, just like the perfect triangle, square, or circle envisaged by Socrates and Plato.
172

An astute reader would have no doubt noticed congruence between leitmotifs
in the MDGs, Transmigration in Indonesia, Villagization in Tanzania and the
scholarships. The generalized view taken in MDGs (generalization and quantified view
on poverty, health, education, environment, etc.), Transmigration and Villagization
(generalized view on cultures, ethnic groups, ecologies, beliefs, application of single
models, quantification of realities, etc.) can be vividly seen in scholarships discussed in
Chapter Two. Note, for instance, the congruence between what has been discussed in
three episodes with the scholarships: In regards to scientificity as seen in the three
episodes, the scholarships state, just to mention very briefly: Malinowski (1944) calling
for scientific study of culture; Parson’s (1951) emphasis on how social inquests must
have clear logical clarity, empirical validity, generality of principles, variables, and
adhere to scientific standards; Lipset (1959) notes the importance of testable hypotheses
and empirically testable statements; North (2005) insists ‘generalization’ enables
construction of models, to understand society, which are then exposed to empirical
verifications; Sachs (2005) asserts the necessity of a “clinical” approach to development;
Easterly (2006) insists on the importance of rigorous testing or experimenting with
scientific methods and tools; while Collier (2007) emphasizes the importance of
statistical evidence. In respect to societal changes as seen in the episodes, the
scholarships note: Rostow (1960) maintains the inevitability of progress, development
signified by his stages of growth; Collier (2007) asserts on how developed societies must
institute standards as well as help those in developing societies demanding for societal
change; North (2005) advocates for fundamental changes in traditional societies by
establishing modern institutions so as to overcome rigid “erroneous beliefs”; Parsons
(1951) insists on societal changes to be in “homeostatic equilibrium”; Inglehart and
Welzel (2005) reason societies invariably move toward modern institutions thus making
them democratic, and economically more developed; while Malinowski (1944) argues
traditional societies should be “enlighten” in the ways of modern institutional values.
(Not to forget how all of the scholarships examined emphasize the need for conformity to
makes the new institutional values normal, i.e. new normal). With regard to the episodes’
justification for development and economic growth, scholarships note: for Malinowski
(1944) and Parsons (1951), economic aspects of society are indispensable for scientific
understanding society; Easterly (2006) maintains the scrupulous nature of economic
principles for development and growth, while blaming lack of economic progress not on
economics but on the failure to properly “apply principles of economics”; Rostow (1960)
insists on transforming societal activities for economic purpose; Inglehart and Welzel
(2005) argue economic growth to increase existential security of societies; Sachs (2005)
maintains the importance of globalized modern economic activities as a “ladder” towards
development; or North (2005) reasons incentives and pay-offs of rationalized modern
institutions ignite economic productivity, activity, growth and development.
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But, alas! for modern technicians, even these philosophers (even Aristotle) are laymen,
since they are not trained in the ways of today’s over-specialized, narrow academic
disciplines.
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CHAPTER IV
THE POLYPHONY
Polyphonic Thoughts
The preceding two chapters tried to ascertain how development is rooted in
scientific rationality, thus influencing its scholarships, schemes, and applications. One of
the principal purposes of the previous chapters was to show how understandings in
disciplines of social science, such as development, are based on deliberate, conscious
creations of what constitute the developing or traditional. Development as an academic
discipline rooted in scientific rationality is the penurious interpretation of societies whose
object of study is the traditional, its peoples, societies, and cultures. The objective facts
thus conceived are but limited to what is included or excluded from what is regarded as
scientific (or computable) aspects of society. The objective facts are then equated to
scientific truths; yet, what is “truth” but, as Nietzsche once remarked, “a mobile army of
metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms… which after a long use seem firm,
canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten
that this is what they are (italics added).”1 Technicians of development, therefore, hold
parochial descriptions to be truth or fact of what counts as the developing. In other words,
the objective truth acquired through scientific means, utilized in development, is the
illusory “army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms” the developed world
has for the traditional.

Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” in The
Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, NY: Viking Press,
1954), 46-47.
1
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Before we begin, it is essential to note the verb-based language structure of most
traditional societies (augmented by their oral based traditions), as opposed to noun-based
Indo-European languages where aspects of the world are categorized and fixed into stable
concepts. Traditional societies, because of their verb-based structure, view everything in
the world, universe, cosmos to be dynamic, a world in perennial vicissitude, never fixed,
and always in movement. Hence, terms such as knowledge, rationality, modes of thought,
belief become highly fluid, interchangeable, and never retain, for themselves, specific
meanings. Moreover, their rationalities cannot be categorized into theories, because to fix
them into theories will only constrain what is a highly fluid experience. What traditional
societies ascertain as knowledge or rationality is always based on direct livedexperiences, their rationalities cannot be fixed into a specific theory nor concept (which
are, by virtue, not only context-less but remain fixed in space and time) because to fixed
them into a concrete concept is to jettison the aborning contexts from which they arise, in
the first place. Knowledge, rationality, thought, belief in English (or in other IndoEuropean languages) are nouns, they have fixed concrete meaning. However, in most
traditional societies, these terms are never fixed. Rather they are fluid, synonymous. In
fact, there is no delineation of knowledge from rationality, or of belief from knowledge,
and so forth. Traditional societies procure their knowledge, belief, rationality through
lived experiences—which are (verbs, not nouns) in acting, knowing, processing,
participating, ongoing, sensing, encountering, occurring, etc. To understand traditional
rationality in Indo-European terms—as something frozen, fixed—is to completely
misunderstand what they are and what they signify to the natives. Therefore, in this
chapter, the terms knowledge, rationality, modes of thought, belief are used
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interchangeably and synonymously. Moreover, to put polyphonic rationalities into
concise systematic theory is to deliberately limit, confine, and, thereby, jettison
traditional societies’ fluid view of the world. The present study has, thus, refrained from
setting out to classify or label polyphonic rationalities or modes of thought as theory, or
theorize them in a concise theoretical manner. Nevertheless, polyphonic knowledge is,
here, explicated in such a way as to reflect traditional societies’ fluid, ever changing view
of the world, this way staying true to reflect, as much as possible, their profound actual
existential significance to those adhering to it.
The preceding chapters provide the context for the present chapter in which one
can appreciate the essentiality of polyphonic rationality in social inquests. The tyranny of
scientific rationality necessarily pauperizes social inquests, in which adherence to
canonical doctrines become the sole matter of course. Under such circumstances, human
expressions are all but eviscerated in the name of science and objectivity.
In contrast, polyphonic rationality signifies the essentiality of reality in any
societal query: the centrality of human person. The term polyphony is borrowed from
Mikhail Bakhtin’s study on Dostoevsky’s literature.2 Bakhtin utilizes polyphony, the term
he borrowed from music, to show the rich diverse unmerged voices in Dostoevsky’s
works. The essence of polyphony, as Bakhtin suggests, is the independence of voices, in
which each voice or each “point of view on the world” stands beside each other and
interacts without merging into one another.3 Just as polyphony in music illustrates the
rich interlaces of harmony among manifold melodious expressions or counterpoints
Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota, 1984).
3
Ibid., 21, 39.
2
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(Johann Sebastian Bach being the foremost genius in polyphony music, attested in his
heavenly music of celestial harmony), so are Dostoevsky’s characters, where each is
given an independent unmerged voice, yet spelling out, at the same instance, the need for
harmony and coexistence among diverse interactions, which are, for Dostoevsky, an
indissoluble aspect of human conditions.
As mentioned in Chapter One, polyphonic is the plurality of knowledge; it
accords all rationalities place in social query, where none is privileged over any other.
The numerous polyphonic rationalities are essential within their differing contexts.
Polyphony implies acceptance of all modes of thought as they are. More importantly,
polyphonic rationality entails the essentiality of the nature of the questioner. Put
differently, the whole question of prober’s identity or being is intricately tied to the
phenomenon probed, the very nature of the questioner—influenced by prober’s direct
lived experiences—makes all the difference as to the manner in which the phenomenon is
questioned, understood, and approached.4 This is because polyphonic rationality
germinating out of direct experiences contains the very being of a person in which one is
inextricably involved in and tied to the very processes of understanding. This is why
Edmund Husserl argued lived experiences to be the principal source of human knowledge
and understanding. For Husserl, human knowledge, or what we call objective
explanation, is ultimately based on one’s subjective lived experiences. These lived
experiences or “world-life” are differently comprehended by each person and each
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culture in accordance to its distinctive views of the world.5 Certainly mathematical
science, presented in Chapter One, presents us with an example of such distinctiveness: ω
(ψa) ± (ψb) = υ (ψa) ± (ψb)…eq (1).What the given equation signifies is the manner in
which one solves the equation depends upon the nature of the prober, viz. the question of
what solves for ω or to solve for ω will differ invariably from prober to prober; the
prober’s nature, in other words, is intimately affixed to the examined query. As such, the
way an inquirer comprehends or solves the equation will invariably differ. Even the value
for ω will vary, from prober to prober, for there are many ways to attain the equally
diverse values that solve and balance the equation. Hence, the values themselves will be
diverse. More importantly, what this equation evinces is, there exists no one universal
value of ω, all the values, as conceived by various inquirers, are equally valid. This in a
way shows the polyphony of nature.
The essentiality of a person’s character or nature probing into a phenomenon is
even suggested by Aristotle. Aristotle saw how individuals, in order to gain
understanding of nature, universe, or things, must rely or act on their corporeal organs of
senses, without which reasoning becomes impossible.6 The senses, which Aristotle
alluded to, are one’s lived experiences, after all, one experiences the world through one’s
sentience, i.e. touch, smell, sight, taste, hearing, etc., which are, in turn, predicated on
actualities of one’s concrete, animated society, in accordance to a particular place and
5
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time. This is to say, one’s sentience is historical or contextual, not ahistorical or
acontextual. One of the greatest painters during the Renaissance, Raphael, was aware of
Aristotle’s allusion to the importance of concrete understanding of the world based on a
person’s corporeal senses, which are themselves contingent on one’s lived expressions. In
one of Raphael’s most well-known frescos, School of Athens, we see at the center, two
towering figures of Western philosophy: Plato and Aristotle. Plato, holding Timaeus,
points upward toward the heavens (or Kosmos), toward the abstract, toward the world of
ideas. While Aristotle, holding Ethics, points toward the viewer, toward the concrete
human world, toward the world framed by human sentience. Indeed, anyone acquainted
with the works of Plato and Aristotle would know that the contrast between Plato and
Aristotle, as indicated by Raphael in his fresco, is expressive of the differences between
the two thinkers.7
Plato represents and presents us, in Timaeus, the world of abstract ideas, the world
devoid of vicissitudes, the world of becomed, an ordered universe created out of
preexisting chaos and disorder by imposing rational mathematical order. This is the world
in which all seats of ideas are placed, the world understood only by rational souls.8 This
is the world akin to the world of technicians, even though theirs is a world much
narrower than Plato’s. In this world, technicians see mathematical order being imposed
For detail analyses on Raphael’s paintings, see Christiane L. Joost-Gaugier,
Raphael’s Stanza della Segnatura: Meaning and Invention (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2002); Marcia Hall, ed., Raphael’s School of Athens (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Robert Haas, “Raphael’s School of Athens: A
Theorem in a Painting?,” Journal of Humanistic Mathematics 2 (July 2012): 2-26; Glenn
W. Most, “Reading Raphael: The School of Athens and Its Pre-Text,” Critical Inquiry 23,
no. 1 (1996): 145-82.
8
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upon the chaotic human world, thereby nullifying the world of its vicissitudes. Thus, the
human world becomes fixed, static, and devoid of flux. Technicians dwell in their world
of abstract ideas ruminating about the traditional. For them, real human expressions are
but “adventitious happenings”; human senses or appearances, they argue, are deceitful,
hence, not to be trusted. Aristotle, on the other hand, points (and presents us in Ethics) to
the world of the viewer, the human world, world that is alive, animated, dynamic. This is
the world of everyday human conduct within the contexts of society, viz. upon each lived
experiences. These lived expressions frame human sentience that in turn affects the
conduct of societies, cultures, persons.9 This is the world akin to the world as experienced
by numerous traditional societies, the world where attention is given to everyday human
realities. This is the world in which human senses, based on particular societal
experiences, frame one’s understandings of the world. This world affords each society
with its own particular practical tools to deal with its own particular everyday lived
realities. This, in other words, is the world of polyphony or the world.
Even the physical universe is context dependent or polyphony, where knowledge,
fact, truth of phenomena is intimately tied to the uniqueness of the prober. Quantum
physics substantiates the essentiality of the nature of the prober, thus the polyphony of
nature itself. It points to the inextricable “observer effect,” meaning, the very act of
measuring affects the measurements. This signifies the fundamental indissoluble role
played by the observer in affecting the measurements. Hence, in the micro subatomic
world, electrons are both, at the same time, waves and particles. As such, whether
Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The
Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984).
9
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electrons behave as waves or particles depends on the particular prober (as well as the
particular instrument used in) carrying out the observations. This understanding of nature
violates the Newtonian concept of (natural) science that gyrates around fixed, rigid
concepts of absolutism—such as absolute rigid separation of space from time, fixed
concepts, universal truths, etc. In modern physics, systemizations of concepts or truths in
a predetermined manner have become problematic, if not a fundamental error. Therefore,
one will find modern physics doing away with the Newtonian predetermined universal
concepts and ultimate understanding of nature.10 They now embrace the multivariate,
polyphonic view to understand nature, universe, phenomena, etc. Since the twentieth
century, natural sciences, especially physics, have embraced a polyphonic instead of a
monological interpretation of the physical universe, for monologism only hampers
scientists from properly understanding natural phenomena.
The message of what has been expounded hitherto is to show the diverse ways to
attain understanding on social (or natural) phenomena. Understanding of what is probed
is much less the product of a single standardized method, rule, or doctrine; rather it is the
product of diverse, even contradictory, thoughts violating the very idea of monologism.
Before expounding any further, it is proper to first provide an essential caveat with regard
to polyphony knowledge. It is essential for the reader to note the existence of equally
10
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diverse polyphonic knowledges among equally diverse traditional societies. Just because
societies are traditional or developing, it does not mean their knowledges are the same.
What is knowledge in one traditional society will invariable differ from another, even the
way people think among these societies will inextricably differ. The present study is
under no illusion about the diversity of thoughts, knowledges, languages, environmental
ecologies, landscapes, myths, songs, dreams, and so on that intimately play the principal
role in how one understands the world. The study, therefore, utilizes the term polyphony
only as a metaphor or a catch-all phrase, if you will, to encompass the diverse
knowledges of diverse traditional societies.11 Concurrently, the term is used to
differentiate knowledges of traditional societies from scientific rationality.
Given the polyphonic understanding of society, what becomes superfluous is the
systematized, clear-cut knowledge, theories, truths, etc. The structure-less and systemless explanations or descriptions are what make polyphonic rationality non-dogmatic.
This way, it is open to multivariate modes of thought in attaining holistic understanding
of phenomena. But, most importantly, it signifies the wholeness of human society.
Human society cannot be properly understood in a piecemeal manner. As Michael
Polanyi notes, to isolate and concisely describe an aspect by separating it from a complex
whole only, “destroy[s] our understanding of complex matters. Scrutinize closely the
particulars of a comprehensive entity and their meaning is effaced, our conception of the

11

In blanketing diverse rationalities under the term polyphonic, the present study
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is resorting to this recourse only in so far as to explicate what is ignored and the
awareness of how according polyphonic rationalities will enrich our sense of
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entity is destroyed.”12 In sub-dividing society into numerous isolated aspects (such as
economic, political, social, cultural, religious), the understanding one derives from such
blinkered examination highly distorts the actuality. Indeed, for Goethe, understanding is
attained in experiencing the animated wholeness of phenomenon, not in isolation.13
Indeed, this is what Bakhtin meant, in regards to polyphony, when he identifies
the unfinalizable, indeterminant, indefiniteness, and unpredeterminable of persons.14
They are unfinalizable because they are always in symbiosis with everything: world,
cosmos, ecologies, landscapes, etc. Human beings are not some isolated fixed concepts
who can be understood regardless of their contextual world, nor are they determined,
finalized, or concluded as to what they are as persons, communities, groups, cultures, or
societies. What human society or person is is never static; instead it is dynamic, lively,
colorful, mysterious, and filled with infinite potentials; potential to accommodate,
contradict, harmonize various realities of society, nature, universe, cosmos, and so on.
Scientific rationality, on the other hand, has a frozen abstract concept of human society
and person, thereby, rendering society determinable, finalizable, i.e. definiteness. On the
contrary, for polyphonic rationality, there is never a conclusion to what a person or
society is or can be. The indefiniteness or unfinalizability hence makes linear structuring
of polyphony knowledge superfluous.
Bakhtin, commenting on Dostoevsky, rightly insist, “it is futile to seek in it
[Dostoevsky’s world] a systematic monologic… finalization—and not because the author
12
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has failed in his attempts to achieve it, but because it did not enter into his design (italics
in original).”15 For Bakhtin, the unfinalizable, unsystematic exposition along with
negation of monologic view enabled Dostoevsky in aborning a new genre of polyphony
literature. Dostoevsky himself saw persons to be indefinite, unpredeterminable, and
unfinalizable. This enabled him more than anyone else prior, with the exception of Dante,
to hear and understand all diverse voices, thereby enabling him to see the “man in man,”
for it conveyed to him the multifacetedness of complex, contradictory, even ambiguous,
internal image of society, person.16 For Dostoevsky, man is never static, obvious, nor
predictable; he saw beneath the shallow exterior image there resides a complex interior
being filled with contradictory qualities that render any stable concept about man
erroneous; hence his creation of polyphonic literature to show the heterogeneous, everchanging man and society. In order to show the polyphony of man, Dostoevsky had to
break away from the usual structured monologic way of writing and understanding that
limited, froze, determined, and finalized man. What is more, structured monologic, he
realized, was incapable of accommodating diverse complex voices because of its single
lens from which to understand man. As a result, structured monologic had to give way to
structureless dialogic understanding. This, structurelessness, enabled Dostoevsky to
finely illustrate the unfinalizability of persons. By the virtue of being unfinalizable, man
is no longer frozen, nor restricted to stable concepts. In doing so, he highlighted the
essentiality of diverse, unmerged independent voices signifying the complex polyphony
in person, society, and phenomena. His view is congruent to the manner in which
traditional societies view themselves, their world, society, nature, etc. For them, nothing
15
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ever remains fixed; instead everything is in a state of constant flux, i.e. unfinalizable,
exposed to vicissitudes of everyday realities and circumstances of world, nature, spirits,
universes, or gods.
Therefore, polyphonic rationality, with regard to the present query, cannot be
concisely systematized into a single model or theory: polyphonic rationality cannot be
categorized into frozen universal concepts, nor can it be the basis for ultimate truth
derived logically through coherent measurements or experiments. Rather, what
polyphonic rationality is cannot be put into words. Ludwig Wittgenstein once verily
reasoned, of which one cannot speak of or put to words, of that one must pass in
silence.17 Likewise, polyphonic rationality will make sense only within the contexts of
society, it cannot be put to words, yet it can only be understood through silence, i.e.
through direct life experiencing and by engaging with people, society, nature, spirits,
myths, songs, ceremonies, etc. And direct lived experiences can neither be put to words
nor cogently explicated, but can only be experienced in-person along with profound
feelings and emotions accompanying such experiences. Even the present effort of this
present study to explicate polyphony is a poor, pitiable translation of what is
indescribable. This is why Michael Polanyi believed experience can never be represented
in or by any theory.18 For Michael Polanyi, experiences cannot be stated in formal
propositional terms or lucidly put into a theory. Rather, one is always led tacitly or
involves a, what he identifies as, tacit dimension, to know and understand a phenomenon.
Moreover, he reasons, the tacit dimension or one being led tacitly is always based on
17
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one’s daily experiences encountered through one’s sentience or “intimation.” And
because experience cannot be theorized, it remains tacit and continuous to sway the
manner in which one’s attains knowledge or understanding.19
St. Augustine remarking on the nature of time, insists, “I know what it is, but
when you ask me I don’t.”20 Here, Augustine is alluding to the indescribable
understanding on the nature of time not because he does not know what it is, but because
it cannot be lucidly systematized, categorized, or catalogued in order to be conveyed. In
other words, it is a personal understanding depending on the nature of each individual.
So, similarly polyphonic knowledge is blatantly obvious to each traditional society and
even to any astute observer; however, in asking to define, theorize, systematize itself, it
loses its very essence: its unsystematic, non-theoretical nature. Organizing or cataloging
will not only distort polyphonic rationality, but, more seriously, it will begin to make no
sense, even to itself—just as St. Augustine’s remarks on the nature of time. Werner
Heisenberg once remarked that explanation at the sub-atomic level stops to explain
anything at all;21 likewise, explanation of polyphony knowledge ceases to explain
anything. It is only through direct lived experiences that one can understand polyphonic
knowledges. This point needs to be understood by the reader, for without taking this into
consideration, what is to follow will make absolutely no sense; indeed, without noting the
above points what is to follow will look like a motley assemblage of isolated observations
Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. It is worth noting Polanyi’s “Tacit Dimension”
not only influenced Thomas Kuhn in formulating his ground breaking work “The
Structure of Scientific Revolution,” but also influenced modern physicists, like David
Bohm, to search for new ways to understand and describe the quantum world.
20
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with no cohering leitmotif, thus misunderstanding the unsystematic, non-theoretical
nature of polyphonic rationality.
No doubt, one may oppose the structurelessness of polyphonic rationality, and
claim theories—be they in natural or social sciences—are systematic, with logically
coherent concepts enabling scientists to rationally discover abstract universal truths, and
how findings from crucial experiments, which are reproducible, dictate the rise and fall of
scientific theories. Still, polyphonic knowledges cannot be measured, they are never
meant to be measured. Furthermore, the neat methodical, logical conceptions of theory as
well as the discovery of abstract universal truths or realities are retrospective stories
constructed to defend the theory and give an air of objective reality untampered by
human subjectivity and sentient.22 In other words, the lucid coherent explanations along
with the linear unfolding of hidden truth or reality behind a phenomenon are ex post facto
constructed to legitimize and boost the verity of a theory. Neither the linear unfolding of
events, reality, truth, nor the logical coherence of theory is intrinsic to the process of
scientific inquests.23 Instead, it is only the romantic ideals of any discipline, trying to
qualify as science, to claim the objective, dispassionate, detached, systematic ethics of its
adherents where the fate of even the most beloved theories, as is claimed, depends upon
the results of crucial experiments validating or falsifying their verity. And scientists
accept new facts, even those falsifying their much adored theories, honestly and
courageously. So, the argument goes.
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Yet, one will find such romantic views of science, of objectivity, of impartiality,
of courage, of honesty to be far from what actually occurs. To take one example: on
March 1989, announcements were made claiming the discovery of cold fusion. This
discovery was made, independently, by two teams: Martin Fleischman and B. Stanley
Pons at the University of Utah, Salt Lake, and Steven Jones at Brigham Young
University. The announcements claimed the discovery of cold fusion at room
temperature—fusion created inside a test-tube. These caused a furore among the
scientific community because the claims violated existing beliefs held by most
conventional fusion scientists, where it was assumed nuclear fusion can only be carried
out at high temperatures, required highly elaborated technical instruments, machines,
equipment, and as such required an international team of scientists with massive budgets.
It can hardly be carried out at small universities with minimal budgets, much less in a
test-tube; hence the claims were rejected outright without even proper investigation.24 No
one bothered to consider the claims seriously since conventional wisdom dictated cold
fusion just could not happen. So, the initial reaction, as one can see, goes against the
romantic view of dispassionate, objective scientists honorably accepting the fate of their
beloved theories. Fleischman and Pons, furthermore, did not help their case, either.
Instead of disseminating their findings and data, like honest, dispassionate scientists as
standard view of science suggests, they became reclusive and circulated their materials to
very few of their colleagues. As such, most scientists had to guess about how the
experiments were carried out and set up careful experiments based on those guesses to
disprove the guessed claims. Moreover, there were other less than objective,
24
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dispassionate, rational reasons as to why the claims of cold fusion were rejected. This
included the fact that the discoveries or announcements came from small Midwestern
universities, rather than large universities, with bigger budgets, grants, and large
international teams. By making the announcements, they threatened the numerous grant
pulling skills of large universities. The assumption was science could, indeed, be carried
out at smaller universities, but it must be done under the supervisions or leaderships of
larger universities. Thus, when small universities challenged the orthodox wisdom, large
universities banded together to put the renegades in place.25
The above episode suggests the view of dispassionate, impartial, rational, honest,
courageous scientists accepting the fate of theories based on the results of crucial
experiments is a far-cry, a phantasmagoria constructed to embellish the image of science,
just as institutionalized religions aggrandize their images by constructing idealistic views
of their catechisms. Certainly, Ptolemaic geo-centric world system was not replaced by
Copernican heliocentric system based on findings of a single crucial experiment, nor did
a single crucial experiment replace Newtonian physics by Einstein’s relativity and
Quantum physics.26 Rather what is science or accepted as science, theory, etc. is much
the product of personal emotional feelings, beliefs, vogue institutional dogmas, and
acceptable orthodoxies of scientists than the otherwise suggested views of rational,
detached, courageous scientists accepting new facts, realities, truths.
As far as the testability or reproducibility of the observations is concerned, which
contemporary social sciences are deeply fascinated with, it must be duly noted that such
idealistic view is never what actually happens. As one physicist reasons verily, “And, far
25
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from all experiments being reproducible…it is well known that some individuals can get
a particular experiment to work, while others never will. Hence, the very basis of science,
its objectivity, repeatable, quantitative observations and experiments, is an unattainable
ideal, for the way scientists are able to design experiments and carry them out is
influenced in so many subtle ways by their feelings and sensitivity to the complex
universe around them (italics added).”27 Even for Heisenberg, science was more about
one’s participation, being involved, and understanding the phenomenon, thus signifying
one’s relation to the cosmos, rather than scientists’ dispassionate, detached observation.28
His view is far from the standardized view of the cold objectivity of observer, as held by
many of his acolytes—be they social or natural scientists. Goethe himself saw the
artificiality of scientific experiments, where the prober (along with equipment utilized) is
detached from the wholeness of phenomenon. By distancing oneself from the fullness of
phenomenon, one isolates narrow aspects of nature, whereby understanding gained from
such observation or experiment is bound to be distorted.29 To demand polyphonic
knowledge to present itself just as any generic theory in a logical concise manner with
room for empirical observations is to contradict the very meaning of polyphony.
Therefore, one hopes the astute reader will appreciate the structureless and indescribable
nature of polyphonic rationality.
Because polyphony rationality cannot be systematized into theory or into any
coherent categorical structure, truth or knowledge of thing, society, nature, universe
becomes context dependent. Put differently, knowledge or truth depends on the context
27
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under which it is acquired. As mentioned earlier in this section, the personality of the
prober invariably makes all the difference in the manner in which phenomenon is
understood and probed. This is one of the essential aspects of polyphony rationality as
well as in its understanding. In other words, knowledge will vary from prober to prober,
society to society, culture to culture, and as strange as it may sound, all such perceptions
are valid, after all, one’s perception of phenomena is one out of infinite other
interpretations, as Nietzsche maintained. The uniqueness of the inquirer, as Marcel
maintained, where the very identity of the inquirer is inextricably linked to the
questioning of the phenomenon, makes all the difference as to the understanding of that
which is probed. For the manner in which one probes into a phenomenon is indissolubly
enmeshed to one’s very being that is, in turn, influenced by one’s life experiences.
Besides, one’s direct life experiences rely on, as Aristotle maintained, the corporeal
organs of sense—sight, smell, touch, taste, hear, and feelings. Human reasoning,
according to Aristotle, is not possible without our reliance on such organs of sentience.
Furthermore, what is sensed by the senses is very much contingent on unique sociocultural contexts framing the daily life expressions of a person, society, group, or
community. Dostoevsky accordingly held this view, for him, as Bakhtin maintains, “The
truth about the world…is inseparable from the truth of the personality (italics added).”30
Hence, context is principal for one’s understandings of direct lived experiences. More
importantly, Bakhtin commenting on Dostoevsky’s polyphony, maintains, such personal
truth derived from lived experiences “[i]n the mouth of another person, a word or a
definition identical in content would take on another meaning and tone, and would no
30

Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 78.

229
longer be the truth (italics added).”31 This is to say, one’s knowledge of phenomenon will
always take on a different nature, content, quality, when the same truth or knowledge is
exported out of its aborning context, viz. what holds to be true in one society will
invariably hold not to be so in another. Hence, knowledge is always contextual to
experiences. Surely, to assume, as scientific technicians, the absences or irrelevance of
context as well as intimacy of knowledge to the nature of the prober is to assume the
infallibility of human knowledge concerning the profoundest depths of society, person,
and community. Dostoevsky, according to Bakhtin, wanted to show this fallibility of
concrete, fixed truths finalizing the concept of man. So, for Dostoevsky, “Truth is unjust
when it concerns the depths of someone else’s personality (italics in original).”32 For so
long as we are humans, one can and will never know the most profound intimate realities
of another human being or, for that matter, society. Indeed, it is precisely this that makes
man unfinalizable, unpredeterminable. Even Michel de Montaigne, one of the great
Renaissance thinkers, saw the unfinalizablility of self. He realized man, society, and
nature never to be static or fixed; instead, things were invariably fluxed, ever-changing,
ever-flowing, and never complete.33
In an ever changing society, therefore, context becomes essential, for what counts
as truth, knowledge, or understanding will indissolubly depend on the aborning sociocultural, personal circumstances. Here, the term context may be understood as, what
Gilbert Ryle identified as, the “thick description.” Ryle, in explaining think description,
dichotomizes between a twitch and a wink: consider, Ryle says, two persons swiftly
31
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contracting their right eyelids: in person A, the contraction is an involuntary twitch; in
Person B, the contraction is a deliberate conspiratorial signal to a friend. An outside
observer passing by will be unable to discern which is a twitch and which is a wink or
whether both are twitching or winking, for the two movements, externally, appear to be
the same. From the outside, or what Ryle calls “thin description,” there may be not much
of a difference between the two movements, yet (in thick description) there is a vast
difference between a wink and a twitch: one being a deliberate conspiratorial gesture, a
wink, and another being an involuntary movement, a twitch. But consider, he says, a third
person C, who tries to parody the wink of person B. Here, (in terms of thick description)
the contracting of person B’s right eyelids is neither a twitch nor a wink, for he is jesting
to amuse his friends. Yet, from the outside appearance (thin description), these three
contractions of right eyelids are indifferentiable.34
The point here being: in thin contextless description, the three contractions of
right eyelids appear the same, however, in thick description or context description, there
are vast differences between the three contractions of eyelids, after all, contexts provide
one with essential elements to discern whether a movement is a wink, a twitch, or a jest:
one being involuntary contraction, another a conspiratorial signal, and third being a
parody or a jest to amuse some friends. Likewise, a contextless description, to use Ryle’s
term, “thin description,” of traditional polyphonic rationality may appear the same: as
assemblage of primitive myths, superstitions. Yet, in terms of “thick description,” or from
contextual lens, these are not some trivial, insignificant mythical understanding of
phenomena. Rather they provide traditional societies with meaningful understanding of
Gilbert Ryle, “The Thinking of Thoughts: What is ‘Le Penseur’ Doing?” in
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their world, nature, and phenomena within their own socio-cultural contexts. So, the
generality of knowledge, which is one of the key aspects of scientific understanding, only
distorts the actual existential experiences of diverse societies because generality is
possible only in the absence of context. Certainly, in its unsullied form, scientific
theorizing and understanding are invariably contextual, in nature.35
Hence, polyphonic rationality cannot be understood without the contexts in which
it is perceived. And because of the essentiality of contexts, to structure polyphony
rationality in a generalizable manner is to distort the meaning it affords to diverse
societies. It is now only prudent to illustrate episodes of polyphonic modes of thought
with the help of few handfuls of episodes. This is done in order to explicate what has
been hitherto discussed. The following episodes will perhaps illuminate the unsystematic,
unfinalizable nature of polyphonic rationality. Moreover, the episodes from various
traditional societies may appear unsystematic, even chaotic, yet there is an underlying
leitmotif providing a context from which to understand the direct life experiences of
societies: diverse peoples, cultures, societies thinking differently.
Societies Think Differently
Societies do not think alike. It is one of the fundamental errors of scientific
rationality as well as of modern developmental progress to insist the sameness in ways
societies think; or to insist uniform linear progression of thought, universally applicable
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to every society, from primitive superstitions to scientific beliefs.36 No doubt, to insist
uniform thinking is only the logical consequence of scientific rationality since, as we
have seen in the previous two chapters, uniformity is necessary to it. Yet, such a
monologic view eviscerates the manner in which each society thinks, ruminates, or
interacts uniquely with its world, people, culture, community, landscapes, cosmos, and
nature. There is polyphony of voices (thoughts) among diverse societies. They frame the
context under which each society’s existential realities are to be understood, for they
afford meaning and purpose to the community as a whole. To discount polyphonic
thoughts, however, is to distort societies’ meaningful existential experiences. Sociocultural experiences cannot be detached from their aborning traditions and made into an
objective truth or knowledge. Astute observers since the earliest of historical human
existence have duly noted the importance of diversity in thoughts. Herodotus, arguably
one of the first writers from the west to contemplate over this issue, in his Histories,
proffers the following episode:
When Darius was king of Persia, he summoned the Greeks who happened to be
present at his court, and asked them what they would take to eat the dead bodies
of their fathers. They replied they would not do it for any money in the world.
Later, in the presence of the Greeks, and through an interpreter, so that they could
understand what was said, he asked some Indians, of the tribe called Callatiae,
who do in fact eat their parents’ dead bodies, what they would take to burn them.
They uttered a cry of horror and forbade him to mention such a dreadful thing.
One can see by this what custom can do and Pindar, in my opinion, was right
when he called it ‘King of all.’37
36
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The point being: for Herodotus, each society arranges its experiences uniquely,
with each affording its own understanding, as well as its own ways of dealing with the
world, people, community, and cosmos. There are, in other words, diverse modes of
thought. He rightly saw customs dictated the ways one viewed and understood the world,
as one can see from his evocation of Greek lyric poet’s, Pindar, dictum that custom is
“king of all.” And what is custom but the accepted knowledge or truths of each society.
Hence, notions such as universally detached objective truths, applicable to all human
realities, are alien to Herodotus since each society thinks differently, lives differently.
After all, for him, to consider one way of thinking or living to be better than others is to
disregard lived actualities of diverse societies.
Ultimately, what is deemed to be the correct ways of living or thinking depends
on societies. Nietzsche, who shook not only the very foundations of western philosophy
but also of western thought, verily saw this to be so. From the mouth of Zarathustra,
Nietzsche notes:
Zarathustra has seen many lands and many peoples: thus he has
discovered the good and evil of many peoples. Zarathustra has found no greater
power on earth than good and evil.
No people could live without evaluating: but if it wishes to maintain itself
it must not evaluate as its neighbour evaluates.
Much that seemed good to one people seemed shame and disgrace to
another: thus I found. I found much that was called evil in one place was in
another decked with purple honours.
One neighbour never understood another: his soul was always amazed at
his neighbour’s madness and wickedness (italics added).38
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For Nietzsche, good, correct, rational, evil, etc. will invariably vary from one
society to another. Truth or knowledge independent of any tradition is indeed impossible
in human society. Certainly, what is seen to be primitive superstition in one may be, to
use Nietzsche’s words, “decked with purple honours” in another. This is to say:
according to Nietzsche, each society has its own rationality. The way each society makes
sense of its world ultimately depends on its direct experiences with everyday realities:
customs, beliefs, values, etc. These different forms of knowledge, in other words, must be
understood within the contexts of the aborning society. Furthermore, for Nietzsche, there
can be no reconciliation between these various viewpoints. Yet, for Nietzsche as well as
for Herodotus, just because these diverse views cannot be reconciled, it does not mean
the end of humanity; rather such differences can live in harmony beside one another,
without merging (certainly, Dostoevsky and Bakhtin also held this view). This view is
vividly exemplified in the Javanese shadow-play or Wajang, which Geertz animatedly
illuminates.39
The play depicts the struggle between good and evil over the fate of the world. In
Wajang, there is no ultimate good or evil, after a long struggle between the opposing
forces, both sides give in and depart with neither side claiming victory over the fate of the
world.40 Moral of the play: good and bad are both an essential part of daily life and
illustrate the perennial human fallibility. The Javanese accepts the world as it is, in
relation to the world in its totality, with each society invariably occupying a microcosm
within the larger context of the universe. They do not categorize the good from the bad,
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nor seek to eliminate everything that is bad or evil from the world (or their society); they
see the essentiality of everything (good and bad, rational and irrational, subjective and
objective) that makes up human society. Thus, Javanese see every aspect of their society
essentially linked and tied to one another; and by appreciating these intricate ties, they are
better able to find meaning and hence deal with uncertainties of daily life—which they
have been doing for hundreds, if not thousands, of years.
Surely, the stalemate of good and evil, in the wajang, may sound irrational to a
scientific mind, but such irrationalities (i.e. irrationality from scientific person’s
perspectives), nevertheless, do play a part in the manner in which Javanese view their
world and their society. Here, good and evil are harmonized, not merged nor reconciled,
for each is dependent on the other. And, of course, Derrida has argued how oppositional
terms—such as good/bad, right/wrong, light/darkness, etc.—are not only complementary,
but are also dependent on each other for the completion of each other’s meanings.41 One
cannot simply disregard such rationality simply because it does not concur with one’s
rationalized system of thoughts that demands good must always triumph over evil. Most
traditional societies, indeed most Asian and African societies, do not see the primacy of
either good or bad; for them both are essential aspects of daily life, i.e. accept things for
what they are, be they good or bad. And, of course, this is what it means to be
polyphonic: diverse independent voices or consciousness co-existing in harmony without
merging into one another. Surely, what makes this planet, earth, the jewel in the universe
is not its (physical or chemical—organic or inorganic) uniformity with billions of other
planets, rather this insignificant of a planetary body in one corner of this vast universe is
41
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inhabited by diverse peoples, societies, cultures with equally diverse languages, histories,
myths, dreams, songs, religions, landscapes, poetries, and beliefs make it the chefd'oeuvre of the cosmos. Just the fact that we are aware of such polyphonic diversity is
itself wondrous.
Because societies think differently, it becomes essential in any meaningful social
inquest for one to acculturate with the existential actualities of society. Intimacy with
society eviscerates the distancing between the prober and the probed, viz. intimacy
dissolves the cold detached view the prober has of the probed, or what twelve century
philosopher Ibn ‘Arabi identifies as the unification of the knower with the known.
Knowledge, according to Ibn ‘Arabi, cannot be attained without this unification: The
highest degree of knowledge is attained by unifying the knower with the known in such a
way that they become one and the same, and there remains no difference between the
two.42 The Neapolitan thinker Giambattista Vico held similar views. He reasons human
beings are historical, i.e. contextual, beings and create their own history, or, what we
today term as, society. Therefore, knowledge of these societies can be properly
understood only from the lens of each individual society, from the point of view of the
society, i.e. context. In other words, knowledge about other societies entails one to
become intimate with the daily life experiences and realities: to see, feel, hear, and
experience the world as they do.43 Indeed, intimation or unification is the only way to
transcend the diverse modes of thought, in a subjective manner, thereby enabling one to
properly understand whatever phenomenon one is inquesting.
Ibn ‘Arabi, Divine Governance of the Human Kingdom, trans. Shaykh Tosun
Bayrak (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 1997).
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Perhaps one of the profoundests and, at the same time, much neglected truths of
mankind is societies think differently. Profoundest because societies do not think alike
(the processes of development, certainly, make this even more apparent). Much neglected
because modern developed societies have somehow managed to convince themselves,
despite the obvious differences, that societies do think alike, or, at least, they assume that
given enough developmental progress, every society will converge towards one universal,
standard mode of thinking, i.e. developed world’s mode of thoughts.44 However, such
conviction seems rather misplaced, as Ruth Benedict reasons:
In the higher cultures the standardization of custom and belief…has given a false
sense of the inevitability of the particular forms that have gained currency… Most
of the simpler cultures did not gain the wide currency of the one which, out of our
experience, we identify with human nature, but this was for various historical
reasons, and certainly not for any that gives us as its carriers a monopoly of social
good or of social sanity. Modern civilization, from this point of view, becomes not
a necessary pinnacle of human achievement but one entry in a long series of
possible adjustments (italics added).45
Benedict is, here, making an important point. In the light of socio-cultural
diversity, to shoulder the inevitability of particular thought through particular form of
progress and development only seems illusory.46 Certainly, Benedict was veracious to
reason modern civilization to be only one out of numerous other recourses available to
human societies. Indeed, it is only obvious for modern civilization to be one out of
numerous other recourses because societies think differently. Hence, it is only
44
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commonsensical for each society to think and, thereby, follow different paths in terms of
what it sees to be appropriate for itself based on its own cultural realities. However,
modern societies seem reluctant to notice the Cartesian error of one mode of thought.
Descartes’ famous dictum “Cogito, ergo sum” seems entrenched in their mode of
thinking, to act as if differences in thinking do not exist among societies. Developed
societies, just like Descartes, fail to realize that just because one can think, it does not
mean the way people think, why people think, emotions and feelings connected with
thinking, events conjuring up the thought processes, existential experiences and realities
of societies, cultures, and so forth are analogous. To think as such is to ignore human
reality and diversity.
The scholar philologist Auerbach, in one of the most important works of the
twentieth century, reasons societies do not think alike. The manners in which people
think vary in accordance to time and place. Even the language used to articulate one’s
knowledge or understandings is inextricably tied to the structure of one’s thought
processes; language itself is tied to one’s modes of thought.47 Therefore, to have any
knowledge at all entails intimate understanding of everyday lived realities: hopes,
aspirations, characters, languages, histories, and so forth. Similarly, modern linguists
have arrived at congruent conclusion. Linguist Edward Sapir suggests human languages
influence cultures and manners of thought. Languages change or evolve in such a manner
as to sway the point of view from which societies interpret, elucidate and represent their
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natural world, culture, community.48 Indeed, one of the most obvious and basic
substantiation of the differences in thinking among societies is language. Anyone
speaking more than one language will easily recognize how sometimes translation fails to
do justice to what is conveyed in another language; or how sometimes certain words,
moods, feelings, actions, terms, changes, or concepts fail to be expressed in another
language and so one ends up using approximate words—even though the approximate
words or concepts selected in no way actually convey the actual meaning of the
translating words—closest to that which one is trying to translate. One ends up resorting
to such recourse not because one is incompetent, but rather the way people think or
articulate the world is different and languages reflect that differences. Hence, languages
express the protean nature of society. This way even language itself becomes
kaleidoscopic, thereby evincing the multivariate socio-cultural realities and views.
Indeed, psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan argues: a third interlocutor, i.e. intercession of
unconscious cultural elements (be they terminologies, concepts, or assumptions regarding
what constitute as real, imaginary, symbolic, along with syntaxes of one’s language and
other nonverbal systems of behavior), is always present in conversation between two
interlocutors.49 Expressed in a different way, for instance, even in this present
conversation between myself and the reader, the third interlocutor, i.e. our unconscious
cultural elements (our different cultural aspects), nevertheless intervenes in the manner in
which we each approach and understand a topic or phenomenon. Differently put,

48

Edward Sapir, Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech (New York,
NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921).
49
Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York, NY: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2007).

240
language manifests the manner in which one thinks, and one’s thinking is very much
related to one’s socio-cultural realities.
Linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf, likewise, argues language is indissolubly tied to
culture and its ways of thinking. Languages evince societies’ predilections or views of
their world.50 Manifested in the language of a society are its views of the world.
Language sums up the shared experiences, ideas, and beliefs of society. And through it
society represents, elucidates, and interprets existential actualities of its world. Jacques
Derrida certainly believes languages to be interpretation of ideas, beliefs, or opinions by
human subjects. In other words, language has meaning simply because we, i.e. human
subjects, allocate meaning to it. The meanings, furthermore, which each language
reflects, are the elucidation or representation of its modes of thought, i.e. human subjects’
views of their world.51 After all, “We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native
language,” and “[w]e cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significance as
we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it this way—an
agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of
our language.”52 Our orientation or how we view the world truly goes on to frame the
languages we speak. The words, concepts, sentences, metaphors, syntaxes of our
language evince the way we understand the cosmos and our place in it.
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An astute reader will recognize that because societies do not think alike, the very
notion of absolute objective universal truth, as proselytized by scientific rationality,
becomes superfluous. Each society decides for itself its own knowledge based on its own
existential realities. Here, one could no doubt protest to what has been hitherto reasoned:
if there is no universal truth then there is only disorder. However, just because there is no
room for absolute universal truth, it means neither chaos nor disorder.53 It is important to
realize, traditional societies do not pettifog about categorization, division, or isolation of
the natural and social world. Here, everything is seen in its wholeness, everything is in
relation with everything, and everything is in a constant state of flux. Moreover, the
social world is seen in its organic whole, traditional societies do not quibble about
subdivisions of worldly phenomena. They do not categorize events into social, cultural,
political, economic, natural, religious, or philosophical aspects. Unlike modern developed
societies, with over-specialized divisions between the abstract and practical, traditional
societies do no delineate between metaphysical-abstract and practical affairs of society.
Rather every event or activity that happens is the daily realities of society and signifies
Of course, the present query is not suggesting ‘relativism’ is the only available
recourse. Rather, the query is against ‘absolutism’ and ‘relativism,’ since both are an
excuse to evade dealing with complexities of the human world. In other words, both
convictions burgeon not only from one’s lack of understanding of our complex human
world, but also from one’s inability to accept the world for what it is. Therefore, when
one claims ‘absolutism’ or ‘relativism,’ one instantly shut-offs any meaningful dialogue
from ever taking place. In other words, we must accept the world for what it is, with all
its contradictions, faults, imperfections, uncertainties, vicissitudes, and chaos of everyday
life. Human society is not perfect and is never meant to be perfect, no matter how hard
one may try to convince oneself with petty scientific reasoning. One mustn’t try to
change the world, societies, cultures, or people. Rather the world, society, culture will
change and do what it has to do in its own merry ways. There is no right or wrong way,
each society must navigate through its beliefs and knowledge to deal with problems of its
own; each will have to decide the future path for itself in accordance to its existential
realities.
53
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what it means to be part of the cosmos. There is no demarcation between specific
religious activities from ordinary day to day activities. Nor do they require justification
for whatever activities they happen to carry out, or to justify their views of the world.
Furthermore, traditional societies do not quibble endlessly with regard to resolving or
avoiding contradictions in their world views. They do not pettifog as to whether their
beliefs are objectively true, are logically consistent, are internally and/or externally valid,
are measurable using the latest scientific models and theories, are differentiated into
independent and dependent variables, are consistent with the methodologies of science,
are statistically significant, can be predicted and succinctly described by hypotheses or
theories, or can hold against impartial scientific scrutiny. Such pettifogging only takes
place and takes a principal role only in (modern developed) societies fixated with
scientific rationality. Still, for traditional societies, their beliefs are what they are, as the
product of their direct life experiences. For them, their beliefs and views on their world
provide meaning and a sense of purpose to each and every one in the society. After all,
life is above all about living, caring, sympathy, feeling, celebrating, helping, and
conviviality. Life is not about whether one’s beliefs or feelings are objectively true,
scientifically valid, statistically measurable, and can be cogently described by scientific
theory or hypothesis. Life in traditional societies is about living, where life is full of
irreconcilable views, contradictions, and where everything is in constant flux.54 The
There is no such concept as ‘contradiction’ or ‘logical fallacy’ in many
traditional societies. Instead, everything is inextricably tied to everything, i.e.
relationship. As such, everything is in relationship with every other thing, and the
essential purpose for each society is to maintain this harmony of relationships. According
to Derrida, even the contradictory or oppositional terms—such as: good/bad, right/wrong,
correct/incorrect, logical/illogical—are not something real but instead they are
complementary to one another in order to realize one another’s meanings. Indeed, for
54
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meaningful practicalities of everyday life are most essential to human life and society.
Society, or even life, without meaningful purpose is indeed a society in absolute malady.
If traditional societies find meaningful purpose in myths, dreams, gods, spirits, or songs,
then let them continue in their beliefs, for these afford life to be meaningful and
purposeful. No one in the world has any authority or right to deprive any society of its
meanings. Just because modern developed societies have rid themselves of any
meaningful myths through scientific inquiry (and thereby also deprived themselves of
their own meaning to their lives), it does not mean they have the right to deprive others of
what is meaningful. Modern developed societies incessantly talk about human rights, but
don’t they realize to deprive meaning from peoples’ lives in other societies is itself a
violation of human rights. Societies have the right to be: to be what they are, as they are.
This world is large enough to accommodate polyphonic voices of every society. Human
society along with the natural ecology is the wonder of cosmos; the diversity makes it
distinctive and splendid, for the diversity among human societies is itself the reflection of
the wonders of the cosmos. Hence, the issue of absolute objective truth becomes
superfluous. Nor does it mean without absolute universal truth there is only disorder. The
world without universal objective truth or knowledge may indeed seem disordered to the
scientific minds or societies, yet for traditional societies, the diversity of cultures or
peoples makes it all the more essential for each society to retain its own knowledge.
Diverse modes of thought are reflected in languages of societies. The diverse
languages succinctly underpin different modes of thought based on existential realities of
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each society. How society perceives the world and how it articulates those views is
expressed in the syntax of its language. Accordingly, what is considered good, bad, evil,
normal, abnormal, etc. will inextricably vary. Anthropologist Ruth Benedict, likewise,
argues what is normal or ethical behavior ultimately depends on beliefs of society. 55 And
what are beliefs but thoughts or views of society on the world expressed though language
rendering certain behaviors normal, good, ethical.
Surely, how can one meaningfully understand other societies, or, indeed, how can
social inquest be meaningful at all when the different ways people think are disregarded?
The way one perceives the world structures the language in such a way as to elucidate
and represent one’s experienced realities. Therefore, each language will elucidate its
particular views. Thus, some societies will categorize and isolate their world into
concepts, while others will view themselves to be in interaction or relationship with the
world around them. Take, for instance, the Indo-European languages, because these
languages are noun-based, they isolate and categorize the world into concrete, absolutely
fixed concepts. What one finds here is the importance of naming, identifying, cataloging,
categorizing of things, names, places, into specific concepts, classes, groups, etc. As a
result, societies belonging to and/or speaking this family of languages (which much of
developed societies are) view and perceive the world around in a manner most conducive
for scientific rationality: isolating, categorizing, fixing absolute concepts about human
and natural phenomena. And, without a doubt, the absolute fixed concepts, frozen for all
space and time, are essential to scientific methods and reasoning. Now in contrast, most
traditional languages are verb-based. Here, the world, as traditional societies see it, is
55
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always in flux; it is a world of happenings, of actions, of events, of relations, of
interactions, of occurring, of actualizing. Nothing in their world is fixed, frozen, isolated,
categorized, universalized, or absolute. This world view tends to go against the views of
concept/noun-based societies. Knowledge in traditional societies is, therefore, based on
everyday existential life experiences. Here, of course, direct experiences help form their
views of the world, which then become their knowledge. In traditional societies, due to
their disregard for categorizations or fixed concepts, “each thing is mentally experienced
on its own merits, and for what it actually is.”56 They experience the world in the
profoundest of ways so as to understand their own place and duty towards the world,
universe, community, people, spirits, plants, and animals.
While, on the other hand, “Western people have stepped out of the mainstream of
our species’ traditional way of recording and remembering experiences. Western thinkers
have erected a series of absolute concepts, some dealing with the physical world, others
describing the world of human affairs. As a consequence, Western people have been
taught to think in a restricted manner.”57 This restricted manner is beginning to serve as a
serious source of impediment in describing the physical universe. Benjamin Whorf
believes native languages, due to their less restrictive nature, is better suited to describe
modern physics.58 One of the co-creators of quantum theory, Niels Bohr, saw noun-based
Indo-European language to restrict physicists from properly describing the eccentric
quantum world. Since Bohr, some of the leading modern physicists, like David Bohm,59
have looked to traditional knowledge to elucidate and represent the physical world,
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because some of the most profound explanations require terms that evince the flux
realities of quanta (such as: electrons being both waves and particles, or identifying either
the position or the speed of electrons one at a time but never both, ambiguity of the
quantum world, and so forth). And verb-based languages of the traditional world, where
the world is ambiguous, in flux, in harmony among opposites/contradictions with no
fixed absolute concepts, afford physicists terms enabling them to better describe the
physical world.60
What the current trend of natural sciences turning to traditional knowledge shows
is not how one thought is better than others, but rather how every form of thought, of
knowledge, of rationality is equally valid, meaningful, and how each has something to
contribute, in its own unique ways, to advance human understanding. It shows our world
as well as the whole of the universe is large enough to accommodate all forms of
rationalities: polyphonic modes of thought. No matter what forms of rationality societies’
adhere to, each is meaningful within the contexts of its society. Truly, languages are
important means to properly understand societies, mainly because the tropes around
which much of traditional languages are based evince views most essential to each
society. Society’s views of the world and those views expressed in its language tend to
illustrate their indispensable relation with culture, people, world, cosmos, landscapes,
myths, dreams, etc. Differently put, the way a given society thinks and understands the
world is expressed in its language. Language is the manifestation of society’s rationality.
The Hopi people, for instance, have in their language no talks of past, present, future, or
Given modern physics’ turn toward and utilizing terms from traditional
languages to describe the physical world, it seems the hitherto scientific description seem
to look more like myths than the ‘myths’ of the traditional world.
60
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of duration. Their concept of time is not an uninterrupted, mechanical linear stream of
time divided into hours, minutes, seconds, milliseconds, etc., instead theirs is a time
where everything is in the moment of actualizing, manifesting, or coming into being, time
itself is one continuous movement of community, spirit, and energy vibrating across the
cosmos in harmony connecting people with the life-force of their ancestors and the living
world. Time, for Hopi, is alive, it is in intimate relation with people’s feelings, emotions,
intuitions, and the whole of cosmos; it is not some abstract entity existing independent of
society.61 Time, in other words, is itself a matter of contextual relationship, thus a
continuous whole: the moment of coming into being, where the living society is in
relation not only to the cosmos but also to rest of the world, animals, ancestors,
landscapes, plants, stones, etc.
Or, take, for instance, the Mohawk people: to understand their worldview or mode
of thought is to involve oneself into a web of relationships with families, clans, relatives,
kinsmen, etc. Therefore, the Mohawk language contains more than 120 terms just to
express family relationships. Hence, to be Mohawk, to speak Mohawk is to participate
not just physically but also emotionally in the intricate complex web of relationships with
the whole community, who are not just members of society but members of the same
family.62 The way they think, approach, understand, and view their world is based on this
aspect of their daily life. While the Yupik people, on the other hand, stress the importance
of maintaining a balanced relation among the spiritual, human, and natural worlds.
Because of this, the Yupik orientation to the world is colored by its emphasis on
maintaining its relations and responsibilities to the natural (ecology) world. This world
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view is epitomized by the word, ella, a root word whose meaning is modified by adding
suffixes to it, such as, as Cajete indicates, ““Qaill’ ella auqa?” (How is the weather?);
“Qaill’ ellan auqa?” (How are you feeling?); “Ellapak nunii” (The world’s land);
“Ellagpiim Yua” (Spirit of the universe); “Ellapak” (Universe); and “Ella amigligtuq”
(The sky is cloudy).”63 As one can see, the variations of the root word, ella, are used in
reference to signify awareness to person, weather, creative forces, gods, sky.64 This is to
say, Yupiks are always aware of their inextricable relation to the world, cosmos,
ecology, society, and tribe, since it is from this relation that they finds their meaning and
purpose. Indeed, the Yupik culture developed values, beliefs, and knowledges based on
“ella” thereby enabling them to maintain and protect their ecological conception of their
world.65 Likewise, the Navajo language is intimately tied to the landscapes that inspired
its development. Hence, the orientation of the Navajos is inextricably tied to the creative
living force reflected in the landscapes and its reciprocal relationships with nature.
Moreover, Navajos derive their cultural beliefs, values, ethics, and knowledge from this
orientation to their landscapes.66 The word, ho’zho, for instance, comprises Navajos’
notion of natural beauty and balance. Inherent also, in this word, is the whole orientation
of Navajos to their landscapes signifying their reciprocal relations with nature. As a
consequent of this view, Navajos see every event, place, etc. to be in unceasing state of
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motion, and their (verb-based) language reflects this mode of thinking elucidating their
beliefs and rationalities.67
Similarly, in order to understand the Nuer, E. E. Evans-Pritchard argues, one
“must first master a vocabulary referring to cattle and to the life of the herd.”68 And,
truly, this importance of cattle in the lives of Nuer is epitomized by the manner in which
they think and comprehend their world, from the manner in which a person is given
names to their notion of time. For instance, men are addressed by names that refer to the
color or form of their favourite oxen, while women take their names from the cows or
oxen they milk, and young boys are given the names of the oxen they play with in the
pastures. A person is usually given a cow or ox name at birth, but, sometime names
handed down to posterity are oxen names, not their birth names. Also, the name of a
person changes through-out his life, it is never static: a name given at birth changes when
a person attains boyhood, he then acquires a new name during his adulthood, and when
he attains manhood or becomes a family man his name accordingly changes.69 Even their
notion of time is indissolubly tied to cattle: indeed, the Nuer’s have no notion of time. For
Nuer, time (for a lack of a better term, because they have no such concept as time) is not
time in a sense of unit of time: as in day, month, year, hour, minute, second, etc.; instead,
it is an activity or some outstanding activities in process, since time, for Nuer, is relation
between activities: such as, at the time of early camps, milking, taking cattle from byre to
kraal, driving cattle to pastures, time of harvesting, and so forth; “Thus, a man says, ‘I
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shall return at milking,’” or “‘At early camps,’” or “‘I shall start off when the calves
come home.’”70 This, of course, does not mean the Nuer are primitive, backward, or they
cannot think, rather it illustrates how one’s knowledge or rationality is a reflection of
one’s views of the world.
Take also, for instance, how traditional societies stress the perennial importance
of communal harmony, i.e. the primacy of communal collective identity over individual
personality, by dropping the first person singular pronoun, I. Languages spoken in
collective societies (which most traditional societies are) drop the pronoun I from
sentences when referring to themselves, while in individualistic societies the pronoun I is
used in reference to individuality of a person.71 This pronoun drop, certainly, does not
mean collectivist societies are incapable to think in an enlightened manner or are
oblivious to human freedom. Instead, each society has its ways to best assemble its
community within its context (contingent on existential realities of society, ecologies, and
so forth) to maintain harmony, thereby ensuring its survival. Its beliefs or knowledge are
tied to its views of the world, which are themselves based on direct expressions of its
society. Thus, one will find, for instance, Samoan language to have no corresponding
terms signifying, with regard to Indo-European concept of, the individual or self;
therefore, “instead of our [i.e. European] Socratic “know thyself,” Samoans say “Take
care of the relationship”; instead of the European image of a rounded, integrated
personality, like a sphere with no sides, Samoans are like gems cut with many distinct
sides. The greater the number of sides, or parts, defined by relationships, the more
70
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brilliant the form, the greater the craft and skill of the person. Personal qualities are
relative to context rather than descriptive of a persistent and consistent quality or
essence.”72 As one can see, for Samoans, the personality of a person derives its meaning
as well as its notion as a person only in relation to members of the society. What this
suggests is the ever flexible and shifting notion of personhood (but always based on
relations) as one forms relations with other members under various contexts even within
one’s own community.
Indeed, for instance, most cultures in Asia view individual-self only within the
context of one’s relatedness to others in the community, as opposed to individual-centric
societies, where the individual personality maintains a separate self apart from others and
thereby seeks to focus on one’s inner attributes.73 For instance, the Chinese word for
man, jen, signifies not the individual-self, but rather it evinces a person’s conducts and
interactions with respect to other members of society. Thus, for Chinese to say of a
person, “he is not a jen (t’a pu shih jen),” does not mean a person is not a human
being/man, instead they mean a person’s behavior, in respect to other human beings
(jens) of his society, is not acceptable.74 Jen highlights not only the importance of
interpersonal relationship, but also harmony among persons’ (jens’) conduct in respect to
other members. In other words, the personality of a person comes into meaningful
existence only in contextual relations with others. This stands in contrast to the western
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concept of individual, where a personal self is seen as an entity standing outside of
society and others. Hence, in collective societies, the notion of what is good or bad is the
product of culture rather than something universally given;75 or as one Chinese proverb
says: “Man is born good; but his nature is changed by association.”76
What has been reasoned so far in is not about language, but how one’s views
about the world are influenced by one’s social, historical, or cultural circumstances, and
how the language one speaks ultimately reflects one’s views. The point here is to
explicate why it is essential to properly understand societies, especially pertaining to
development or any other social query, for societies think differently, and this difference
in thinking is reflected in the language one speaks since languages elucidate, represent
societies’ world views. In other words, what constitutes, according to Hans-Georg
Gadamer, as human knowledge or understanding is invariably contingent on society’s
cultural circumstances; they are neither independent of society nor culture.77 Indeed, how
can societies who think differently ever harmoniously embrace alien (noun-based) ideas
or concepts—such as development, modernity, civilization, progress—that have no
equivalence, i.e. do not even exist, in verb-based traditional societies. In light of such
polyphonic views, it is even more illusory to go on imposing or proselytizing concepts—
such as, modern development and progress—as if they are universally valid. Moreover,
how could societies highlighting communal identity make sense of concepts—primacy of
economic-man, individual initiatives, self-interests—proselytized by individualistic
societies. Put differently, how could modern development stressing the importance of
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individual initiatives, i.e. Social Darwinism, through economic accumulation of material
wealth, competition, efficiency, or “survival of the fittest” attitude make sense to
societies highlighting cooperation, sharing, helping, and communal harmony? It is no
wonder, in order to make alien concept palatable in traditional societies, it becomes
necessary to displace the existing beliefs with new beliefs backed by enticing goodness of
material wealth, which is established as an emblem of universal human right. It is
therefore not surprising for indigenous societies to be devastated in the name of modern
progress—as seen in the previous chapter: transmigration in Indonesia and villagization
in Tanzania. In order to make some alien concepts normal, the old beliefs in traditional
societies have to be abandoned. Then, with new beliefs normalized, they make
concepts—such as development, progress, etc.—or make societies strive to attain
idealized aims of such concepts as a matter of course, as something commonsensical, as
something that always existed, but only brought to light by scientific rationality and
modernity.
What may be a simple straight forward concept, “development,” in one society
may be an alien concept in another or it may require complex interpretations, with
analogous (not homologous) terms being brought in simply to make comprehensible the
term “development.” The following episode may perhaps convey to the reader what is
being reasoned. “[A] judge makes a brief remark and waits while the translator begins a
long oration in an indigenous [i.e. Native American Indians] language. The judge asks in
surprise, “Did I really say that?” The translator replies “Yes,…more or less.” “But,” the
judge will say, “I only spoke a couple of sentences and you went on for about twenty
minutes!” A little later, when asked a question, a native witness will begin a long speech,
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at the end of which the translator may simply report, “The witness says, ‘No’.”78 The
meaning behind this episode being:
What is going on is not simply a matter of moving between two different
languages but of translating between profoundly different worldviews. What to the
judge was a single sentence may have contained words that are related to
concepts, that touch on issues, that are never found within the traditional
indigenous worldview. The translator will have to set the scene, as it were, and
provide the context in which the judge’s brief remarks can be understood.
Likewise, the act of saying no, within some cultures, may depend upon a variety
of factors that are not thought to be relevant in ours (italics added).79
As one can see, interpreting is not as simple as many assumes. Rather it involves
elucidating, interpreting, representing, understanding of complex and subtle cultural traits
supplemented by polyphonic contextual circumstances, which may or may not be present
in the translating language, in order to convey what is being translated. Non-traditional
societies take it for granted the polyphonic worldviews of diverse societies. They simply
assume everybody thinks as they do or ought to think as they do because they are modern
and technologically advanced societies. They assume what they are represents the
emblem of humanity or universal good, something which every society should emulate.
Hence, what for the developed world may seem a concept decked with, to borrow from
Nietzsche, “purple honours” may not be seen in the same light or such concepts may not
even be found in traditional societies.
Certainly, goals and demands evident in the episodes examined in the previous
chapter (transmigration in Indonesia, villagization in Tanzania and goals proposed in the
MDGs), from forced resettlements to standardization of societies, are conceivable
precisely because the diverse rationalities predicated on each society’s unique socio78
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cultural realities are brushed aside. This is why when millions of peoples were moved,
during transmigration and villagization, from their traditional lands and resettled
elsewhere, the technicians of development could not fathom the profound significance of
what traditional lands evinced for the natives. Just as the Hopi, Navajo, Yupik, and
Nuer’s views of the world were based on their land and ecology that rendered their
existence meaningful as society and human beings, the natives in Tanzania and Indonesia
likewise based their views of the world and derived their beliefs, knowledges, and the
whole basis for their existence from the lands they were forcefully removed, in the name
of developmental progress. The technicians could not have and cannot fathom such
significance precisely because they assumed every society thought alike and that every
society, sooner or later, would adhere to one mode of thought. For the natives, however,
their ecology and their lands located within are more than just lands, they signify the very
singularity of their existence, the basis for their moral growth and spiritual uplift, the
basis for their knowledge, their source of comfort, their source of history, their source of
culture. For each native person, the lands, landscapes, trees, stones, ecologies, birds, fish,
and leaves are part of one’s very being and, consequently, one is part of them. There is a
union between the natives and their world in such a way that they become one and the
same. However, for technicians, the natives were ignorant, who had to be sanitized and
brought into the rationalized systems dictated by scientific reasoning, after all, what can
the natives do, in a highly globalized world, with their primitive education based on
superstitions, agricultural practices that destroyed the environment, and backward healing
practices based on magic and myths. Similarly, the standardized objectives set by the
MDGs conveniently discounted the existence of other modes of thought. The goals set by
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the MDGs are good only from the perspective of the developed world and technicians
that created them. They failed to apprehend how the good in one society or from one
perspective may not hold to be so in another.80 This is why the MDGs blanketed
traditional societies with standardized goals and universalized steps to alleviate problems.
Of course, by problems, it means, what the technicians and developed world defines as
problems. And because they define what the problems are, they also set up standardized
steps and goals to remedy the problems. Furthermore, by defining what the problems are,
they implicitly define also what is good or desirable. Certainly, inherent in such thinking
is the assumption that there exists only one mode of thought, scientific rationality,
appropriate for all humanity.
Since societies think differently, polyphonic experiences signify the expression of
this diversity in thoughts. Not only do societies think differently, but what constitutes as
knowledge indissolubly vary, even the manner (method) in which knowledge is acquired
will differ. Meaning: just because what counts as knowledge, in the developed world, is
reserved only for those that utilize scientific reasoning, it does not mean the same method
is used, or valid even, in other traditional societies; or that what constitutes as knowledge
is the same. In fact, even the word knowledge or rationality is a misnomer when
signifying traditional knowledge. Due to traditional world’s views of the world, which
are never frozen, the noun, knowledge, or rationality, freezing and categorizing the word
becomes highly misleading. Instead, like their worldview of constant change, evinced in
their verb-based languages, knowledge, for traditional societies, is something always in
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the acting, experiencing, knowing, processing, participating, understanding, coming into
being, ongoing, sensing, encountering, occurring. The –ing differentiates between
knowledge as something past, stable, or a dead concept, fixed for all time and space, and
knowledge as something always in present, in movement, in flux, in happening, in direct
experiencing. Knowledge for traditional societies is never (i.e. never becomes) fixed or
settled, instead it is an event of unfolding. Of course, even the term polyphonic
knowledge or rationality, utilized in this query to show this diversity, is itself a
misnomer. However, to avoid confusion, this term is, nevertheless, employed. It would be
helpful for the reader to view polyphonic knowledge as something experiencing,
encountering, understanding, ongoing, knowing.
Indeed, for Native American Indians, knowledge is not knowledge as in a fixed
concept (or static noun), but knowledge as in something one is “coming-to-knowing.”81
For Native American Indians, knowledge is always in the acting, of knowing, of
experiencing, of feeling, of participating, of engaging. Because knowledge, in IndoEuropean language, is categorized as a stable noun, it invariably leads knowledge to be
viewed as something fixed. Thence, the concept or categorization-centric nature of the
Indo-European language becomes a fecund aborning ground for scientific rationality.
Indeed, the language itself is tied to the manner in which societies belonging to this
family view the world: they categorized, catalogued, systematized, organized their world.
Consequently, knowledge becomes fixed and hence the emphasis on universally objective
truth or knowledge. In fact, look at the manner in which the term Indian has remained
fixed even to this day to define the identity of Native American nations. In relation to the
81
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outside world, they are not known as the Cree, Mohawk, Blackfeet, Apache, Hopi,
Navajo, and so forth, but as Native/American Indians. The realities of these people were
displaced by erroneous mistake of one European explorer who foolishly thought he
discovered a new route to the land of spices, and referred the people in the new world by
the term, Indians. Or, even take the abstract maps drawn by the colonial empires. The
colonial empires, after pillaging their colonies, left by drawing fixed arbitrary maps on
drawing boards thereby constructing new realities (realities defined by the colonial
empires), by virtue of which actual living local realities were displaced by abstract maps
fixing people (regardless of their tribes or communities) by instructing where they should
live, where everyone must stay put or fit in, i.e. how everyone must abide by the imposed
reality. Yet, the porous boundaries among many of the former colonies, and the
continuous civil wars and ethnic violence perennially defying the fixed abstract
boundaries not only mock the imposed reality of abstract concepts denying cultures their
reality, but also show the adverse consequences of categorizing human societies. Thus, to
insist on the applicability of single rationality or single form of knowledge in every
society is to disregard others’ existing realities. It denies the very humanness of other
societies, as if they were incapable to think, or lead meaningful lives.
Because polyphonic knowledge is that which is experiencing, participating,
understanding, sensing and never of one kind, it becomes essential to understand it in its
polyphonic nature. In other words, there are no strict rules or methods as to how
knowledge is attained. Knowledge, on the other hand, is attained through direct
experiences involving one to sense, feel, perceive events, activities thus occasioning one
to understand the day to day realities of life. The following episode will perhaps illustrate
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the participating, sensing, understanding nature of polyphonic knowledge. James C. Scott
notes of the following episode while doing fieldwork in Malaysia, he recalls:
Growing in the compound of the house in which I lived was a locally famous
mango tree. Shortly, before my arrival, however, the tree had become infested
with large red ants, which destroyed most of the fruit before it could ripen. It
seemed nothing could be done short of bagging each fruit. Several times I noticed
the elderly head of household, Mat Isa, bringing dried nipah palm fronds to the
base of the mango tree and checking them… He knew that small black ants,
which had a number of colonies at the rear of the compound, were the enemies of
large red ants. He also knew that the thin, lancelike leaves of the nipah palm
curled into long, tight tubes when they fell from the tree and died… Such tubes
would also, he knew, be ideal places for the queens of the black ant colonies to
lay their eggs. Over several weeks he placed dried nipah fronds in strategic places
until he had masses of black-ant eggs beginning to hatch. He then placed the egginfested fronds against the mango tree and observed the ensuing week-long
Armageddon. Several neighbors…and their children followed the fortunes of the
ant war closely. Although smaller by half or more, the black ants finally had the
weight of numbers to prevail against the red ants and gain possession of the
ground at the base of the mango tree. As the black ants were not interested in the
mango leaves or fruits while the fruits were still on the tree, the crop was saved.82
The traditional knowledge used in remedying the problem of red ants destroying
the fruits was not through the usage of bio-chemical pesticides or any other modern
scientific insecticides, which only harms the soil. Rather, at their disposal was organic
traditional collected wisdom, attained through the long process of intimate experience
and participation with nature, passed down for generations. Indeed, Mat Isa had no use of
biological or chemical theories, botany, zoology, agronomy, entomology, pomology; nor
did he carry out experiments to see if his traditional knowledge concurred with his
empirical experiences; nor did he measure using sophisticated scientific instruments; nor
did he concisely outlined his theory or hypothesis; nor did he follow any scientific
methodologies; nor did he lay out his falsification criteria for his experiences; nor did he
82
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use statistical measurements to see if what he experienced was statistically significant;
nor did he apply for grants in order to study how to remedy the problem; nor did he
employ opinion or survey polls, like social scientists, to give an air of science to validate
his experiences. All Mat Isa did was to understand the nature of black and red ants by
participating and sensing, knowledge that, no doubt, has been passed down for
generations, by keeping in mind the context of his local ecology. As Scott notes of this
episode:
This successful field experiment in biological controls presupposes several kinds
of knowledge: the habitat and diet of black ants, their egg-laying habits, a guess
about what local material would substitute as movable egg chambers, and
experience with the fighting proclivities of red and black ants. Mat Isa made it
clear that such skill in practical entomology was quite widespread, at least among
his older neighbors… What is clear to me is that…[i]t is hard to imagine this
knowledge except in the context of lifelong observation and a relatively stable,
multigenerational community that routinely exchanges and preserves knowledge
of this kind.83
Just because polyphonic knowledge of traditional societies does not utilize
scientific methods, it does not invalidate the reality that the community was able to rid
the red ants from destroying their crop. Moreover, even the means utilized to remedy the
problem was not modern scientific insecticides or pesticides (which are more harmful for
the soil). Instead the problem was remedied using local, organic, or natural techniques:
black ants and dried leaves. In other words, nature or the local milieu provided Mat Isa’s
society with enough knowledge and organic (natural) apparatus to remedy any local
societal problems.
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Similarly, the Native Indians in South America knew that chewing the bark of
cinchona tree was an effective means to cure malaria.84 Or native societies in Africa
knew how to avoid malaria within their community simply by living in small groups in
high and dry land over large areas.85 Also, modern science boasts about the fact that it
discovered vitamin C. But evidence reveals native societies were already aware of such
knowledge. Native Indians in North America, for instance, already had knowledge on
how to cure scurvy, a malady caused due to deficiency in Vitamin C, while the white
mariners were dying of scurvy not knowing how to cure the disease. The first recorded
cure of this disease was made in Canada. The native Indians in Canada taught British
soldiers, who were dying in the thousands, to use tea made from the shoots of the spruce
tree to cure scurvy.86 What is more, Masai, the Eastern Africa tribe, is reported to have
known the carrier of malaria: mosquitoes. They also knew how to prevent serious
spirochetal infections, caused by syphilis, by exposing those infected with syphilis to
malaria, thereby preventing further infections.87 The Aboriginals in Australia, the Central
African tribes, and indigenous societies in South America, used clay, i.e. kaolin
(aluminum silicate) for treating allergies and other serious digestive maladies. This
knowledge is well known among many traditional societies all over the world. Persons
within these societies always carried balls of clay which they tipped into their foods and
drinks before consuming. Modern science latter found the clay (kaolin) helped prevent
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serious digestive ailments, other bacterial infections of the gut, and even help in
remedying allergies.88
Moreover, traditional societies also knew how best to utilize their ecologies to
attain their wherewithal everyday essentials: such as crops, agriculture, etc. The
polycroppings, shifting cultivation, and so forth (thoroughly discussed in the previous
chapter) were based on the conditions of their local ecology. Such practices had
generations of careful observation, participation, and understanding of local
environments; they weren’t just primitive, mythical agricultural practices. Traditional
societies understood how to preserve nutrients and fertilities of the soil, how to regenerate
forests, protect against erosions, insects. They were also well aware of their local
conditions: climate, ecology, types of soil, as well as types of vegetables, fruits, and
plants best suited to their needs and conditions. Knowledge of traditional societies is
based on generations of careful observation and direct experience and, as Scott maintains,
“no research scientist can hope to duplicate (italics added)” such local experiences; yet,
more importantly, because lives of their families directly depend on the outcome of their
experience and knowledge, it would be thoughtless to consign this knowledge as myths.89
As Howard reasons, “The approach to…farming must be made from the field, not from
the laboratory… The views of the peasantry in all countries are worthy of respect; there is
always good reason for their practices; in matters like the cultivation of mixed crops they
themselves are still the pioneers.”90 Indeed, local farmers are continuously in close
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interaction with their ecology, soil, climate, etc. affording intimate understanding on
seeding, planting, harvesting, soil preparation, and so forth.
The point behind these episodes is: traditional societies did not carry out
experiments using scientific methodologies to remedy against malaria, scurvy, syphilis,
soil erosions, etc. Instead their collected wisdom, passed down for hundreds of
generations, taught them how to care for the well-being of their society: be it natural
(crops, soil, etc.) or physical (health). Does this mean traditional rationalities not adhering
to scientific reasoning are, therefore, unsound or mythic, even though they provide cure
against diseases and help preserve crops? Of course, the answer is No. To assume every
kind of knowledge must be attained through one means, i.e. scientifically, is to assume
every society thinks alike. Polyphonic rationality of indigenous societies is scorned for its
unscientific nature because any form of knowledge procured independent of scientific
methods, instruments, doctrines and not codified in formal scientific theories is dismissed
as superstition, myth, supernatural, etc. More importantly, polyphonic knowledge is
denigrated precisely because it undermines the religious like catechisms of the
academics, technical experts, specialists and their institutions. Certainly, what use is there
for the academics, expert technicians, specialists if they don’t flaunt their inept technical
skills to the primitive societies, skills that are of no relevance, whatsoever, to the realities
of the traditional world?
Indeed, the demands made in the MDGs (uniform agricultural practices,
education, health concerns, diseases, etc.) and standardized agricultural practices cajoled
in Tanzania show how different rationalities are eviscerated, thereby disregarding
polyphonic knowledge that hitherto sustained traditional societies. The uniform
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agricultural practices proselytized, by the MDGs (and utilized in Tanzania), using
machineries, pesticides, insecticides, scientifically or genetically enhanced seeds,
monocroppings, etc. in the long run deprive soil of its fertility and essential nutrients.
Traditional societies have for centuries, if not for thousands of years, utilized their
accumulated wisdom to developed a system of agricultural practices best suited to meet
the demands of their ecological milieu. Yet, such realities were discounted by technicians
under the justification that native societies’ practices were backward and primitive.
Moreover, by dismissing polyphonic accumulated knowledge of societies in favor of
scientific rationality, technical experts viewed with contempt anything not modern or that
which is not a product of scientific rationality. As such, traditional ways of healing and
curing are ridiculed and stigmatized as irrational superstitions and magic. In other words,
principal of one mode of thought, scientific rationality, makes everything that has been
done prior to modernity appear backward and primitive, i.e. incorrect. This is vividly
illustrated by the manner in which the MDGs, transmigration, villagization, and
development scholarships make it appear as though it is only through scientific reasoning
and modern technology that diseases are cured, environments protected, agricultural
yields increased, societies enlightened or educated in the right fashion, status of women
elevated, and so forth. When existing knowledge of societies is decried, it not only
undermines societies’ foundations but it also leaves societies helpless to care for
themselves. For instance, by removing local peasants, in Tanzania during the compulsory
villagization, from their local milieu and imposing on them standardized agricultural
practices in order to increase the country’s agricultural output, the agricultural yields
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actual decreased.91 This was augmented by the fact that peasants who hitherto knew well
about farming—where to farm, what crops to plant, how to prepare the soil, how to retain
soil fertility and nutrients, how to read the soil and weather conditions, and so forth—
within their local ecology were left as mendicants dependent on state for assistances
because they were thrown out from their environment (where they were not only
competent, but were also proficient in what they did) and resettled in a new ecological
milieu utterly alien to them.92 Hence, to dismiss diverse modes of thinking, of living, of
knowledge is to ignore societies’ realities.
Diversity undeniably makes each society think differently or retain for itself
modes of thought relevant within its socio-cultural contexts. Given the diversity among
societies, it makes very little sense for every society, irrespective of its contexts, to
adhere to one universal mode of thought applicable for all place and time. Thus, the ways
in which each society thinks will vary inextricably. And each mode of thought, i.e.
polyphonic rationality, is valid within the contexts of its society. Besides, just because
societies do not adhere to scientific rationality, it does not mean their modes of thought
are nonsensical. Ultimately, what constitutes as rational will depend on societies’ cultural
experiences. The pacific island societies, for instance, believe the sun revolves around the
earth. Certainly, this belief of theirs is not justified by myths; rather, it is thought through
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rationally and even substantiated empirically by their lived experiences. As one pacific
island navigator reasons:
I am aware of the foreigner’s claim that the earth moves and the sun stands still,
as someone told us; but this we cannot believe, for how else could it happen that
in the morning and evening the sun burns less hot than in the day? It must be
because the sun has been cooled when it emerges from the water and when toward
setting it again approaches the water. And furthermore, how can it be possible that
the sun remains still when we are yet able to observe that in the course of the year
it changes its position in relation to the stars?93
It is understandable why the island navigator thinks it is rational for him to
believe in his knowledge about the sun revolving the earth. This is because he (along with
other members of his society, since time immemorial) has used this celestial navigation to
sail across vast open oceans and this rationality/knowledge of his is further substantiated
by his lived experiences: sailing across vast open oceans navigating from one tiny island
to another, that are sometimes hundreds of miles apart, in their small canoes.94 “However
wrong from our point of view,” Goodenough reasons, “his belief was well considered and
quite adequate to his needs. We can understand in the light of his reasoning and
experience why he considered it foolish to accept a foreigner’s belief that seemed so
thoroughly contradicted by the fact.”95 Indeed, from the view of the native navigator, how
can the fact—the sun moving across the sky, the change in the sun’s relative position to
stars, the navigator navigating with the aid of the stars’ positions—confirmed by his
experience—using the facts to sail hundreds of miles of open seas to tiny islands in his
small canoe boat—be incorrect. For him, his reasoning is sound, while the foreigner’s
rationality or belief is unsound. Tyco Brahe, Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, not even
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Ptolemy, are of any relevance pertaining to this native navigator’s sense of truth, after all,
who can blame him for holding on to his rationality since his knowledge is verified by his
experiences. No society has the right nor the duty to deprive him (or his society) of his
truth that affords meaning and purpose to his life. Let him live the life that makes sense to
him.
Traditional societies hold their wisdom, belief, knowledge to be true not because
their myths tell them to, nor out of blind faith, but because their knowledge is based on
actual lived experiences (and surely not based on academics, technical experts’ journal
articles, books, statistics, hypotheses, theories, etc.). Because societies are bound to think
differently, even the manner in which knowledge is attained will equally be polyphonic in
nature and equally valid. The Beaver Indians, a hunting people, in Northern Canada, for
instance, highly emphasize the issue of truth since their society’s survival depends on it.
As Brody reasons, “Precision and accuracy in all aspects of land use have obviously been
integral to survival. It is not surprising, therefore, that among the Inuit, Beaver, and many
other hunting peoples, there is great hostility towards any unreliability about resourceharvesting activities. It is striking that in some hunting peoples’ languages there is no
very clear distinction between making an error in judgement and telling a lie. In a society
where information about the land and its animals can make the difference between life
and death, there cannot be much tolerance for errors of judgement (italics added).”96
Given the essentiality of truth—how to track animals, where to and how to spot them,
how to set traps, the food animals eat, their behaviors, predilections, which animals to be
trapped, knowledge of their landscapes, weather, ecology, and so forth—for the survival
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of their entire community, it is highly imprudent to simply dismiss their beliefs,
knowledge, or truths as myths or product of unscientific thoughts with no real basis.
Also take, for instance, the Trukese in Micronesia. They believe elephantiasis is
caused by malevolent spirits. “They [evil spirits] are especially active at dawn and dusk,
when they are said to rise from the ground and bite human beings, thereby making them
ill. People are warned not to go to work in their taro patches before the sun is well up and
to stop working before the sun gets too low.”97 From the stand point of scientific
rationality, this belief of Trukese may be dismissed and viewed as another traditional
myths (as far as most social science definitions go) affording native societies to deal with
phenomena beyond their control. Yet, this belief or myth of theirs is based on rationally
sound judgments and, as one will see, for very good reasons. Certainly, from scientific
point of view, this belief is false, after all, how could malevolent spirits cause
elephantiasis. However, “Empirically, it would seem, the ancestors of these people have
learned to associate elephantiasis with swampy ground, especially at dawn and dusk,
when mosquitoes, which actually carry filarial, the responsible parasite, are especially
active. By staying away from such places at these times people minimize their exposure
to filarial infection, thus lowering their chances of…infection.”98 One can see natives’
beliefs or truths are not mythical; rather their beliefs are based on sound rationality within
the context of their own society. It also demonstrates how every society or culture thinks
differently/polyphonically. Furthermore, what the outsiders identify traditional truths as
myths are not some fantastic stories or magic made up to control or deal with phenomena
beyond one’s control, but instead these myths are always based on sound reasoning and
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based on lived experiences containing within themselves lessons or knowledge—
pertaining to health, food, caring, sympathy, cooperation, crops, responsibility towards
each other and towards nature, etc.—for present society as well as for its posterities.99 Of
course, for traditional societies, their truths aren’t myths, nor are they known or identified
as myths; rather they are recognized as collected wisdom/knowledge. In many ways, the
term myth and its pejorative tone is a modern construction to downplay polyphonic
knowledge of traditional societies.
The polyphonic modes of thought may surely seem non-linear, unsystematic,
irrational, unscientific, even silly and something to be laughed at, yet, for traditional
societies, their modes of thought are not only sound, but are also based on their
existential realities. Their mode of thinking makes sense to them, it affords them to make
sense of their world as well as their place in it, even if it may seem abnormal to outsiders.
Consider, for instance, decision making process of Athapaskan Indians in Northern
Canada. Brody describes how decisions are made by taking into account the multifaceted
relational elements that pervade daily existences:
To make a good, wise, sensible hunting choice is to accept the interconnection of
all possible factors, and avoids the mistake of seeking rationally to focus on any
‘Myths’ are in many ways a misnomer of what one might identify as wisdom or
knowledge of diverse societies. ‘Myths’ are not magic or supernatural, instead they are in
fact knowledge that aids societies to deal with everyday practical realities and are always
based on direct lived experiences, i.e. ‘myths’ are knowledges, truths passed on for
generations based on actual lived experiences of society. Vide, Deloria, The World We
Used to Live In; Paul Radin, The World of Primitive Man (New York: Grove Press,
1953); David Suzuki, and Peter Knudtson, Wisdom of the Elders (Bantam, 1993);
Graham Hancock, Supernatural: Meetings with the Ancient Teachers of Mankind (New
York, NY: Disinformation Books, 2007); Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966); and Melissa K. Nelson, Original
Instructions (Bear & Company, 2008). Also see, Brody, Maps and Dreams; Cajete,
Native Science; Peat, Blackfoot Physics; Goodenough, Cooperation in Change; and
Deloria, The Metaphysics of Modern Existence.
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one consideration that is held as primary. What is more, the decision is taken in
the doing: there is no step or pause between theory and practice. As a
consequence, the decision—like the action from which it is inseparable—is
always alterable (and therefore may not properly even be termed a decision). The
hunter moves in a chosen direction; but, highly sensitive to so many shifting
considerations, he is always ready to change his directions (italics added).100
The Athapaskan’s decision making process may not even be seen as decision by
the standards of scientific rationality. And indeed, Athapaskans emphasize not only
avoiding the mistake of rationally focusing on one isolated element, but also emphasize
non-delineation between theory and practice, the alterability of decisions, decisions taken
during the process/encountering, and always being prepared to change. All of these
emphases violate the standards of scientific rationality that proselytize isolation of
primary variables, fixation over one factor, preoccupy with their predetermined course of
actions, fixed methodologies, and separation between theory and practice. Still, for
Athapaskans, their rationality or decisions is based on fluid realities of the world, no
events remain fixed, change is always present, the spirits of the forests or animals may
not be in the mood to help the hunting expeditions, and so forth. Athapaskans always take
into account the constant vicissitudes of reality. They neither put under bracket, nor put
under the term ceteris paribus, i.e. other things being equal, the numerous flux aspects of
reality that nevertheless sway everyday happenings. Does this mean the Athapaskan does
not know how to think and so, they must be taught how to think or to think in the right
manner, scientific rationality? Of course, the answer is No. The Athapaskan Indians have
their own mode of thought. As Brody verily explains, “The hunter, alive to constant
movements of nature, spirits, and human moods, maintains a way of doing things that
repudiates a firm plan and any precise or specific understanding with others of what he
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is going to do. His course of action is not, must not be, a matter of predetermination
(italics added).”101 Following such rationality, Athapaskans have survived for thousands
of years. If their mode of thoughts was abnormal or superstitious, then, how could they
have endured or survived for so long?
Surely, one would have imagined, since Athapaskans’ life depends on hunting,
they would have meticulously planned for days coming up with systematic organized
schemes for their hunting expeditions. However, such is not the case. Instead, the
unfolding of hunting expeditions usually involves blasé talks about issues that have
nothing whatever to do with hunting, they wait to see how they feel, sense one’s moods,
check the weather, debate the rightness of time for the hunt, wait to see how things turn
out, no planning, no methods, no preparations, occasionally there will be talks about
where they might (if conditions are right or if they feel like it) go for the hunt or whether
or not to abandon hunting and instead go fishing, or whether it would be better to
abandon the expedition altogether, and so forth. As Brody notes: “A number of
individuals agree that they will go [hunting]. But come morning, nothing is ready. No one
has made any practical, formal plans. As often as not—indeed, more often than not—
something quite new has drifted into conversations, other predictions have been
tentatively reached, a new consensus appears to be forming. As it often seems, everyone
has changed his mind.”102 To an outsider, this would no doubt seem vexing, chaotic even,
but for Athapaskans, this only feels right and makes sense. “The way to understand,”
Brody says, “this kind of decision making, as also to live by and even share it, is to
recognize that some of the most important variables are subtle, elusive, and extremely
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hard or impossible to assess with finality.”103 Athapaskans certainly seem to grasp the
fluid nature of the world, where various aspects of everyday realities are open to
vicissitudes and powers beyond one’s predictions.
Consider also the traditional navigation skills of the Bugis seafaring society in the
Flores Sea. The Bugis’ navigation skills were developed prior to the invention of
magnetic compass, sonar, sextants, etc. As Gene Ammarell shows the navigation skills of
the Bugis, developed within the context of their society and ecology, to be remarkably
accurate.104 In the absence of scientific instruments, the Bugis utilized natural
surroundings and astronomical phenomena to navigate through the Flores Sea. For
instance, the Bugis sea captains rarely, if ever, use a navigational compass, charts, or
maps. These Navigators navigate using stars, waves, and wind. By looking at the clouds,
the Bugis can tell changes in the direction and strength of the winds, changes in tides,
currents, etc.; they can also tell by the movement of the clouds whether to expect rain as
well as convey strength and direction of the winds. Even by looking at the colour of
rainbows and types of birds flying above, the Bugis can tell of impending rain and wind.
They use astronomical phenomena to predict the coming east and west monsoons.
Indeed, an experienced Bugis sea captain can tell the direction and course of the wind by
feeling the wind on their ears and even when fast asleep, they are awoken the minute
there is a change in currents, winds, directions of the ship, weather, etc. Moreover, the
Bugis navigators keep their ships in the desired course by feeling the motion of their
ships. They can tell by looking at the waves the water currents, direction of the wind, and
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even warn them of reefs and shallows. The navigators identify landfalls by type of
clouds, birds, reefs, fishes, and dolphins. They can even tell by the movement of their
ships whether they are over reefs. Sometimes, even by the smell of the water as well as
by waves and surface turbulence, the Bugis can tell whether they are approaching or
passing over reefs. Even the course and wind directions provided by Bugis sea captains
based on sensing and feeling seemed to be more accurate than those provided by a
magnetic compass.105
What is remarkable about the Bugis’ navigation skills is, this knowledge is
learned orally, where one learns the navigation skills by participating and doing that
occasions one to directly experience the realities involved in navigation: how to steer the
ship, read and follow the stars, avoid reefs, avoid shallow waters, rocks; identify wind, its
directions; how to tell change in water currents, waves; identify clouds to forecast any
impending rains or change in winds, currents, tidal waves and so on.106 Most of these
skills are learned by experiencing first hand: by sensing and feeling (the waves, stars,
wind, currents, reefs, clouds, rain, tides, even birds and fishes), but this does not mean
their knowledge and mode of thinking is incorrect or mythical. Using these skills, the
Bugis have sustained for centuries, after all, they are dependent on their navigation skills
for their survival: trading, carrying cargoes and hopping from island to island. There must
be and is verity in the Bugis’ mode of thoughts. This is substantiated by their lived
experience: the fact that they have used their knowledge to navigate from island to island
in the open sea trading and carrying cargoes to be traded for hundreds, if not thousands,
of years. Hence, it makes little sense to dismiss these modes of thought simply because
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they do not adhere to the catechism of scientific rationality, as if it were the only mode of
thought preordained for entire humanity.
Furthermore, because societies think differently, it is only proper for there to exist
rationalities which can only be understood or made sense through feeling, experiencing,
sensing. Take, for instance, the BaMbuti people in Congo. BaMbuti, Turnbull notes,
believe the forest to be good. BaMbuti say the forest is their father and mother, and like
any good parents they provide food, shelter, warmth, affection, clothing, and love to their
children (i.e. the BaMbuti, plants, insects, animals, birds). However, when something
goes bad in their community—illness, death, or bad hunting trips—they reason the forest
must be unhappy and must therefore be made happy again. They perform a ceremony
called Molimo. Molimo is itself a musical instrument used during the ceremony. There
the BaMbuti blow the instrument making sounds—of animals and birds—heard
throughout the forest. The BaMbuti believe in performing the ceremony, the forest is
made happy; thereby, everything returns to being good and people will not get sick, or
have bad hunting trips.107
Turnbull trying to grasp the significance behind this ceremony is helped by one of
the elders, one Moke, whose statement is a glaring example of understanding through
feeling, sensing, participating (something which cannot be put to words): Moke remarks
to Turnbull, “You will soon see things of which you have never heard, and which you
have never seen. Then you will understand things that I can never tell you.”108 The elder
is trying to show Turnbull, the meaning and significances behind the ceremony can be
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understood only through shared experiencing, participating, engaging, performing. It will
make sense within the contexts (how they feel, think, sense, see, etc.) and wholeness of
their society. Indeed, this way of understanding may perhaps be more in harmony with
realities of the world than to understand in a scientific manner. As Turnbull notes his
realization, thusly:
One night in particular will always live for me, because that night I think I learned
just how far we civilized human beings have drifted from reality… Just before
going to sleep…I heard a curious noise from the nearby children’s bopi
[playground]… There, in the tiny clearing, splashed with silver, was the
sophisticated Kenge [Turnbull’s BaMbuti guide], clad in bark cloth, adorned with
leaves, with a flower stuck in his hair… I came into the clearing and asked,
jokingly, why he was dancing alone. He stopped, turned slowly around and
looked at me as though I was the biggest fool he had ever seen… “But I’m not
dancing alone,” he said. “I am dancing with the forest, dancing with the moon.”
Then, with the utmost unconcern, he ignored me and continued his dance of love
and life.109
Indeed, Turnbull’s latter realization illustrates the ceremony cannot be understood
in isolation or by itself independent of everyday realities, rather it must be understood in
its totality, wholeness with everything that goes on in the society: in hunting, in picking
berries, in searching for honeycombs, in singing and talking to the forest, in laughter, in
celebration, in dancing with the moon and forest, in teaching their children, in their
beliefs, in their views of the world. Because BaMbuti do not isolate nor categorize their
world, a ceremony, an act, an experience, an event, a happening cannot be understood in
isolation. This way every act, experience, event is part of everything that exists in the
world, thereby signifying the harmonious interrelatedness of each with each other.
BaMbuti’s way of thinking and understanding the world surely seems to be in tangent
with scientific ways of thinking, however, this does not mean BaMbuti’s mode of
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thoughts is primitive, backward, or animistic. Their mode of thoughts makes sense to
them; after all, the forest provides food, shelter, warmth, love, care, cloth, meaning,
purpose all of which are important for any meaningful society. Thus, they have every
reason to think as they do and even celebrate, talk, dance, sing to the forest. Hence, one
who is unaware of contexts and ways of society (such as wholeness of events) can hardly
understand the profound significance behind a ceremony or an experience. Thus, one will
find numerous academics, from the developed world, observing an event in isolation and
without understanding societal contexts, label traditional ceremonies as mythical rituals,
witchcraft, supernatural, and magic.
To assume, there is only one mode of thought valid for all humanity means
discarding the rest, irrespective of their relevance to other societies. By this standard,
even Eskimos’ mode of thought will make no sense at all to the scientific minds. In the
Eskimo language, for instance, as Franz Boas notes, “the words…are born on the tongue
on the spur of the moment. Where we [English language] possess finished, fully
developed words or phrase, the Eskimo create new combinations specially formed to
meet the claim of every situation (italics added).”110 Just because Eskimos create new
words to meet the circumstances of their day to day experiences, it does not mean they
cannot think properly, or that their mode of thoughts is primitive. Given their ecological
circumstances in which they navigate, it is only proper for them to generate words to
describe the aborning novel conditions. There is no point using terms that cannot properly
describe what has been experienced or is being experienced. Indeed, due to the hazardous
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conditions in which they live, precision in conveying the experience or what was
experienced will make all the difference (now and in the future) between life and death—
as they go hunting or perform other daily activities. In such a society, to assume
everything or word has a fixed meaning is to court disaster. Still, just because Eskimos
think differently, as illustrated by word creation in their language, it does not mean their
mode of thought is any less valid. It is because their mode of thought is valid, within the
context of their society, they have lived and sustained for hundreds, if not thousands, of
years. Moreover, to impose alien modes of thought oblivious to Eskimos’ realities will
only spell calamity and ruination.
Even if one were to acquiesce to the conviction of scientific rationality being the
only mode of thought universally applicable in every human society and societies not
adhering to this mode of thought to be brought or shown the correct way of thinking
thereby integrating them into civilization through modern developmental progress, then
how could one explain societies going out of their way to stay away from any civilizing
process: progress, development, modernity, nation-state, etc. Consider the Zomia, for
instance. Stretching from Northeastern India to the Central Highlands of Vietnam, and
traversing five Southeast Asian countries—Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and
Vietnam—and four provinces in Southern China, James C. Scott veraciously shows how
the Zomia have been deliberately moving away from civilizing process.111 The Zomia or
the hill societies, Scott argues, have been, for over the course of two millennia, fleeing
any civilizing process—slavery, warfare, tax, epidemic, corvée labor, nation-state, etc.
These hill societies are culturally and linguistically diverse. In fact, the porous nature of
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these societies makes any fixed identity futile, for they reformulate themselves, their
identity, kin-groups, and the whole community in order to stay as far from any fixed
stable state-forming or civilizing process. These societies resist any forms of effort to be
brought under the rule of any civilizing state. Because the Zomia are highly mobile, they
value freedom of movement, mobility, and base the lives of their society on hunting,
gathering, foraging, swidden or slash-and-burn agriculture. This, of course, means they
are egalitarian societies with common property land-tenure system with equal access to
open frontier lands—indeed, this idea goes against any civilizing process that emphasizes
individual property rights. The Zomia isolate themselves by living in remote areas
beyond the vicinity of civilizing-states, thereby rendering any form of outside governing
inefficacious. Curiously, these societies have not developed any durable state-like
hierarchical structures, thus freeing themselves of the inconvenience to form (any modes
of) government.112 This does not mean there is only chaos, disorder within these
societies, rather they are self-governing kinship units based on cooperation and
consensus113 (of course, this does not mean they are democratic, which most
contemporary academics, experts, specialists have the tendency to instantaneously and
habitually label anything that is self-governing, consensual, cooperation as democratic, as
though democracy—and even the word itself and its meaning—is something universal).
Certainly, this is not out of the ordinary because many traditional societies “do not have a
chief or headman at all, but are governed by a council of elders or family heads. It is
common to find leadership roles in different activities in the same society calling for
quite different persons and offices. The adjudicator of disputes is not likely to be the
112
113

Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed.
Ibid.

279
leader in war, for example.”114 What is more, their oral cultures afford them to delineate
themselves from the civilized society. Their oral traditions, however, do not mean they
believe in myths, rather the oral culture enables them to interpret experiences within the
current contexts of their society: current interests, current relations with their neighbors,
kin groups, etc.115
Does this thinking (staying away from civilizing process, foraging, hunting,
swiddening, oral culture, porous/flexible identity, absence of any forms of government,
etc.) of the Zomia make them raw, primitive, nescient? The answer is No. The Zomia’s
modes of thought are the manifestation of polyphonic rationality grounded on their lived
realities. Not only is there verity in their modes of thought, but they also have the
paramount responsibility to be confident in the rightness, in the truth of their thought
within the contexts of their society.
Inherent in the developed world’s insistence on scientific rationality and how,
once this has been embraced, it would afford traditional societies to progress is the,
implicit and explicit, assumption that inevitably there is only one universal mode of
thought, which each society invariably has to realize, and modern developmental
progress—bolstered by market rationalities, scientific managements and productions,
individual initiatives, competitions, private properties, wealth accumulations, market
efficiencies, etc.—is inevitable, inevitable because scientific rationality is universal.
Nevertheless, reality seems to suggest otherwise. Since societies think differently, there is
bound to be divergent beliefs on knowledge, property, societal activities, and so on. For
instance, in Melanesian societies, producing and acquiring wealth is done to fulfill social
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obligations, responsibilities, or to underwrite big festivals, the realization of which leaves
the underwriter materially impoverished, but at the same time gains in social standing
and respect; while in the Gilbert Islands, as soon as someone accumulate material goods,
the person voluntarily shares them with other members of the society; or take the Trukese
notion of property, where, for instance, the plot of land is owned by one person, the tree
by another, the territory by yet another person, and so forth.116 Similarly, the Kaoka of
Solomon Island, the Trobriands and Kapauku of Papua New Guinea, see accumulation of
wealth only for the purposes to share it or give it away to less fortunate members, and
also to provide lavish festivals and feasts.117
Consider also the following episode from Tonga, as illustrated by one of Captain
Cook’s crew member, William Mariner. Upon arrival on the Island, the crew traded with
the natives, but in this midst, there arose the natives’ bafflement over the concept of
money and its value, which they could not fathom. As Mariner explained to chief Finow
what money and its value meant (for the Europeans, or as the Tongans called them,
‘Papalangis’), Mariner notes the subsequent reaction of the chief:
Finow replied that the explanation did not satisfy him; he still thought it a foolish
thing that people should place a value on money, when they either could not or
would not apply it to any useful (physical) purpose. ‘If,’ said he, ‘it were made of
iron, and could be converted into knives, axes and chisels, there would be some
sense in placing a value on it; but as it is, I see none. If a man,’ he added, ‘has
more yams than he wants, let him exchange some of them away for pork or
gnatoo [i.e. cava root]. Certainly money is much handier, and more convenient,
but then, as it will not spoil by being kept, people will store it up, instead of
sharing it out, as a chief ought to do, and thus become selfish; whereas, if
provisions were the principal property of man, and it ought to be, as being both
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the most useful and the most necessary, he could not store it up, for it would spoil,
and so he would be obliged either to exchange it away for something else useful,
or share it with his neighbors, and inferior chiefs and dependents, for nothing.’ He
concluded by saying ‘I understand now very well what it is that makes the
Papalangis so selfish—it is this money!’118
For Finow, material accumulation is desirable only in so far as the one who
accumulates shares and helps those less fortunate than oneself. Furthermore, the concept
of money and its value makes very little sense to Finow, and from the context of his
society rightly so, because what is the use of some abstract concept or entity that cannot
be put into actual purposeful physical use (knives, axes, chisels all of which can be
utilized to gather wood, make huts, boats, hunt, fish, etc.) for society’s benefit. Finow
also makes another key observation: he realizes that because money is inorganic, as it
were, it does not spoil or rot, so instead of sharing, one stores it, accumulates it and this,
says Finow, leads to selfishness like the Europeans. However, for Finow, because
essential provisions—which are also and ought to be, according to Finow, the “principal
property of man”— are perishable and hence susceptible to decomposition, it affords one
to share with other members of the society; this way the needy are cared for.
Tongans do not see the primacy of material wealth because for them societal
harmony and egalitarianism is much more essential in nourishing a community: affording
meaningful purpose to their lives. Indeed, the words of Finow are a damming negation
not just of the idea of the universality of one mode of thought, but also of the universality
of capitalism and materialism.119 Certainly, Finow has not heard of Marx (or any of
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Marx’s intellectual predecessors and contemporaries: Henri de Saint-Simon, Fourier,
Hegel, Feuerbach, Engels), nevertheless, his analysis is much livelier than Marx’s (or any
of his predecessors or posterities) critique—in Finow’s analysis, he, at least, retains the
principal of the organic person. As Finow reasons, material benefits ought not to take
precedent over society’s needs, for ultimately what sustains a person are not material
goods but society. Differently put, Tongans, like most traditional societies, see the
importance of communal harmony and not leaving other members helplessly on their
own. For them, society and its members are important, are meaningful; each has its
human dignity, and everyone is cared for. It is the collective well-being of one’s society
that precedes over any other needs and certainly over any abstract concepts (such as
money, scientific rationality, etc.). The superfluousness of money or accumulation of
material wealth for the Tongans is only proper because it reflects their world view.
Therefore, it is only appropriate for them to be indifferent to money, material goods or
wealth.
Indeed, Tongans aren’t the only ones to hold such antipode views. This is what
Lorna Marshall, for instance, had to say about the !Kung of Kalahari apropos to their
material needs (i.e. non-subsistence needs):
As the !Kung come [sic] into more contact with Europeans…they will feel
sharply the lack of our things and will need and want more. It makes them feel
inferior to be without clothes when they stand among strangers who are clothed.
But in their own life and with their own artifacts they were comparatively free
from material pressure…for every man can and does make the things that men
make and every woman the things that women make… They lived in a kind of
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material plenty because they adapted the tools of their living to materials which
lay in abundance around them and which were free for anyone to take… With
plenty of most materials at hand to replace artifacts as required, the !Kung have
not developed means of permanent storage and have not needed or wanted to
encumber themselves with surpluses or duplicates. They do not even want to
carry one of everything. They borrow what they do not own. With this ease, they
have not hoarded, and the accumulation of objects has not become associated
with status (italics added).120
As one can see from the above statement, lack of one or the other material
possessions becomes more apparent only in comparison with, in this case, the materially
wealthy Europeans. However, on their own, the !Kung are not deprived of any material
things essential for their daily societal activities, since the tools and materials are, as
Marshall notes, always laying in “abundance around them…which are free for anyone to
take,” thereby they are “free from material pressure.” If they require anything which they
do not possess, they could with ease borrow from other members. Hence, they never had
to hoard or accumulate materials beyond that which are absolutely essential to their
everyday existence. What is more, the !Kung consider material possession burdensome
as, they have the good sense to recognize, it interferes with their daily existences. The
!Kung, like most traditional societies, value movement, motion, freedom; material
possessions, on the other hand, only serve as a cumbersome burden to their freedom of
movement. Thus, Sahlins was right to reason, “Mobility and property are in
contradiction.”121 These are further vindicated by James Scott who has, most astutely,
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shown how, in an effort to preserve their autonomy of movement, societies (such as,
Zomia) deliberately shy away from any civilizing process.122
Because most traditional societies do not value or hold dear material
accumulation or wealth, one should not be surprise at their indifference to material goods.
Sahlins notes of an European, one Martin Gusinde, assessment of (Yamana) Indians
indifference to material possessions:
They do not know how to take care of their belongings. No one dreams of putting
them in order, folding them, drying or cleaning them, hanging them up, or putting
in a neat pile. If they are looking for some particular thing, they rummage
carelessly through the hodgepodge of trifles in the little baskets. Larger objects
that are piled up in a heap in the hut are dragged hither and yon with no regard for
the damage that might be done them. The European observer has the impression
that these Indians place no value whatever on their utensils and that they have
completely forgotten the effort it took to make them. Actually, no one clings to
his few goods and chattles which, as it is, are often and easily lost… The Indian
does not even exercise care when he could conveniently do so. A European is
likely to shake his head at the boundless indifference of these people who drag
brand-new objects, precious clothing, fresh provisions, and valuable items
through thick mud, or abandon them… Expensive things that are given them are
treasured for a few hours, out of curiosity; after that they thoughtlessly let
everything deteriorate in the mud and wet. The less they own, the more
comfortable they can travel, and what is ruined they occasionally replace. Hence,
they are completely indifferent to any material possessions.123
The European’s condemning views about the Yamana Indians are clear. He,
Gusinde, is baffled at Yamana’s indifference to material things; yet, instead of
appreciating the difference between his and Yamana’s modes of thought, the European
views Indians to be primitive with no sense of proper conduct toward material goods. He
looks down on the Yamana as if they were still lingering in the early stages of human
development from animals. The European is shocked as to why the lives of Yamana do
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not gyrate around material goods; and for him the answer is apparent: the Yamanas are
incapable of rational thinking because they are primitive, still lingering in stone ages and
oblivious to the correct mode of thought that affords societies (such as Europeans) to
civilize, after all, civilization itself rests on valuing or accumulating material goods,
things, etc.
What the European fails to realize is: for Yamana, like most traditional societies,
life does not gravitate towards nor gyrate around materialism. The “indifference” of
Yamana to material things is seen to be indifferent only when viewed from the developed
world’s perspective. From the perspective of the Yamana, they do not consider the way
they treat material goods to be “indifferent.” Even the question of how material things
ought to be treated or carried does not even arise because their worldview is different
from that of the European. What is more, Yamana do not let material things get in the
way of living life: fulfilling one’s societal responsibilities, activities, helping, caring,
sharing, cooperating, etc. They realize, to value material possession is to deprive society
of its humanity, whereby things, objects, goods become the principle from which
moralities, beliefs, values, ethics are defined. In other words, (human and society’s) life is
defined through material lens, where each person (including society itself) is redefined as
an economic person (homo-economicus). And in this way, what is essential to traditional
societies is undermined. The Yamana’s indifference to material possession is only proper
within the context of their society, just as Europeans veneration for material goods is
perhaps good within the contexts of their society. Because societies think differently, it is
only proper for their beliefs or what is valued to be different.
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Trying to make traditional societies embrace material possessions and money not
only burdens them, but they also impede in fulfilling their social obligations, movements,
responsibilities; thus, undermining the very fabric of their way of life. And this is not
difficult to fathom. One astute outsider grasps this aporia: Laurens van der Post, as he
was considering gifts for his Bushmen friends for allowing him to be part of their society
while he was carrying out his study, realizes:
This matter of presents gave us many an anxious moment. We were humiliated by
the realization of how little there was we could give to the Bushmen. Almost
everything seemed likely to make life more difficult for them by adding to the
litter and weight of their daily round. They themselves had practically no
possessions: a lion strap, a skin blanket and a leather satchel. There was nothing
that they could not assemble in one minute, wrap up in their blankets and carry on
their shoulders for a journey of a thousand miles. They had no sense of
possession.124
Indeed, van der Post was right to think giving material things, no matter the
intentions of one’s generosity, will only burden those he wanted to thank. Certainly, one
wants to be grateful to those who accommodates or helps one. Yet, no matter the
profoundest of one’s kind intentions, one’s act of thanks will only impede those who are
to receive one’s gratitude from properly accomplishing their societal obligations and
activities. What this event illustrated to us is the polyphony of thoughts among societies.
It substantiates: societies are different, they think differently, hence even their values,
beliefs, knowledge, rationalities will therefore vary. Moreover, what is good, proper,
helpful, correct, honorable, virtuous, even one’s sense of thanks, will invariably vary and
depend on each society’s views of the world.
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One may certainly be sympathetic to van der Post, after all, he sincerely was
grateful to his Bushmen friends. However, if, for instance, one was to nevertheless confer
gifts to one’s Bushmen friends, one will only manage to burden them, no matter the
philanthropic magnanimity and generosity of one’s intentions, with things that do not
matter and that only hamper them from attaining that which is valued above all else,
freedom of movement. Thus, one must realize what is good in one is bad in another, or
what is bad in one is, to use Nietzsche’s words, “in another decked with purple honours.”
Similarly, scientific rationality and its accompanying modern developmental progress—
decked with economic rationalisms, private properties, competitions, individual
initiatives, efficiencies, material richness, wealth accumulations, and so on—may,
perhaps, be good and hold true for the developed world; yet, the same mode of thought
and its accompanying values, beliefs will not hold to be so in traditional societies, no
matter the conferrer’s “decked in purple honours” benevolent intentions.
One cannot, therefore, for instance, insist the Bushmen should be taught, by
instituting correct beliefs or modes of thought, how to embrace materialism so that they
can appreciate the generosity of material gifts one is conferring onto them. Just because
one’s views and beliefs are in antipode to the views of others, it does not mean one’s
beliefs are universal, right, proper, or even more human than others; or that one’s ways of
thinking should triumph over other’s modes of thought. From the eyes of the developed
world, what they offer to the rest of the world may seem good and proper, but such
benevolent kindness only undermines traditional societies’ beliefs, knowledge,
rationalities, and their whole ways of life. As one Native American elder notes: “The
culture and civilization of the white man are essentially material; his measure of success
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is, ‘How much property have I acquired for myself?’ The culture of the Red man is
fundamentally spiritual; his measure of success is, ‘How much service have I rendered to
my people?’”125 Indeed, from developed society’s point of view, this view of the Native
American elder will make no sense whatever; so will from the elder’s (or any traditional
society’s) point of view, the primacy of material accumulations will make no sense. This,
however, does not mean a hostile confrontation between different world views; rather, it
only illustrates the polyphonic rationalities among societies.
The significance behind what has been hitherto reasoned is, societies think
differently, this difference is in turn tied to the ways each view its world with each
establishing its own beliefs, values, etc. Certainly, scientific rationality affording the
developed world to arrange societal activities in terms of scarcity, rational economic
system, rational behavior, rational activity of individuals, wealth accumulation, material
production, is only one alternative out of numerous other possible alternatives available
to human societies. This mode of thinking and arranging society is not universal. The
bafflement over traditional societies’ indifference to material goods, accumulations,
possessions is only the developed world’s ethnocentric views on the other, because for
traditional societies, their indifference to material is neither bewildering nor something to
be baffled about, rather it is only proper. In fact, it is not even “indifference,” because the
term “indifference” arises only when viewed from the material lens of the developed
world. As Sahlins notes of this blinkered view: “Scarcity is the judgment decreed by our
[developed societies] economy—so also the axiom of our Economics: the application of
scarce means against alternative ends to derive the most satisfaction possible under the
125
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circumstances. And it is precisely from this anxious vantage that we look back upon
hunters. But if modern man, with all his technological advantages, still hasn’t got the
wherewithal, what chance has this naked savage with his puny bow and arrow? Having
equipped the hunter with bourgeois impluses and paleolithic tools, we judge his situation
hopeless in advance (italics added).”126 Truly, from the vantage point and standards of
the developed world, traditional societies will indeed look hopelessly backward,
primitive, and living at the very threshold of precarious existences. Therefore, the
condemning outlook is only the developed world’s interpretations on traditional societies,
arising from its own particular mode of thought that is, in turn, tied to the manner in
which it sees, thinks, and understands the world. In other words, money, competition,
material accumulation, economic rationality are not universal, rather they are just one out
of numerous other possibilities available to societies. What society values, its ideals
depend on the contexts of its society. Thus, some will value money, wealth accumulation,
while others will value conviviality, cooperation, harmony. It is imprudent to assume
one’s values to be universal. Nor are economic activities exclusively independent of other
societal aspects. For traditional societies, economics is not the primary lens from which
to understand the world. Nor do they categorize everyday societal activities into
economic, political, cultural, or social aspects. They do not isolate certain aspects of
everyday activities and render them as the sole primary lens from which to view,
understand, represent, and elucidate their world.
Such tangential views on the responsibilities of person to one another, sense of
property, of wealth, of material accumulation, of sharing, of helping, of money between
126
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traditional societies and the developed world only vindicate humanities’ diverse
rationalities. In light of such diversity, how can one insist societies do not think
differently or insist every society should conform to a single mode of thought?
Societies Are What They Are
Polyphonic rationality evinces societies’ diverse ways of thinking. These
polyphonic modes of thought among societies, on the other hand, reveal how each society
views its world based on its direct lived expressions. Therefore, even the manner in
which each society ascertains its knowledge, truths, beliefs, etc. will invariably differ.
And because each has its ways to understand, elucidate, represent the world, polyphonic
rationality, therefore, cannot be organized systematically nor can it be neatly explicated
concisely. Polyphonic rationality above all else is an awareness, awareness of the human
reality: diverse ways of living, of being, of knowing, of thinking, of experiencing, of
understanding. It is not a theory and is never meant to be one. In other words, to
categorize any understanding into a theory is to restrict its possibilities, its views by
picking and choosing what counts, what doesn’t, and is hence narrowed. To position
polyphonic rationality into a theory is to truncate it, thus making it narrow just like
numerous other existing theories in social sciences. However, one of the essentialities of
polyphony rationality is its open-endedness, its, to use Bakhtin’s term, unfinalizability.
Polyphony affords each form of rationality to voice itself, all voices are heard, and all
modes of thought co-exist beside one another. There is no privileging any one mode of
thought, each rationality is valid within its contexts. Thus, it cannot be systematized. It is
as one thirteenth century poet wrote: “Excuse my wandering./ How can one be orderly
with this?/ It’s like counting leaves in a garden,/ along with the song notes of partridges,/
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and crows. Sometimes organization/ and computation become absurd (italics added).”127
Here, the poet is talking about love and how it cannot be rationally understood. Perhaps
the only way to comprehend love is not even through systematic rational calculation, i.e.
weighing (to use modern platitudinous idiom) pros and cons of loving someone
(“computation”), but by permitting oneself to be swayed and led by love wherever it may
lead (“wandering”), because to do otherwise is to court absurdity. Likewise, polyphonic
modes of thought cannot be systematically or computationally understood, for to do so is
to court absurdity. Polyphonic knowledge will begin to not make sense even to itself
when it is categorized. What is more, it would also be improper to ask for concise
systematic description or theory, for no concept, word, or term in the human language of
any culture, nor any theory, which the human mind is capable of, can ever constitute such
diversities, or as Ibn Khaldun notes: “Complete knowledge does not exist in man. The
world of existence is too vast for him.”128 Indeed, the vastness of human existence affords
societies to experience diverse existential realities, thus giving rise to different
rationalities. Certainly, an eighteenth century thinker, Johann Gottfried Herder, held
similar views. Herder asserts different societies have different knowledge or truths and all
of these truths are valid within their own peculiar and differing contexts. His assertion
comes from the fact that human society is diverse, thus, for him, the way each society
thinks or reasons is not something acontextual independent of its historical, cultural
realities, rather its modes of thought are highly contextual. He therefore forewarned not
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to judge other societies according to one’s societal or cultural standards.129 Even
Immanuel Kant, regardless of his fidelity to reason, nevertheless argues human mind to
be capable of diverse conceptions of knowing, of being, of experiencing, and of
understanding. And because, for Kant, experience is the only way thought which reason,
knowledge, or truth is attained, what the human mind ascertains as reason is, thus,
invariably tied to diverse human experiences.130
Moreover, experiences—which are but forms of event, activity, occasion—are
diversely perceived by societies, and what is therefore being perceived, i.e. experienced,
is then interpreted in a way appropriate and meaningful within each society’s contexts.
One could here argue: perceiving is sensing, hence subjective, and such experiences have
no place in human rationality. However, anyone familiar with rudimentary biology will
know that human eyes are physiologically part of the human brain: eyes and brain are not
two separate organs, connected by nerves and muscles, rather they are one organ of the
human body—hence, one will find great minds, since Aristotle, to have always
emphasized the importance of perception or sentience in ascertaining human knowledge.
Thus, what one perceives is indissolubly part of what one thinks in the mind. And since
the mind, which even Descartes and Kant admit, is the aborning abode of human
rationality, what it therefore ascertains (in the mind) as truth, reason, thought, or
knowledge is but the interpretation of experiences being perceived and comprehended
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(by the eyes). Eyes are the window to one’s soul, Shakespeare once noted,131 but now one
can say, in addition to Shakespeare’s dictum, they are also the window to one’s
knowledge.
Therefore, each society depending on its perceptions, elucidations, representations
of experience will ascertain its own understanding of the events, activities experienced.
As such, different societies are bound to think differently. This is why even the same
event or experience is interpreted differently by different societies—evident in the
manner in which freedom, democracy, market-based society, liberalism, etc. is
understood differently by different societies. Indeed, W. H. Ittelson and F. P. Kilpatrick
argue that two persons encountering the same event at the same time take away different
understandings of the same experience. This is because, they argue, each person brings
into his or her experience different expectations, fears, and hopes. And this makes each
person seek different meanings or things from the same event.132 Such case is even
applicable to societies and cultures, as Geertz notes with regard to traditional rituals being
observed and the differing meanings they signify to local participants, on one hand, and
visitors, on the other: “Where for “visitors” religious performances can, in the nature of
the case, only be presentations of a particular religious perspective, and thus aesthetically
or scientifically dissected, for participants they are in addition enactments,
materializations, realization of it—not only models of what they believe, but also models
for the believing of it. In these plastic dramas men attain their faith as they portray it
This saying is usually summarized from Shakespeare’s Richard III: “To thee I
do commend my watchful soul/ Ere I let fall the windows of mine eyes.” William
Shakespeare, Richard III, ed. John Jowett (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2008), 95.
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(italics in original).”133 Here, the ritual ceremony will manifest, for native participants,
the profoundest existential meaning and significance; for the visitors, however, the same
ceremony will only be of interest only in so far as it concerns the visitors’ expectations to
experience the exotic. Outside of this quest for exotic, the ceremony experienced will
have no profound existential significance for the visitors as it does for the natives. Thus,
Goodenough was prudent to note, “An American tourist watching a Hopi snake dance
does not see it as a Chinese tourist would, and neither will see it as a Hopi does.”134
Americans, Chinese, and Hopi will indeed experience the same event, Hopi snake dance,
differently because each (society) has its own views of the world, and so the
understanding and perception of the event are bound to differ as their views about the
world.
Lastly, the significance behind polyphonic modes of thought is their attention to
the basic human reality in its diversities. In doing so, they do not distract themselves from
the needless embellishments—scientific methodologies and criteria—that get in the way
of understanding and of social inquest. An eminent theatre director and one of the cofounders of the Royal Shakespeare Company, Peter Brook argues theatre can be a
powerful, yet profoundly transformative and engaging experience for audiences. Indeed,
all that is needed, for theatre to be a transformative experience, is an actor in an empty
space with someone watching. This is all that is required. For Brook, an actor in a space
with someone watching the actor is the irreducible element of theatre. The curtains,
scripts, directors, stages, spotlights, darkness, etc. are unnecessary embellishments as
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they distract one from the principal concern: engaging theatrical experience.135 This
analogy is relevant to our present discussion because just as theatre embellishments
distract one from properly appreciating a transformative theatrical experience, likewise
scientific rationality—with its demands for scientific criteria: concise
hypotheses/theories, variables, mathematical models, statistical measurements,
methodologies, internal/external validity, justification for cases selected, (or as in social
sciences) balanced citations of authors from both ends of ideological spectrum, etc.—
only distracts one from the main concern of social inquests. This is where polyphonic
rationality matters: polyphonic rationality avoids unnecessary embellishments that
distract one from the principal concern of social inquests: understanding. And it does so
by attending to basic human reality: diversity in thoughts. In other words, just as an actor
in a space with someone watching is the irreducible element of theatre, the society,
culture, and people in their diversity are the fundamental and irreducible elements of
social inquest. Indeed, in many ways, each society is a human drama unfolding in its own
social-cultural stage. Polyphonic rationality pays attention to the basic human realities by
not distracting itself from the needless decorative embroideries that single-mindedly
emphasize the need to satisfy the standards of scientific criteria.
By avoiding redundant ornaments, polyphonic rationality does not fall into the
trap of, to use Alan Watts’ words, confusing symbols, concepts, labels, categories,
classifications used to describe and measure the world with the world itself.136 For Watts,
this confusion of symbols with reality is one of the fatal flaws of modern society. He
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argues symbols, concepts, numbers, formulas, and standardized timetables, laws, rules,
clocks used to describe the world are taken as reality itself. In other words, the world is
abstracted into concepts, which are then accepted to be the reality.137 Certainly, scientific
rationality with its demands for strict scientific standards only confuses numbers,
mathematical models, statistics, theories, and hypotheses with human reality: society,
culture, people, etc. In fact, human society, culture, and people being replaced are
nowhere to be found, or are merged into undifferentiated generalization of numbers, in
scientific studies of society. This way the abstract numbers, concepts, theories,
hypotheses, equations, symbols become more important and real than human reality. On
the contrary to scientific mode of thought, polyphonic rationality does not confuse
symbols with reality because it has in its focus the basic human reality. For, in reality,
one does not see people, cultures, societies with numbers, concepts, numerical charts
hanging over their head indicating the mathematical values, standard deviations, or
symbols signifying their feeling, belief, happiness, wealth, education, income, standard of
living, calories consumed, energy level, GDP per capita, freedom, spending habit, belief
in democracy, health care, access to clean water, marginal productivity, efficiency,
innovativeness, patent laws, etc. Yet, scientific rationality acts as if such is the case,
vindicated by its demand for scientificity. Since societies are neither abstract concepts nor
symbols, but real human beings, it is only prudent for each to embrace what it sees to be
proper. No society should be pilloried because it thinks differently.
At this point, one may no doubt argue, ‘societies think differently, so what of it or
why should this, polyphonic rationality, matter?’ It matters because to dismiss diverse
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rationalities is to make a mockery of real living societies whose lives are pilloried and
devastated in the name of human progress. Each person and society has an intrinsic
purpose and meaning. Therefore, it is only prudent to let societies and persons live life as
they see fit and proper. It matters also because if social inquests are to become not only
meaningful, but also worthy of intellectual rumination, then it is essential to understand
societies in their unrivaled complexities, after all, what is the purpose of social analyses
or intellectual contemplations if not to understand.
One of the implications of this study is that there cannot be universal concepts,
truths, beliefs, institutions, rationalities, knowledge. Another implication is that if one is
to accept what has been reasoned then one wouldn’t do or espouse development. Both
implications are, if understood, one and the same for they ultimately stem from the same
aborning source. Since societies think differently, each society (as thoroughly mentioned
in this chapter) is bound to have its own views of the world based on its own unique
societal circumstances. Hence, what knowledge is will ultimately vary. It is imprudent to
assume the universality of one mode of thought, scientific rationality, for all humanity.
Furthermore, because each society has its knowledge, each will have its own beliefs,
values, truths, etc. This is to say, what is valued or accepted as proper—be it moral,
spiritual, social, cultural, or otherwise—will invariably differ as well. As such, modern
developmental progress by foisting rationalized societal institutions—market economy,
democracy, individual initiatives, competition, mass consumption and production, private
property, etc.—is only one out of numerous other possible alternatives available to
societies. Differently put, market system, material goods, accumulation of wealth,
democracy are not universal. These are just one alternative out of numerous other

298
possibilities available for societies to embark upon. Surely, the episodes of scholarships,
MDGs, transmigration, and villagization succinctly explicated the misplaced generosity
and munificence of the developed world, who naively suppose the existence of universal
modes of thought, beliefs, norms, and institutions. Indeed, to accept the universal is to
dismiss diversity. Yet, reality shows the world is diverse, not uniform.
One could interject and reason: ‘should the developed world, then, not intervene
and help developing societies affected by natural disaster?’ The answer, however, to this
question is and can never be as straightforward as one would hope for, because: firstly,
natural disasters have been occurring since time immemorial, they are part of the world,
as a planet, due to the physical and chemical elements that constitute the landscapes,
atmosphere, and geology, thereby affecting different parts of the world with equally
varied forms of natural disasters—droughts, hurricanes/typhoons, earthquakes,
volcanoes, and so forth. Secondly, disasters are part of every society; it has happened
before and will continue to do so. However, at the same instance, societies have faced
many disasters and have continued to survive. It must be noted that each society sustains
itself by understanding their ecological milieu, which in turn provides knowledge on how
to survive famines or other natural disasters, how to build homes specific to its ecology
so as to withstand or protect people from the disasters specific to their ecological
conditions, and so forth. In other words, local wisdom or knowledge accumulated for
generations provides societies with necessary tools on how to care for their society, how
to withstand local disasters, how to cure physical ailments, and how to procure everyday
wherewithal. Societies endured and lived through disasters precisely because they had
their accumulated knowledge. However, with rampant development and insatiable need
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to modernize every society, the long held accumulated polyphonic knowledge that once
sustained and guided societies is lost or destroyed. So, when disaster does strike, its
effects are amplified due to the loss of local societal knowledge that hitherto advised
societies on how to cope with nature’s misadventures. During1980s, Ethiopia, for
instance, embarked on a compulsory villagization similar to those in Tanzania. Much of
the rural population was moved from their traditional lands and resettled elsewhere. By
virtue of being moved to an alien ecology, the skills and knowledge of rural peasants
(specific to their lands) were all but invalidated. With large resettlements of population,
the agricultural productions decreased. Moreover, to the anguish of the rural population,
the drought and famine coincided with the forced villagization. Certainly, drought is not
new to the region; however, this time the drought had monumental effect and triggered
massive humanitarian crises precisely because the forced villagization, which Ethiopia
embarked on in the name of development, dismantled existing communal bond, family
ties, local charity, communal cooperation, conviviality, communal reciprocity, and
sharing that hitherto held societies together and helped them overcome periods of drought
or other famine. The villagization not only deprived local populations of their local
knowledge that advised them how to overcome disasters, but the social structure holding
the society together was dismantled as well. The consequence of massive resettlement
with accompanying dismantling of social structure was the extreme starvation for a vast
majority of the population, triggering one of the most deadliest disasters of the twentieth
century.138 This is indeed a rather long answer to the question ‘should the developed
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world intervene if natural disaster is to strike a traditional society?’ Yet, it is essential to
remember the historical contexts that ultimately led traditional societies in their current
predicament before answering such a question. One cannot simply answer yes or no, for
that would mean resorting to mere generalization, and to do so would be imprudent.
Moreover, questions concerning society and its well-being can never be answered by a
simple yes or no.
It is only proper to conclude the present chapter by alluding to Cervantes’ Don
Quixote. Don Quixote lives in his own world; he imagines himself to be Don (knight) and
imagines Sancho Panza, his servant, to be his faithful squire. He rides out, with his
squire, to right the wrong, undo the injustice, but most of all he is in quest for his
(imaginary) beautiful damsel, Dulcinea.139 In this quest, fantasy as it may be, after all, he
is not a knight and some of his duels as a Don included jousting windmills which he
supposed were giants, Don Quixote nevertheless manages to experience many adventures
that poured meaningful purpose in his otherwise nonchalant life. Despite all his makebelieves, he nevertheless led the life he saw fit, no matter its outward irrational
absurdities or what others, including his squire, thought of it. Indeed, in many ways, he
led a full life any man (or, for that matter, any society) could ask for—indeed, this is what
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche so much admired about Don Quixote. Inwardly, his quests and
the ways in which he led his life gave him meaning and purpose; after all, what is life or
society without meaning. Likewise, from the outside, what has been argued, polyphonic
rationality, in this chapter (or even the whole of this present study) may seem naïve; even
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the fact that traditional societies, not adhering to developed society’s mode of thought,
may indeed seem as the vindication of naiveté of primitive societies not yet enlightened
by the power of scientific rationality. Yet, like Don Quixote, inwardly, despite all its
outward absurdity, how traditional societies lead their lives, the way they think and
ascertain their truths give them meaning and sense of purpose, which cannot be otherwise
attained. Their modes of thought afford profound existential meaningfulness to their
society as well as to persons within. Life of human beings and societies is not about
establishing the ultimate objective truths, knowledge, beliefs, or principles; rather they
are about giving meaning and living a life that is purposeful, be it helping, sympathizing,
loving, caring. Hence, it is only prudent to let each society live life in ways apposite to it.
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CHAPTER V
The Faustian Geist
Verstehen: Understanding
The previous chapter elucidated on how societies think differently and how that
difference in thought, rationality, knowledge, whichever one may wish to call it, depends
on each society’s lived existential experiences: its views of the world. So, the question
that inevitably arises is what is the purpose of these differences, viz. what is the point of
considering polyphonic modes of thought? The answer: polyphonic modes of thought
afford one to understand societies, social phenomena; after all, understanding is the
ultimate purpose of any social inquest, development itself being one. In fact, it is also the
raison d'être of any scientific examination. However, what is this understanding?
Now, understanding will neither be congruent among persons nor will it be fixed.
Indeed, it can never be a concept defining what it means to understand. Rather, each
reader will have to attain his or her own understanding. Yet, on another level,
understanding is itself an experiencing or, more precisely, affecting. It involves affection
igniting certain emotions or ideas. Understanding of any phenomena, be in natural or
social sciences, usually involves the prober being affected by probed phenomena by
evoking, within him, certain ideas, just as a piece of music, especially music from the
Baroque era, evokes certain emotions on the listener. Even Descartes, despite his rational
outlooks, nevertheless emphasized how affections or passions—such as sadness,
happiness, envy, hatred, melancholy, wonder, joy—were essential to human experiences
(of course, human experiences were, for him, abode from which rational knowledge
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aroused).1 Certainly, understanding is not possible without such affections, for it requires
one to immerse oneself—along with or bringing one’s life experiences—into one’s
encountering (or probing) of an event (or a phenomenon). This is what Gabriel Marcel
meant by the uniqueness of the individual;2 or what Ibn Al'Arabi meant by wahdat alwujūd (the oneness of being): union between the knower and the known.3 This is what
understanding ultimately culminates into; it cannot be put to words, rather it can only be,
on a subjective basis, hinted at as to what it can signify to the person who comes to an
understanding. Carl Jung precisely had this in mind in regard to understanding:
What does lie within our reach, however, is the change in individuals who have,
or create for themselves, an opportunity to influence others of like mind. I do not
mean by persuading or preaching—I am thinking, rather, of the well-known fact
that anyone who has insight into his own actions, and has thus found access to the
unconscious, involuntarily exercises an influence on his environment. The
deepening and broadening of his consciousness produces the kind of effect which
the primitive call “mana.” It is an unintentional influence on the unconscious of
others, a sort of unconscious prestige, and its effect lasts only so long as it is not
disturbed by conscious intention (italics added).4
Understanding of whatever or whoever involves, as Jung argues, changes within
the person, change evinced by one’s understandings, and as such one “involuntarily”
influences one’s environment, be it through appreciating or accepting things as they are.
And such appreciating, accepting, or understanding is then unconsciously and
1
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involuntarily transmitted to one’s environment, after all this is what mana means to the
Polynesians. Truly, this is what science (at least an uncorrupted view of science) means
by understanding. It is the acceptance of things as they are—such as the heliocentric
view, stages/life cycle of stars, nature of quanta, properties of light, electro-magnetism,
laws of energy, and so forth. Science does not proclaim, in advance, it is going to
understand a phenomenon and that the rest of humanity must follow suit, rather science
in its eccentric manner understands things as they are and when it understands, the rest of
humanity, without even science’s demands, follows the understanding: i.e. understands
what science understands. In other words, science does not persuade nor preach others to
follow its understandings, rather it is its understandings that unconsciously and
involuntarily influence others to follow suit. Indeed, social inquest, in its proper sense
with respect to understanding, is no different.
Inherent in understanding are the notions of appreciation and acceptance. Thus,
genuine understanding kindles acceptance and appreciation of things (whatever they
may be) as they are because this is what it means to be objective, impartial.5
Understanding encourages one to accept “things as they are, rather than as we want them
to be; to overcome our fears of the unknown; and instead of claiming to be able to change
the world and to save ‘humanity,’ to try saving ourselves from our own compelling need

Hence, ‘objective’ does not mean change whatever is not to one’s liking; rather
it means accepting things as they are: be they good, bad, myth, supernatural, and so forth.
Physicists do not try to change compositions of atom to one sub-atomic particle just
because existence of numerous sub-atomic particles makes understanding of phenomena
even more complex and diverse. So, why should social scientists try to change societies
they examine?
5
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for comforting illusions (italics in original).”6 Differently put, understanding does not
mean one already knows what that understanding is going to be even prior to one’s
inquests, rather it means one would grasp what that understanding is only at the
conclusion of one’s examinations. All the numerous aspects of one’s life from personal
qualities, feelings, emotions, views of the world that one brings with oneself to
experiences one goes through during an inquest come together to give profound
significance to the understanding one gains at the conclusions of an inquest. Indeed,
understanding attained at conclusions of that inquest will be specific to that particular
prober, hence, the essentiality of the uniqueness of the prober. Understanding is personal.
Thus, for instance, the manner in which this study is understood will invariably differ
from reader to reader. This is only proper because the present inquest is not trying to
establish an apodictic foundation of human rationality.
And because understanding is attained only at conclusions of an inquest, one must
thereby also bring one’s examinations to an end. Inquests end with understanding. In
other words, any genuine social or scientific examination concludes when the examiner
has understood the examined phenomenon. This is because understanding is the raison
d'être of any (social or scientific) inquiry. Thus, one will not go beyond the
understanding of a phenomenon. If one understands the examined phenomenon, then one
will appreciate the examined phenomenon for what it is, i.e. as it is, with all its faults,
limits, absurdities, strengths. And one can accept things as they are only when one has
understood what one has set out to understand. Because in accepting as they are, one is
Majid Rahnema, “Towards Post-Development: Searching for Signposts, a New
Language and New Paradigm”, in The Post-Development Reader, eds. Majid Rahnema
and Victoria Bawtree (New York, NY: Zed Books, 1997), 392.
6
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appreciative of diversity constituting the understood phenomenon. When, for instance,
physicists discover new sub-atomic particles or astrophysicists discover new distant
neutron stars, they accept and appreciate their discoveries because they understand that
such diversity at the sub-atomic level and in the universe is what gives meaning to them
(particles or stars). They also recognize the fact that their discoveries were only made
possible by their understanding of the examined phenomenon (and not by predictions or
empirical measurements because these are predicated on understanding). Furthermore,
just because physicists or astrophysicists have discovered and understood particular
phenomenon (sub-atomic particle and neutron star), they do not try to change the way
sub-atomic particles behave, or change the way distant neutron stars appear, or change
composition of their electromagnetic lights being emitted. They know that such acts are
not only fatuous, but they go against the very meaning of scientific inquest and
understanding.7
Regardless, there is a proclivity in social-scientific inquiries to go beyond
understanding and, sadly, in most cases even before one has reached the level of genuine
understanding. Here they try to predict and measure even before the social phenomenon
is properly understood; they instantaneously equate predictions and measurements with
understanding. It is rather farcical to watch social sciences go beyond phenomena (even
before understanding) because such kinds of naive errors are mostly absent in natural
7

So, why should technicians (and social scientists) after having studied and
(hopefully) genuinely understood societies want to transform examined societies in the
name of progress? Indeed, eliminations of diversity, invariably accompanying
development and progress, threaten not only civilizations but scientific thoughts as well,
for it is diversity that gives rise to civilizations. It is the contribution of diverse
knowledge obtained from diverse rationalities from equally diverse civilizations and
societies that makes it possible for posteriors to make unprecedented advancements in
human knowledge. But unfortunately, this very much goes amiss in social sciences.
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sciences (of course, natural sciences are not completely immune from such pathologies
either). Natural sciences do not go beyond understanding of phenomena; they appreciate
and accept phenomena as they are, because they discern understanding to be the ultimate
purpose of scientific inquiries, and, more importantly, they conclude their examinations
after they have gained a proper understanding of the examined phenomena. Of course,
social sciences (development being one) tend to go beyond phenomena precisely due to
their preoccupation to become exact science, which they, erroneously, assume is wholly
empirical and math driven. Natural scientists do acknowledge the role of empirical
mathematical measurements in their disciplines; however, they also recognize
measurements only as tools used to describe phenomena, not understanding. It must be
duly noted that predictions and mathematical truths in hard sciences, which natural
scientists themselves acknowledge, only designates or describes the laws and workings
of the universe; they neither, by themselves, create the laws or the universe. Indeed,
Newton was quite explicit about the fact that his laws were not the causes of the universe
or its workings, rather his laws merely described natural phenomena as they were in
nature.8
Very much the opposite is the case in social sciences. Here, instead of limiting
oneself to understanding, one erroneously, through perversions of scientific reasoning,
goes on to equate measurements and predictions, which are in reality only tools in
scientific inquiry, as the sole essence of scientific understanding. Newton after
discovering (it is important to keep in mind Newton did not create, he only discovered)
8

Vide, Isaac Newton, The Principia, trans. Andrew Motte (Amherst, NY:
Prometheus Books, 1995); I. Bernard Cohen, The Newtonian Revolution (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1981).
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the laws of nature did not say, ‘I have, by discovering the laws of nature, created the
universe,’ nor ‘The laws of nature, which I discovered, created the universe’;
unfortunately, this is what social scientists assume and try to do. This can be seen in the
manner in which social scientists from the outset, without understanding, try to create
theories and then fit diverse social phenomena into those theories, as they “strive to shape
a people and landscape that will fit their techniques of observation.”9
In other words, social sciences, being epigones of science equipped with its
narrowest version, pervert not only science, but social inquiries as well. They, thereby,
create and fabricate social phenomena by positing them upon examined societies as
something actual and natural. Furthermore, the penchant of social sciences to mimic
physics makes them disregard the fact that society cannot be measured. Of course, this
does not mean social sciences refrain from measuring societies. Certainly, they think
societies can be measured, hence the current popularity of survey and opinion polls.10
Indeed, increased popularity of inquiries based on inane survey and opinion polls only
show how far social sciences have gone off track; and how little they know and
understand. Social sciences insist they are not only measuring what can be measured
utilizing scientific methodologies, but they are also affording measurements on those
aspects of human societies that cannot be measured. This way, they maintain, social
inquests become more scientific and, of course, anything science is good or preferable.
Yet, Konrad Lorenz contests against such claims: “Well-known sayings, such as that all
research is science insofar as it involves mathematics, or that science consists in
9

James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
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“measuring what is measurable, and making measurable what is not measurable,” are
epistemologically the greatest nonsense that ever came from the lips of those who should
know better.”11 Certainly, what Lorenz is in fact evincing is the essentiality of
understanding. For without understanding, what use are the mathematical tools and
measurements. Epistemologically, mathematical or empirical measurements are
dependent on understanding of phenomena, after all, mathematical numbers, equations,
symbols, even measurements, gain their significance as scientific tools only in relation to
and contingent on the prober’s understandings of the phenomenon. Without
understanding the phenomenon, mathematical tools, no matter how sophisticated,
accurate, or practical, will be as useful as the rarest and finest string quartet instruments
in the hands of persons who have no acquaintance with any musical instruments
whatsoever and asking them to perform one of Beethoven’s String Quartets.
Without understanding, measuring means very little. One can carry as many
empirical measurements as one wishes, but these will only lead to the collection of
numerous measurements with no meaning, just as one can go on measuring birds in one’s
garden every day or collect computable data on how many blue cars one sees on the street
or empirically observe how many pieces of hair one sheds from one’s head. All these are
meaningless without understanding: what makes birds attracted to one’s garden—is it the
trees or fruits on the trees or is it something else—or what makes hair shed from one’s
head—is it because of blood pressure, other health ailments, or is it because one has long
hair and is time to get a haircut—or what make blue cars pass through one’s
neighborhood—is it because there are people in the neighborhood who own blue cars, or
Konrad Lorenz, Civilized Man’s Eight Deadly Sins (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc., 1974), 94.
11
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is it because the street is one way, or is it because the street is named blue street, or is it
because owners of blue cars happen to like this street, or is it something else. Hence,
without understanding, empirical measurements have no meaning.
Indeed, Mark Twain tells us that when he was appointed as a correspondent for a
newspaper, the editor advised him not to cover nor write about events that cannot be
empirically verified. So, following the instructions given to him by the editor, Twain
describes an event thusly: “A woman given the name of Mrs. James Jones, who is
reported to be one of the society leaders of the city, is said to have given what purported
to be a party yesterday to a number of alleged ladies. The hostess claims to be the wife of
a reputed attorney (italics added).”12 Mark Twain certainly saw the silliness and absurdity
of instructions given to him by the editor, who was very keen on empirical facts and
observations. And this is exactly what Mark Twain did by showing the silliness of
empiricism in his descriptions of the social event following the instruction of an editor,
who considered empirical observations to be the only source of truth. Truly, this anecdote
of Mark Twain offers valuable lessons on human experiences to the social sciences.
Understanding does not mean measurements, nor do measurements mean
understanding. Social inquest means understanding; it does not mean measurements or
empirical observations. Certainly, Newton did not discover gravity by measuring without
first understanding why objects always fell to the ground. He certainly did not resort to
mathematical equations or measurements to discover gravity; rather he first had to
understand why objects fell to the ground. And on understanding, he represented his
understanding by describing it in an equation, not vice-versa.
12
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At this point one may argue what is the point of understanding when science can
and will in the future solve all the problems. Yet, it is essential to remember human
problems are not meant to be solved, rather they are to be understood. In understanding, a
problem solves itself. It must also be remembered, science only describes phenomena; its
problem solving aspects reside in its understanding of phenomena it is describing.
Science does not offer solutions without first understanding the nature of phenomena. To
be more precise, by understanding phenomena, problems begin to solve themselves. This
is how science solves problems. In fact, this aspect of science is notoriously ignored by
many of its epigones, for they assume, science upon encountering problems immediately
offers solutions though measurements and experiments.
Moreover, what mostly goes amiss in development studies and social sciences, in
general, is their assumption of how science can solve all problems of society.
Nevertheless, as Claude Lévi-Strauss verily reminds us: “Science will never give us all
the answers.”13 Science is ultimately a human product based on cultural experiences; and
like any human product, it is bound to be fallible and restrictive (in its applicability).
Indeed, most supporters of science have erroneously come to the conclusion by insisting
empirical measurements and mathematical tools to be of necessity in social sciences.
They argue social sciences must become like natural sciences—mathematically rigorous,
application of scientific methodologies, etc. Yet, it is essential to recognize that just
because certain methodical tools favorably serve the needs of a specific discipline, this,
however, does not necessarily mean the same tools will be beneficial in other disciplines.
Aldous Huxley maintained, one cannot simply extend the same methodologies of natural
13

Claude Lévi-Strauss, Myths and Meanings (New York: Schocken Books,
1979), 14.

312
sciences into social sciences because the two disciplines are not the same, nor are their
objects of study, for one studies external natural material outside of man, while the other
studies man himself. He notes:
“But the methodology of social science is inevitably different from that of natural
science. It is different and must be different from [sic] one basic reason—the
investigator is inside instead of outside his material. Man can not investigate man
by the same methods by which he investigates external nature. He can use the
methods of natural science to investigate certain aspects of man—the structure
and working of his body, for instance, or the mode of his heredity; but that is
because these are shared with other organisms and because they are partial aspects
which can be readily externalized. But when he starts investigating human motive,
his own motives are involved; when he studies human society, he is himself part of
a social structure (italics added).”14
What Huxley means is, society is not an atom nor a quant, it does not reflect from
a shiny surface nor does it tell where it is but not how fast it is going, it is not an abstract
number waiting for someone to run statistical regressions, it is not a square root nor a phi,
it is not an equation, it is not a variable, it does not exists in the realm of ideas. As such,
to assume tools used in describing the natural world will be beneficial to social sciences
is an absurdity, for it implicitly shoulders the idea that by somehow utilizing those tools,
they will somehow solve the profoundest of societal maladies. Even Franz Boas, who was
trained in physics before turning to social sciences, saw very early in his career that
methods from natural sciences could not be applied to social sciences. He realized social
sciences had to formulate their own approaches independent of the hard sciences. Even
though he couldn’t apply scientific methodologies in his new field, he nevertheless
brought with him the very best of science: the spirit of science. Boaz saw the importance
of critical skepticism towards any kind of generalization, he was unwilling—just as any
Aldous Huxley quoted in George A. Lundberg, “The Future of the Social
Sciences,” The Scientific Monthly 53 (October 1941): 347.
14
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astute physicist would—to accept any kind of generalized explanations. For this he was
considered an eccentric by most of his collogues mainly because they were more inclined
toward facile generalized understanding.15
Indeed, understanding is not an easy task for it mocks at the face of lazy
generalities of scientific rationality. Understanding requires one to examine not only
oneself but also requires one to be open to new views. It requires one to appreciate
diversity of views that is diametrically opposite to one’s own, after all understanding is
critical towards one’s sense of what is good, moral, rational; it is indignant to one’s prior
beliefs; it mocks at terms such as universal, uniform, standard, method. Only when one
accepts things as they are in their varieties, will one become wise, not only as an inquirer
of society, but also as a human being. However, for scientific epigones, such arduous task
to understand can be easily by-passed by employing empirical measurements that
promise instantaneous answers to solve the profoundest problems of the human world, so
why bother with understanding. They may even argue, measurements point us to the
causal variables, and that cause and effect are essential to science. Nevertheless, it must
be duly noted that, as Heisenberg maintains, modern physics have abandoned the concept
of causality, i.e. cause-effect, as a useful tool for interpreting physical experiences.16
They are abandoned because the law of causality is too restrictive and, hence, does not
hold in quantum theory, as Heisenberg further argues, it is possible that the “space-time
processes may run in reverse to the causal sequence.”17
15
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Thus, it is rather imprudent to hold on to or utilize redundant concepts that no
longer hold and that have been rejected by natural sciences, and apply them to explaining
human society, which is as complex, if not more complex than the quantum world. As
such, one must accept human reality for what it is. No amount of scientificity can make
societies, cultures, and peoples predictable or measurable as is usually assumed by
simulacra of science. At least, great minds from every century seem to hold this view, so
why can’t the modern society.
Theory-less
From what has been hitherto reasoned, in this study, may give the impression that
there is no redeeming quality in development studies, however, this is not the case. There
is, indeed, a redeeming quality to this discipline: it has numerous theories borrowed from
other disciplines of social sciences or, more precisely, it has no theory of its own.18
Indeed, what are called theories of development or development theories are nothing but
utilization of political, economic, and socio-cultural theories for the purpose of
development. These theories together make up theories of development, for there are no
theories that exclusively deal with issues of development. There is nothing wrong with
theories being brought together to understand development, this is not the problem for it
is always prudent to understand any social issue by examining it from multiple
perspectives and, of course, development cannot be understood in piecemeal manners
because development can only be made sense through amalgamation of social, cultural,
political, and economic aspects: in a holistic manner. So, what then is the problem? The
18
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problem lies in the theories themselves. The political, socio-cultural, and economic
theories brought into development studies are themselves highly devoid of worldly
realities—thereby leading one to erroneously assume the larger human reality to be
composed of one set of rationalities. It is, therefore, important to recognize that theories
which are brought into development studies are themselves highly oblivious to their own
prodigious limits. These theories,19 ironically, are simply incapable in carrying out a
single uninterrupted train of thought (or argument) without succumbing to logical and
rational fallacies of their own making—which is rather risible considering the fact that
the whole foundation of their theory rests on the infallibility of scientific rationality and
logic.
Nevertheless, absence of theories dealing exclusively with issues of development
is not unwise because it provides the best possible milieu to make clear the true purpose
of development: understanding. Absences of pure theories of development provide a
fecund environment from where to begin de novo the purpose of development,
meaningful understanding (of course, in the best of worlds, development studies and
social sciences, in general, will eternally remain theory-less). One must also realize just
because there is no pure theory (or theories) of development, one should not, thus,
conclude a pure theory of development is, therefore, needed. Such conclusions would be
19
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a grave misunderstanding of what has been hitherto discussed. Rather, one of the
principal aims of this study is to maintain this theory-less in development studies, viz. no
theories, no methods, examine societies as they are. Here, the words as they are point to
the heuristic nature as the best possible way to fully realize the aim of social inquests:
understanding societies. One cannot take for granted how important it is to maintain
theory-less examination of societies. Development studies already lacking a pure theory
must be made to remain theory-less, but this should not lead one to erroneously conclude
it is perfectly wise to bring in numerous political, economic, and socio-cultural theories
from without. Rather, development must be examined without scientific theories,
methods, and criteria. If one were to insist it is unthinkable to carry out development
without any theory or method, one is forgetting human, and as such societies, are sui
generis, they cannot be made to conform to what is unnatural and artificial—which
scientific theories and methods are. It is out of the soil soaked in fervent adherence to
narrow scientific catechisms that one finds this fecund ground from where to better carry
out social inquests. If this opportunity is lost then, indeed, development will continue to
be an abortive cul-de-sac process.
Traditional societies do not hold the same worldviews; rather societies think
differently (thoroughly discussed in the previous chapter). Hence, theories constructed in
one society, under different societal realities, will hardly be of any relevance to societies
who do not hold the same worldviews. As Hirschman verily reminds us, “theories which,
because of their high level of abstraction, look perfectly ‘neutral’ as between one kind of
economic system and another, often are primarily relevant to the conditions under which
they were conceived… Therefore, the more useful they are in one setting, the less they
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are likely to be so in a completely different one.”20 What is more, because theories are not
reality but are only abstractions of reality, they are far removed not only from the
contexts of their own aborning societies, but are even further removed from the context
of societies where they are to be implemented.
That is to say, theories build on one social setting and transplanting them into an
alien culture is no different from how, “events that surround a forest ranger differ from
the events that surround a city dweller lost in a wood. They are different events, not just
different appearances of the same event.”21 There is a world of difference between
knowledge of woods (or forests) in which the ranger is accustomed to and the citydweller’s understandings of the forest. The forest ranger knows the landscapes, what to
do in an event he goes astray from the path, and so forth. While, on the other hand, the
city dweller lost in woods is in a totally alien world, with little or no knowledge of the
environment he finds himself in (other than what he might have otherwise read in books
or magazines). No doubt, the lost city-dweller might have read books on survival and
what measures to take when one goes astray in forests, but there is a world of difference
when it comes to actual applicability of what the city dweller might have read in survival
guides and reality of his circumstances. It may so happen, the city dweller might have
read survival guides and how to books, but the applicability of putting it into practice
depends on one’s understanding of the environment in which one is in. For it would be
rather unwise for one to use the African savanna survival guides, which one has read in
books, and use those practices when one finds oneself in the tundra regions of North
20
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America. What is more, just because one has read survival guides and how to books, it
does not mean one is instantaneously well-equipped and apt for survival. This is because
survival requires constant interactions with and understanding of the environment. The
forest ranger in this case by virtue of his constant interactions with and understanding of
the landscape enables him to be apt to various unforeseen circumstances; indeed, the
forest ranger would find the survival guides and how to books to be a horrible means to
get oneself out of difficult situations, for he knows there is a vast difference between
what is said in the (survival) books and the actual experiences. Likewise, there is a vast
difference between numerous social sciences theories and their applicability to traditional
societies.
Moreover, traditional societies do not care about numerous political, sociocultural, economic theories popular among technicians; still, this point always seems to
go amiss. Differently put, traditional societies do not hurdle around in groups and
contemplate which theories they should choose. Nor do they think, “We are acting
according to ‘R’ or ‘K’ theory of economics”; nor do they say, “because the demand of
‘O’ is X and the supply is Y, hence I am going to sell ‘O’ at price Z.” These kinds of
scenario never take place, yet technicians tend to assume such scenarios do take place
within traditional societies. The traditional world functions at a very different level; its
realities are vastly different from realities of technicians, who live in their own societies
with their own societal realities. And whether one likes it or not, each social reality
affects the manner in which each society views its world.
No doubt, there are problems in traditional societies, yet these problems are
specific to each society and must therefore be addressed by each according to its
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existential realities. Friedrich von Hayek maintained, because of societies’ long process
of adjustments to their own milieu, they are better equipped to deal, on their own, with
their own specific problems. This is because each society has, at its disposal, means that
relate to the realities of its circumstances. Thus, local societies are better equipped to
address their own problems, rather than any intellectuals or experts would, using
advanced theories and equipment at their disposal to do the same. He further warned that
“rational interventions” with advanced scientific theories and equipment only leave
societies in worse conditions than they were prior to such interventions.22 Indeed,
problems of development, underdevelopment, etc. are the logical consequences of
development. Traditional societies are in the state they are not because they do not want
to develop, but rather they want to develop, modernize, become wealthy, and join the
wealthy society club. The urban slums, poverty, illnesses, rancid living conditions, overpopulation, dense overcrowding of living spaces, unemployment, fragile health, air and
water pollutions, destruction of environment, desertification of rural lives, poor
sanitations, lack of clean water, and so on are not the result of societies’ effort to shy
away from development, rather they are the consequence of societies’ effort to develop,
progress, modernize, etc. What, for instance, makes people flock to urban areas? It is the
quest for development that people flock, by the millions, into urban areas. People,
erroneously, hope better life awaits them, and that their first step towards the “ladder of
development” is to move away from existing slow rural lives. And, no doubt, their
illusive dreams are scattered the very moment they decide to leave their homes. They
22
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believe in the illusive allurement of modern development promising much “existential
security” through economic progress. If development never took place, then there
wouldn’t be the destructive underdevelopment in traditional societies. In absence of
development, each society would make for itself the path in which it wants to remain or
maintain. In other words, each society will become what it was meant to be (whatever it
may be), at least, for Aristotle (as well as for the Greeks), this is what it meant by life,
society, and progress.
Philosopher’s Stone and the Perennial Manifestations of the Faustian Geist
In this enquiry, we have seen how scientific rationality colors development
studies. Certainly, technicians of development23 proselytize not only the hopes that (if
only scientific rationalities are embraced by traditional societies) development—through
rationalized societal institutions, governments, economic systems, values, beliefs—would
be a smooth process, but also that social-scientific inquiries will help solve much of
societal ailments. It is as if technicians take scientific rationality to be the philosopher’s
stone, an elixir capable not only of answering societal malaises, but also capable of
describing, explaining, interpreting, representing societies themselves. On one level, it is
unfair to equate alchemists with technicians because alchemists were not only
knowledgeable of their limitations, but they were also some of the greatest minds, with
broad understanding of the human and natural world, from every corner of the world,
from China, India, Arabia, Mediterranean/Levant, Greece, Rome, to Europe, who
advanced human knowledge. Newton was an ardent alchemist, so also was the
23
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renaissance thinker Paracelsus. Even Robert Boyle, one of the pioneers in chemistry, was
an alchemist. While today’s technicians, unfortunately with their narrow parochial
understanding, are simulacra of the great minds of the past. Alchemists did not impose
their views on others, nor did they demand every society to adhere to their modes of
thought, certainly they also never did find their philosopher’s stone.
In complete contrast, technicians of development have found their own version of
the philosopher’s stone, scientific rationality. They, thereby, demand every society to
adhere or conform to their modes of thought. After all, this is their elixir that will resolve,
decipher, answer numerous afflictions of society. For technicians, it is their principal
purpose to turn traditional societies into developed societies; this is their equivalent of
alchemists’ aim to turn base metals into gold. Alchemists failed in their effort because
metals, be they noble or base, are not human products, rather they are products of nature.
Likewise, technicians fail to learn from the errors of alchemists because societies are not
the product of a few groups of individuals planning what human society ought to be,
rather societies are products of nature where each society acclimatized, in its best
possible ways, to its given milieu. No amount of scientific engineering can bring to fore
what technicians aim to achieve. Technicians have, no doubt, come to accept the
necessity of only one mode of thought, scientific rationality, while relegating others as
irrational superstitions. They genuinely believe in scientific rationality’s benign gifts
conferred onto man; they believe these gifts to be nothing but benefits for societies. Yet,
Blaise Pascal saw such views to be erroneous. For Pascal, the greatest errors of scientific
rationality are not only its failures to recognize any other forms of knowledge, but also its
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failures to recognize the fallibility of the doctrine of the certainty and sovereignty of its
techniques.24
The failure to recognize other modes of thought, which Pascal points to, limits
technicians understanding of human societies. In order to understand any issue, be it
social or natural phenomenon, what is essential is the freedom of thought, to think
independently. It requires freedom of mind to think without any constrain—rigid rules,
methods, standards, theories, rationalities, logic, etc. As Allan Bloom verily notes:
Freedom of the mind requires not only, or not even especially, the absence of
legal constraints but the presence of alternative thoughts. The most successful
tyranny is not the one that uses force to assure uniformity but the one that
removes the awareness of other possibilities, that makes it seem inconceivable
that other ways are viable, that removes the sense that there is an outside. It is
not…commitments that will render a man free, but thoughts, reasoned thoughts…
Real differences come from difference in thought and fundamental principle
(italics added).25
Indeed, the intense zeal with which scientific rationality (and with it the
inevitability of modern progress) is advocated only substantiates the verity of Bloom’s
statement. The developed world as well as technicians’ insistence on only one mode of
thought deemed beneficial for the entire human society, by condemning other modes of
thought and ways of life, is no different from the most successful tyrant who not only, to
borrow Bloom’s words, “removes the awareness of other possibilities,” but also gives the
illusion “that makes it seem inconceivable that other ways are viable.”26 This way the
difference in thoughts and ways of life is negated.
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Without free and difference in thoughts, any social or natural inquest will remain
purposeless without any real meaning. It is only through unconstrained thoughts
unhindered by doctrinal dogmas that inquests can be beneficial not only to societies, but
also to humanity itself. At the very least, it requires societies to be viewed through a
humanistic lens—where societies are accepted as they are with all their complexity. In
the end it is important to have the tenacity to accept the world for what it is. This means
accepting, as Tertullian puts it, “Credo quia Absurdum” (I believe because it is absurd);27
after all, this, in few words, is the humanness of our world.
Truly, it is the absurdities of the world technicians cannot accept. In fact, it is this
absurdity Goethe’s Faust was also unwilling to accept. What technicians are trying to
achieve is no different from what Goethe’s Faust planned on achieving: to rid the world
of needs, wants, cares, and guilt.28 Faust is a German fable in which the protagonist,
Faust, makes a pact with the devil, Mephistopheles, for which he receives infinite
knowledge and other worldly pleasures in exchange for his soul. This fable has been told
many times prior to Goethe’s Faust: Johann Spiess and Christopher Marlowe before, and
Mikhail Bulgakov and Thomas Mann after Goethe. Indeed, Faust has even been put to
music by Hector Berlioz, one of the most original composers of the nineteenth century,
and Franz Liszt, one of the great pianists and composers. Anyone familiar with Faust will
know why it is that this fable is often retold. As human beings, we are all terribly
interested in knowledge that can be utilized to do something good for humanity. This is
Pierre Bühler, “Tertullian: The Teacher of the credo quia absurdum,” in John
Bartley Stewart, eds. Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions (Burlington,
VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 131.
28
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indeed the case in Faust. However, what sets Goethe’s Faust apart from other
incarnations is that in Goethe’s Faust, his desires are not so much with the infinite
knowledge and worldly pleasures in of themselves, but rather, as Marshall Berman
astutely notes, he is, here, infatuated with the notion of self-development as a means to
transform the entire external world.29 With Mephistopheles by his side, Faust goes on to
transform and develop the landscapes, towns, villages, societies, forests, seas. He
harnesses the power of nature by subduing and controlling it. There are immense human
costs, but Faust consciously ignores the evil acts being done (which Mephistopheles
obliges) in order to realize his goals for physical, social, cultural transformations not only
of himself, but also of the entire world. Faust’s project to transform “earth and sea” is
done in order to do good (good defined by Faust) for human society; after all, he has
received infinite knowledge from his pact with Mephistopheles; hence, what point is
there to waste such knowledge.30
He created new living space in the barren wastelands: built harbors and canals for
ships to carry goods, men, and for commerce; they also attract new migrants into the
developing lands thereby creating settlements, towns, cities, and thriving commerce.31 All
these he attains. Yet, at what human costs (after all, human, cultural, societal lives
became obsolete). These human costs are overlooked because Faust always maintained
the possibility to create a new human society, a world devoid of wants, cares, guilt, and
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desires with clean hands.32 No doubt, he has created new and vibrant social systems with
cosmopolitan commerce, high productivity, free economic and individual activities, longdistance trade, but these were, nevertheless, driven by the need for standardized modern
systems that, in their wake, erased the old traditions without a trace.33 Goethe in his Faust
most astutely forewarns us of the inherent destructive features of progress upon man and
nature. As Berman notes, “Ironically, once this developer [Faust] has destroyed the
premodern world, he has destroyed his whole reason for being in the world… [thus]
show[ing] us how the category of obsolete persons, so central to modernity, swallows up
the man who gave it life and power (italics added).”34
An astute reader will find parallels between Faust’s development works and what
technicians of development, today, aim to achieve. The Faustian Geist is a recurring
theme throughout human history: more often than not it involves making a deal, with
devil or, what is termed as, necessary evil, for human good. Truly, every human malaise
is the product of projects aimed at bettering human conditions, just as Faust’s contract
with Mephistopheles. After all, he, more so than any of his preceding incarnation, was
infatuated with bettering the human world by taming the “earth and sea.” Every kind of
human suffering arises in an effort to do something deemed beneficial for human
societies, they do not arise from wanting to make peoples or societies suffer.35 Today,
technicians of development, no doubt, see their role as the facilitators to better human
conditions; however, the results of their effort will be the same as have been for much of
32
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human history: more human suffering, destruction of societies, cultures, values, beliefs,
and expendability of human lives. Perhaps, we as human beings are a threat to ourselves,
for we hardly seem to confer any principal importance to anything or anyone other than
to our own selves.
We, as human beings, for most part of the known human history have been in
quest to create a better human world, but the magnitude and zeal with which today’s
developmental progress is carried out (and believed in) are unprecedented. If one looks
into human histories, one will find no equivalent, in terms of magnitude, to contemporary
societal changes. Indeed, science and technology have much to do with it: with
instantaneous access to media, internet, information, transportation, and so forth. Here,
one could, no doubt, argue man have throughout history shown the tenacity not only to
learn, but also to adjust and thrive under new environmental, social, cultural conditions.
Yet, like everything else in the world, we are bound to exhaust our adaptability, for there
is only so much, or a limit, to how species can adjust.36 This is why since the earliest of
human civilizations, the importance of golden mean has been expressed, always: from
Ancient China (Confucius) to Greece (Aristotle). Human societies have, indeed, adapted
36

Through-out human history there is the recurring theme of exhaustion.
‘Exhaustion’ in which societies are not only unable to rectify existing problems, but are
also unable to solve new problems arising from changing societal—cultural, social,
political, economic—circumstances. Vide, Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West:
Forms and Actuality, vol. 1 (New York, NY: Alfred. A. Knopf, 1980a), and The Decline
of the West: Perspectives of World History, vol. 2 (New York, NY: Alfred. A. Knopf,
1980b); Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, Abridgment of Vol. 1-6 (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1987a), and A Study of History, Abridgment of Vol. 7-10 (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987b); Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz
Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Reinhold Niebuhr, The
Nature and Destiny of Man: Human Nature, vol. 1 (Louisville, KT: Westminster John
Knox Press, 1996a), and The Nature and Destiny of Man: Human Destiny, vol. 2
(Louisville, KT: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996b); Will Durant, and Ariel Durant,
The Lessons of History (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2010).

327
themselves to many changing circumstances, but it is also unavoidable to exhaust their
adjustment ability, after all, there is limit to everything.
Furthermore, ruinations of traditional societies and cultures will no doubt
continue; it will continue not out of malaise intent, but out of innocent, yet misplaced
concern for bettering human societies. Sadly, the Faustian Geist is far too pervasive for
any society to refuse its offers: infinite knowledge, money, power. What is more, the lure
of modernity, development, progress is immense; societies can hardly ever resist such a
lure of material wealth, big houses, vehicles, entertainments, leisure, medical
enhancements of any aspect of human body, material comforts, and so on. This is further
aided by high paced media, information, transportations, and interconnectivity. The
attraction of modernity is far too intense in its scope and presences for any traditional
society to contain itself. In this day and age isolation becomes impossible, when everyday
new isolated societies are being discovered, if not academically examined. Hence,
invariably traditional societies very soon set themselves on their quest to attain the same
things they see or hear though mass media or other information outlets. And who
wouldn’t want to amass personal wealth that gives more freedom to do what one wants.
In the face of such a reality, traditional values of conviviality, nobler forms of poverty,
cooperation, sharing, etc. become too absurd for any descent modern man.37 Indeed, the
37
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more peoples or societies become materially better off, the more they tend to regard with
contempt not only other societies and human beings, but also sneer at the whole of
organic environment on which life depends; they begin to take many essential things for
granted. Yet, this is perhaps only understandable, after all, we as human beings are weak
in temperament, especially towards materiality, hence we have institutionalized states,
places of knowledge, religions and other abstract entities, somethings which we can set
up or put in pedestal, bow down before and offer to them our sacrifices.
Development will go on regardless of human, social, and cultural costs. For the
Faustian Geist is always ready to give assurance about the future benefits that await us
for the price we pay today to attain our ideal human society. Given a chance most people
would want to change the world, yet because we are fallible, even our most munificent
and selfless generous intensions will only kindle more sorrow. One can only commiserate
the humanity at large, for we are indeed pitiable.
No doubt, just as Faust benefited from his contract with Mephistopheles with
knowledge and power, likewise, modern societies have benefited by embracing scientific
rationality: material wealth and riches, modern technological advancements, ease of life
and travel, intense and high paced connectivity, and so forth. Yet, such an embrace is
indissolubly accompanied by consequences not so beneficial for societies, just as Faust
soon discovered about his development projects. Consequences depriving societies of
their essences, of their humanness through economic valuation and mechanization of
society and human lives, intense impersonal and superficial human relations, neurotic

individual self-interests that invariably accompany modern developmental progress.
Differently put, new values, beliefs, etc. provide an avenue for traditional societies to
justify their break from their existing beliefs.
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emphasis on technical efficiencies, uniform organization of human societies, intense
alienation and meaninglessness in peoples’ lives, and numerous other societal
pathologies. In other words, inherent in scientific rationality is its internal logic that leads
to it becoming universal with generalized uniform laws that, in turn, make human
societies and, in fact, the human world, conform to these laws. And this inherent logic, if
you will, to it becoming universal is its impulse to domination. It dominates by
eviscerating other modes of thought, i.e. diversity, and then blankets the whole of human
world with its rationality that in turn adheres to its universal laws. Thus, the logical
product of scientific rationality is uniformity, uniformity among societies, cultures,
rationalities, knowledges, beliefs, etc. Given such a nature of scientific rationality, it is,
therefore, only prudent to have polyphonic forms of thought, based on societies’ diverse
realities affording diverse lenses, from which to view and understand this complex,
indeterminable human world.
What is proposed in this inquest, polyphonic rationality, is not a means to solve
problems of development or to better human conditions. It is only an awareness to show
the humanness of diverse societies and what they have to contribute within the larger
realm of human understanding. Understanding is perhaps the only way to delay the
inevitable fallacies of our own making that endanger the very place on which all life is
contingent.
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